Vietnam War > Dellums Committee Hearings on War Crimes in Vietnam

DELLUMS COMMITTEE HEARINGS ON WAR CRIMES IN VIETNAM
April 25, 1971
Caucus Room, Cannon House Office Bdlg

Special thanks to Peter Ungar for this data contribution

DELLUMS: The hearings will be in order.

I am Congressman Ron Dellums. This is the 1st day of our mornings of hearings that will be conducted in this room between the hours of 9:30 and 12:30. This is the 1st open set of hearings on war atrocities in Indochina.

We introduced back on 3-1 of this year House Joint Resolution [HJR] 409, cosponsored by 21, fellow Congressmen.

We asked for action by the Rules Committee on this resolution and none was forthcoming. All of us are very interested in full, official hearings into the potential of war atrocities in Indochina, but receiving no action from the RULES COMMITTEE or the leadership of the Congress, we proceeded to try to plan as completely and capably as we could with these ad hoc hearings.

I would like to introduce on my far left Congressman Reuss, who has joined us this morning, Congressman Riegle from Michigan, Congressman Don Edwards from California, Congressman Badillo from New York, Congressman Frank Ryan of New York; to my immediate right Cngwmn Bella Abzug of New York, Congressman Parren Mitchell from Baltimore, Congressman John Conyers from Michigan, Congressman Seiberling from Ohio.

Are there Congressmen who have any opening statements that they would like to make this morning? Congressman Mitchell.

MITCHELL: We have begun hearings today to investigate the military policy used in Vietnam which appears to us to foster war crimes. We are concerned with such schemes as free-fire zones, search and destroy missions, mass resettlement of peasantry and the so-called "bodycount mania." Since the Dept of Defense [DOD] acknowledges the use of these tactics, we wish to illustrate graphically what happens when such tactics are translated into action. Vietnam has been called the ultimate model war of attrition where civilians die by the score for every combat soldier killed. Our interest here is in the suspect military policy, not in uncovering war tames, but it is likely that we shall hear testimony as repugnant to the nat'l conscience as My Lai.

We do not do so to demean the military or to undermine the nat'l confidence, but we must bring the nature of the Vietnam war home to the American people, for it is they in the final analysis who must reject and end it.

The men who testify before us, and I know some of them personally, display great courage, and we commend them. In order to speak about these atrocities they have discarded careers and jeopardized their future security. but they speak out of a deep moral conviction that demands respect.

This nation will be shocked by what it hears, but America will be better for having heard it. We call upon our fellow Congressman to attend these sessions and to learn from what is said here. The people are war-weary and the Congress must assert its constitutional prerogative to end the longest war in history.

This Congress has had chance after chance to end the war, and we have not done it. Hopefully these hearings in combination with all the other pressures that can be exerted, hopefully, we will then force the Congress to act and to cause it to end this bloody and immoral war in which we have been so long engaged. Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CONYERS: The statement that I would have made has been ably made by my by my colleague from Maryland. So I will only make 2 points. 1st of all, I want to emphasize that this Congress has displayed a complete lack of moral responsibility and legislative integrity in not having the courage to openly look at the actions that we are forced to do as an ad hoc committee through the failure of anyone to act on the Joint Resolution 409 or to have hearings under 1 of the several committees that this could have been done under the rules of the House. 2dly, Mr Chairman, I want to personally commend you as a freshman member of this body for under taking this very, very important responsibilities.

DELLUMS: Thank you. Cngwmn Mink from Hawaii, 2d from my far right, has just joined us, and we welcome you. Congressman Seiberling.

SEIBERLING: Yes. Today we are beginning 4-day hearings of ad hoc public hearings on policy and command responsibility for war atrocities in Vietnam. I think this forum is necessary because today, despite requests by a number of members of Congress, including myself, there have been no official hearings.

The central question to which this series of hearings must address itself is simply stated by Telford Taylor, chief counsel for the prosecution at the Nuremburg Trials, in his book, "Nuremburg and Vietnam-An American Tragedy", and I would like to read a key paragraph of that book. "The 1956 Army Manual provides explicitly that a military commander is responsible not only for the criminal acts in pursuance of his orders but is also responsible if he has actual knowledge or should have knowledge that troops or other persons subject to his control are about to commit or have committed a war crime and he fails to take the necessary and reasonable steps to insure compliance with the law of war or to punish violations thereof." The purpose of these hearings is not to discredit our military services, but 1st to determine whether there were widespread violations of law by the American military with respect to the treatment of civilians and POWs and, if so, to pinpoint responsibility for such violation.

I might say parenthetically that 1 of the chief reasons so many Americans are disturbed by the decision of Lieutenant [LT] Calley's case was that it appeared that after all the terrible events and possible crimes and atrocities in Vietnam that 1 single LT was being made criminally responsible for the entire armed services and indeed for the entire country. Obviously it is vital to bring justice not to just minor officials but those responsible at whatever level of command it may be.

Neither the military services nor the nation should have to face the world under a cloud of suspicion. The best way to prevent this is to get the facts and to take what ever action is necessary to correct the deficiencies which may have led to such violations.

1 of the most shocking and depressing aspects of the disclosures of the German atrocities after World War II was the fact that so few citizens in that great nation raised their voices in protest or even took pains to learn the truth. This is understandable in a people living under the grip of a totalitarian regime; it is unthinkable in a human and civilized democracy. We must know the truth before we can deal effectively with our nations problems.

If I could borrow a single biblical phrase to cover our nation's needs in this difficult time, it would be, "You shall know the truth and the truth shall set you free." Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

DELLUMS: This morning we will look at policy and command responsibility, and we have with us 5 West Point graduates, 4 captains and a major. We also have Capt O'mera, who is not a West Point grad, who will be a corroborating witness with 1 of our capt's, Capt Bartek. Our 1st witness this morning will be Capt Fred Laughlin.

Statement of Fred Laughlin, Capt, US Army, West Point, Class of 1965, Bethesda, MD LAUGHLIN: I graduated in 1965, spent 5 years in the service, 2 1/2 years in infantry, 1 year in Vietnam as a company commander and as a platoon leader.

I was a 1st LT.

I would like my testimony to center more on the distortions of war and my examples to be more illustrative than shocking. I would like to give 3 examples and hope that I can--I, we can--draw something from it. When I arrived in Vietnam in 1966, in October, I was sent to a jungle warfare school in Lai Khe. Lai Khe is on the northeastern tip of the eastern triangle. I spent a week in the jungle warfare school being taught the way it really was in Vietnam by non-commissioned officers [NCO's], some of whom had been in battle themselves. At the time the BODY COUNT idea pretty will hit the military in Vietnam, and we were taught at the jungle school, that it is very important to get BC. There is a big difference between BODY COUNT and so-called killed in action [KIA].

It is very important to verify some member of the body, particularly the ears.

The ears seemed to be the favorite in order to report validly a BC. This was not promulgated officially. It could not be, of course. but this was taught in the school and it was clear to a what the sergeant [Sgt] was talking about. and these people were blank pages when they came to Vietnam, They had no idea what was coming off. I did not. I was supposed to be educated. I did not know. As far as I knew, he was giving me the straight story. The 2d example that I would like to give of the distortions in Vietnam occurred during my 2d month in Vietnam as a platoon leader. VC had reportedly run into a village, a village not unlike my Lai. We surrounded the village with our platoon and began to seal it off in the typical manner. Civilians were pouring out of the village at the time. It was late in the evening. All of a sudden, with no warning, the platoon opened up on the civilians. It was their job to keep the civilians in, and God knows where they got the order.

I was in charge, completely. By the time I could get the firing stopped, which seemed like an hour--it was probably 30 seconds--1 man was shot in the back, an old Vietnamese. We picked the man up and took him back to base camp, which was not far from civilization. It was about a 2 minutes' helicopter ride from Du Lai. The man was clearly bleeding internally and didn't have long to go. I wasn't a doctor, but that was pretty clear. I reported this to my company command, said that we needed immediate evacuation, and there was none forthcoming. The man died about 5 the next morning.

The 3d example I would like to give has to do with the distortions of a different type. It occurred late in my Vietnam tour when I was company commander, just south of the Cambodian border, about 25 miles north of Tay Ninh. It was called the battle of Prec Loc. the battle of Prec Loc is probably the only claim to fame that the 2d Battalion [Bn], 2d Infantry, had at the time, and, of course, these are things that people like to cherish: battles.

The battle of Prec Loc occurred late in the summer of 1967. The perimeter that we had, and it was 2 companies, was attacked by supposedly a regmt of enemy troops. The battle waged throughout the thing. The brigade [Bgd] commander was over my head, and over his head was a helicopter, over his head was the asst division [div] commander, the div commander was over his head and God knows who was over his head, and it was really terrific. It was just the thing you want when you are in battle.

During the night in radio conversation after the battle lulled, there was a wager made by 1 of the company commanders, the A Company commander to the C Company commander, as to who would find the most bodies out in front of their positions, a case of beer, as a matter of fact. The next morning they went out to police up the bodies. The A Company commander had 8 and the C Company commander had 5, for a total of 13, as I recall. The asst div commander landed his helicopter, surveyed the situation. It was clear to him there were 13 bodies in front of the position. He proclaimed by some strange way that I will never be able to figure out that there were 197 bodies, and that is what was printed in the paper the next day.

Now, the distortions that I described here, and I think it is pretty clear what they are, run across the board, and are a result of some type of immoral template that seems to be superimposed on the whole world in Vietnam--the whole horror, aberration, aspect, concept. These same distortions caused the general, 1 of the members of my platoon, and a Sgt at the general school, the same distortions that seem to be causing Americans to shrug now, and perhaps this is the greatest price for America.

The way I feel about it is the term "war crimes" is a bit of a misnomer itself, in that war seems to be a repudiation of all laws except those that are sanctioned by bodies. I think that America needs to undergo a bout with reality, which I hope you people can do during these hearings, for in the long run America is the one, not the people who fought in Vietnam, not the Calley's, not the Westmorelands, but America is the 1 in the long run who bas to carry this stigma. Thank you for your time. If you have any questions, I would be glad to answer them.

DELLUMS: Thank you, Capt Laughlin. I appreciate your testimony. I have 1 question I would like to ask. From where do you understand the policies that you have enumerated to come?

LAUGHLIN: I don't know. They seem to permeate throughout Vietnam, and I could not associate them with any particular source. I think they seem to be a major component of war. You are going to have these policies if you are going to have war.

DELLUMS: We will be operating under the 5-minute rule. Congressman Ryan?

RYAN: I was gratified by everything you said, Capt, and I think you have very well stated the necessity for the American people to examine themselves and the role it plays in Vietnam by representatives of the American people.

1 thing that struck me, and that was your reference to the wounded villager, that you asked he be evacuated and wasn't evacuated. Did you find or do you believe on the basis of your experience that we in Vietnam value less the lives of the Vietnamese than other lives? Did you find there was a certain amount of waste implicit in the attitude stated toward the Vietnamese?

LAUGHLIN: I would have to say we certainly valued American lives over Vietnamese.

However, I could certainly not go so far as to say the Vietnamese lives were valueless. I am afraid I can't answer it any further than that.

RYAN: How prevalent was the practice of measure the BODY COUNT by the evidence of an ear? Was that a prevalent practice? As you went from the jungle school into the field, did you find that practice prevailing?

LAUGHLIN: My units never took up this practice, and I don't now how many did.

The fact that it was promulgated in jungle warfare school I think is indicative of the feeling at the time: Okay, yes, we can't put out official policy to cut off people's ears. Our unit was guilty of throwing dead bodies on our APCs until it came down as a policy that we couldn't throw dead bodies under the APCs and parade them through town any more. That was a policy that was stopped about 3/4's through my tour. But the severing of members, I never saw it, but I heard it. It was a definite, informal, unwritten policy.

RYAN: Was the BODY COUNT exaggeration of finding 197 when there was actually 13, was that typical of the way the count was reported in your experience?

LAUGHLIN: In my opinion it was. I think the body count was used as a measure of success in Vietnam, a measure of a general's, a commander's success. They made every opportunity to get the BC.

RYAN: Thank you.

DELLUMS: Congressman Badillo?

BADILLO: The 2d incident that you mentioned where there was unauthorized firing upon the villagers, were you the platoon leader at that time?

LAUGHLIN: Yes.

BADILLO: Did you stress afterwards as to why there was an unauthorized firing on these villagers?

LAUGHLIN: No. I did not.

BADILLO: Why not?

LAUGHLIN: I don't know.

RYAN: Did it happen again?

LAUGHLIN: It did not.

REUSS: When did this incident with respect to the enemy BODY COUNT of the Able and Charlie companies occur?

LAUGHLIN: I think it was Junction City II, up Route 4 in later summer 1967.

I don't know the exact dates. I am sure the annals of the 2d Bn, 2d Infantry, will give the exact date. I would have to guess maybe the middle of September or late August.

REUSS: and these were companies A and C of the 2d Bn of the 2d Infantry regiment?

LAUGHLIN: Yes.

REUSS: and what Bgd and corps were they?

LAUGHLIN: I don't remember the Bgd that handled the operation. It was a multi-Bn operation where they are put under operational control of a Bgd commander. I don't remember which Bgd had operational control at that time.

REUSS: and you were a platoon leader in what company?

LAUGHLIN: I was the B company commander.

LAUGHLIN: Yes.

REUSS: and did you have an opportunity to observe personally the incident you described?

LAUGHLIN: I was commanding the fire base which was about a 1/2 mile from the incident and attended a staff meeting the next morning where the weapons and all the spoils were displayed from the battle. I did not participate directly in the battle that night, although there were minor skirmishes around our perimeter as a result of the battle.

REUSS: Who was the asst div commander who made the enlarged BODY COUNT that you described?

LAUGHLIN: It was a man by the name of General Hollingsworth.

REUSS: What is your source for saying he made this high BC?

LAUGHLIN: During the staff meeting the Bn commander told us at the time that it was the asst div commander's feeling that there were at least 197 bodies or 197 people killed. At that time it became very clear that was the number of people that were killed. Part of the reason I think was the Vietnamese supposedly have a habit of dragging away their dead bodies, and they found so much blood on the perimeters and somehow that gets translated into bodies. It was all quite creditable at the time.

REUSS: That is your source for saying that in fact body a total of 13 bodies were found in front of companies A and C?

LAUGHLIN: That again was a staff meeting. It was put out that 13 bodies were found. The case of beer was delivered by the man who lost the bet, and the score was tallied, and at that time even though the score had been tallied 8 to 5, the Bn commander said well, it is 197 because the asst div commander had proclaimed so.

REUSS: I am not sure I understand it. Did the Bn commander say at the Bn officer's staff meeting, 1, that the actual count was 8 and 5 or 13; and, 2, that the asst div'nal commander is claiming a count of more than 100?

LAUGHLIN: Yes, sir, to both questions.

REUSS: Did he by word or facial indication give any impression of what he thought of the discrepancy between those 2 figures?

LAUGHLIN: At the time, as I said, it was quite creditable. We all longed for success, and people in that type of situation, I would say, would tend to believe anything like that. It made us look good, and we were very happy to say 197 members were killed and somehow managed to forget there were only 13 bodies lying in front of the perimeter. There seemed to be no tongue in cheek, no raised eyebrows.

REUSS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

DELLUMS: Cngwmn Abzug?

ABZUG: I was interested in your statement that you reported to the commanding officer [CO] the existence of this wounded Vietnamese and there was no attention paid to it. What steps did you take with respect to that? Laughlin: I reported to him personally. I reported to him over the telephone that the man needed attention. I reported later that the man needed more than just attention, that he needed to be evacuated. The commander said that they couldn't get a chopper in to evacuate a Vietnamese. So, my medic and myself stayed up with the man and did what we could for him and he lost consciousness early in the morning and died shortly thereafter.

ABZUG: Did you have obvious experiences or other experiences with respect to the handling of wounded civilians or Vietnamese? If you did, would you describe what practice was with respect to there treatment and handling?

LAUGHLIN: All other experiences that I had occurred in a village called Thanh Phu Khan, where our company was in charge of the security. It was supposedly a VC village that had been pacified. We had a great deal of association with the civilians and had built up what 1 might call an affinity. All other experience that I had with civilians had been very favorable, very good. There were a few shrapnel wounds or a stray shot or something like that went on, and it was readily attended to at the time. This was the 1st incident that I thought 1 would call out of the ordinary with my experiences. I didn't mean to go around the question. I just hadn't had any experience up to that time.

DELLUMS: Congressman Mitchell?

MITCHELL: I have a theory that the war crimes have an impact on the lives of Americans, those who committed and participated in or witnessed the war crimes, that it is impactual on their lives once they return. Under my theory it seems to me that we can break some returning veterans into 2 categories.

In the 1 category the veteran who has learned to accept violence, and, therefore, assumes a kind of hatred, disgust, and suspicion of people who are not white Anglo-Saxon partisans, the kind of thing that Calley was reported to have said from the witness stand by telling people and didn't regard them as human beings." that is 1 category.

In the other category it seems to me we would find some veterans who have been so torn, so traumatized by the experience that their own personal value system has been severely disrupted.

I shall ask each witness during these hearings to comment on both of those categories in terms of their own personal lives. What has this done to you, in terms of violence, how you regard other than white Anglo-Saxon partisans?

What has it done to you in terms of your value system?

LAUGHLIN: I find the experience in Vietnam has made me more aware of my value system, number one.? Possibly a lot of people don't think about the questions, never have been asked the questions. I can't say I however been asked the questions quite that way.

But by making myself aware of the value system, I constantly take a harder look at it, and try to setup my priorities based on the experiences to establish a value system that I think would be contributory to society, that would contribute to America as I see it.

What that all means is, A, I don't feel that my opinions toward people of another color or another race really have changed very much from when I went over there; B, I think that my attitude toward violence has changed quite a bit in that I put a stigma on the term violence, whether it is in defense or fighting against Pres Nixon or anything else. I think that violence has the stigma regardless of the truth, the objective that one is seeking.

Finally, I just think that I am more receptive to ideas as a result of my experience, because I felt Vietnam, I a felt it was right. I didn't flinch when people talked about cutting off ears. I didn't flinch at the battle of Prec Loc when people said there were 197 and not 13. So I have to be less quick to judge everybody. On the other hand, I feel that my own set of values, as I mentioned earlier, have been more closely scrutinized.

DELLUMS: Cngwmn Mink.

MINK: Thank you very much, Mr Chairman. During the Calley trial, there was reported in the papers that 1 of the underlying considerations throughout the trial was a so-called unwritten policy established by the military authorities referred to as MGR. Are you familiar with what policy?

LAUGHLIN: I never heard it expressed in that way. I don't feel that I have.

I have heard aspects of it.

MINK: In what way did you hear it expressed?

LAUGHLIN: What does MGR mean?

MINK: Mere Gook Rule.

LAUGHLIN: There were a lot of people over there who felt that people were mere gooks. that is about as ar as I can go. We had incidents where civilians were killed or injured, and there was this hope of apathy.

MINK: In issuing any orders to you and the superiors' issuance of any orders to you, was there any reference to such a policy?

LAUGHLIN: None.

MINK: No?

LAUGHLIN: No.

MINK: How do you know then that there was an unexpressed, unwritten understanding of the existence of such notions on the part of the military there in Vietnam?

LAUGHLIN: Talking. I spent 11 months on the line in Vietnam, 1 month in the hospital, and I got to know the people over there pretty well, the Americans.

And that is What I base my comment as to the aspects of the MGR, not based upon any official policy or official word that was passed down. It was based upon my feelings in talking with the people, with the Americans.

MINK: Would you say that such a notion that Vietnamese were not human or something less than human was a general understanding, generally held by most of the military personnel in Vietnam?

LAUGHLIN: It depended a great deal on the unit. the unit that relieved us had just come from the north themselves, and that was the general feeling of that unit. as a matter of fact, the 1st month they were there after they relieved us there were a number of Vietnamese killed as a result of very gross errors.

there was just no consideration to the civilians. However, in our unit, it was a different story. I felt that most of my unit considered the Vietnamese human. On the other hand, there was a marked contrast in the units.

MINK: In describing the attitudes of the unit, were you a live witness to any incidents that would verify your impression of their attitudes?

LAUGHLIN: Yes, I was.

MINK: Would you describe those incidents which you were a live witness to?

LAUGHLIN: there was 1 incident where a man was supposedly clearing his rifle and he put a little boy in his sight and killed him. I was riding by at the time and didn't see the incident. I heard a shot. As a matter of fact, I sat on the court martial and the man I think was given 6 months and he was let off over there, he was fined or something. It was very minor. This was another unit. Another incident, the night we were to leave, they assumed part of the perimeter, and we had become used to the habits pretty much of the city it wasn't a city it was a village - and 1 of the Vietnamese got up in the middle of the night to go use the bathroom or the toilet which is outside over there - only the generals have flush toilets over there--and he was shot down and killed by this other unit, where I think had it been our unit, we would have been used to the people and we knew what was coming off in the village and bad gone to fairly great lengths--this was the result again of our commander. Colonel Kahn I think was an excellent commander and went out of his way to associate with the people. The man was killed and buried a couple of days later and we left the village in the hands of these people, in the hands of this other unit. Regretfully we did.

MINK: Thank you, Mr Chairmen.

DELLUMS: Congressman Seiberling.

SEIBERLING: In this incident about the man who was shot in the back, it isn't quite clear a me whether the COs deliberately declined to call up any chopper to evacuate the man or whether you just don't know what was available.

LAUGHLIN: I don't know where the denial occurred. I wish I did. I wish I would have had the gumption to find out at the time. I can't quote verbatim what he told me except that no chopper was available, and there was some reference to the fact that the man was a Vietnamese, something to the effect that there was no chopper available for a Vietnamese or a civilian or that type of thing.

This seemed to me to be very strange, because we were using a chopper at the time in our operation, and the S-2 at the tune was flopping around above doing something, I don't know what he was doing. but it would not have hurt to drop down and pick up the man and spend 2 minutes a take him to the hospital, and in 2 minutes the S-2 could be back up.

SEIBERLING: What you are saying is, I gather this is why the incident sticks in your mind, to you a chopper could have been made available and there was some sort of at least callousness on the part of the CO?

LAUGHLIN: Yes, sir, no question about that.

SEIBERLING: We are faced with somewhat of a dilemma here, because it seems to me it is important to pinpoint the facts as much as possible and at the same time try to get some impression as to whether there was a general atmosphere of lack of concern about possible crimes against civilians or at least failure to live up to our legal obligations and our moral obligations, and 2dly, whether there was a general knowledge on the part of people at all levels of command as to these conditions that we bring up or we can bring up such lack of concern. To what extent do you feel qualified to generalize; as to the general knowledge among all of the military people that incidents of the kind that you saw and other incidents that you may not have seen were going on?

LAUGHLIN: I certainly don't feel qualified in generalizing. That is 1 of the problems that the Administration is having, probably 1 of the problems that commissions of this type would be having. I hope, as you point out, that we do in this exercise get down to the facts, not be guilty of generalizing, and I hope from my testimony that I was. You can certainly go from my experience and say this is my opinion; on the other hand, this is what I saw.

SEIBERLING: I want to commend you for your courageous statement and your very carefully sticking to the precise facts. That helps us a great deal.

DELLUMS: Thank you, Captain Laughlin. We deeply appreciate your coming forward this morning and aiding us in these hearings. I know I speak for myself and the rest of my colleagues. We appreciate your coming forth.

Our 2d witness is Mr Gordon Livingston, who achieved the rank of major, rgmntal surgeon for the 11th Cavalry Regiment in Southeast Asia.

DR. GORDON LIVINGSTON Major, U.S.Army, West Point, Class of 1960. Baltimore, Maryland DR. LIVINGSTON: Thank you. I think that we ought to take a very broad perspective in terms of what we are trying to do here today, aid in doing so I think that perhaps some generalizations can be drawn from our total experience. In a sense, a of us in this room, in a sense all Americans, are vets of this war and victims of it. Our cities are decaying; our children reject us; and there is violence in the land from both the left ald the right. I think that we who have been in Vietnam can bring you some sense and some of the specifics of what we have seen, but I do think the general conclusions to be drawn are valuable, and I won't hesitate to both draw and defend those here.

1st of all, the question of attitude on the part of Americans toward the Vietnamese people, I think is absolutely critical to any understanding of what we have done, whether we are talking about the war as a whole or individual atrocities.

The attitude of Americans toward the Vietnamese is 1 of very nearly universal contempt. This is expressed in a variety of ways ranging from the indiscriminate destruction of lives and property to the more casual references to the Vietnamese, friends and enemy alike, as gook or slope or dink, because once the dehumanization necessary to apply terms like that to another human being has occurred, then you are on your way to My Lai. I think there was very little sense, virtually none, expressed on the part of any veterans of that war that I know at the My Lai disclosures in 1969. As some examples in my experience of this dehumanization, they are almost too numerous to list, but I will give you some examples. my unit, as I said, was the 11th Armored Cavalry Rgmnt and commanded by General George S Patton, III. The emphasis in the unit, since it was a professional unit and by military professionals, was obviously heavily weighted toward those things which would advance the professional future of the officers therein, specifically General Patton, and, therefore, placed heavy emphasis on maintaining and exploiting contacts with the enemy and on achieving a high BC.

In all fairness, I think I should say as far as I know the major distortions in the BODY COUNT in our unit consisted of those who were reported killed by air, that is, there were no instances so far as I know in our unit where the BODY COUNT of the unit was distorted. There was great meticulousness to make sure it was accurate, but in the instance, for example, of helicopter pilots engaging people on the ground where it was impossible to count the bodies, particularly at night, the exaggerations were tremendous.

That is, 1 would hear of a company of North Vietnamese being wiped out by a helicopter and there would be a BODY COUNT of 100 or 150 and in the morning there would be no blood trails.

So there was obviously a distortion. but in terms of what this meant, this tremendous dedication to destruction and so on, I think it was never more evident than the night when Colonel Patton, then Colonel Patton, at the nightly briefing, said to his staff and this was at a time when he was getting some publicity in the press and on TV for his dedication to pacification, and in fact was quoted on ABC-TV as saying that pacification is my most important mission. He was able, however, to say to his staff, of which I was a member as the regimental surgeon, he was able to say the current ratio of 10% pacification to 90% killing is just about right.

That was clearly in his career what was being rewarded, and obviously this was going to be a determining factor in his behavior. In terms of the attitude award the Vietnamese, I think 1 was struck during the time of the Calley trial and during the disclosures that various members of that platoon made by the absence of in will expressed toward the Vietnamese. I think it was striking. In fact, LT Calley himself referred to the atrocity as being no big deal, and used an interesting euphemism for the word killed, which I think showed how nicely he could separate himself from it by using the term waste, we wasted the civilians. 1 does not waste human beings. 1 wastes insects, that is, things that are of absolutely no consequence. So what is staling in that attitude and in the attitude of the high majority, above 90% of the Americans with whom I had contact in Vietnam, was just this contempt, and this includes the highest ranking officer with whom I had to deal, in this case being regimental commander. An example of the distinction drawn between American and Vietnamese life, for example, just before I joined the unit, 1 of the helicopter pilots flying what was euphemistically described as a low-level reconnaissance ran down and killed with his helicopter skids 2 Vietnamese women who were riding bicycles on the roads, to give some idea of how low level that reconnaissance was. He was temporarily grounded and I had the opportunity to speak with him about that as the surgeon, and there was complete absence of any feeling other than regret that he was not drawing his flight pay, and interesting in terms of the official action taken was the fact that he was totally exonerated by a board of inquiry and returned to active flight duty. In fact, whether to describe that as intentional murder or as an accident, I think misses the point, that what is expressed there is not any particular murderous intent but just a total lack of caring about whether anything happened or not. It was routine for the pilots flying north across the Danang River, as the phrase goes, to "flat hat" the Vietnamese who were pulling their sampans along the river.

Usually the Vietnamese acted with sufficient alacrity to escape death, but not always. The business of helicopter evacuation that Fred referred to struck a responsive note. I have 2 examples of that in my experience. I was in the village in I Corps visiting with the Marines, and 1 night 7 Vietnamese were wounded by a grenade. 1 was killed and the others were wounded. There were 2 who had perforating abdominal wounds and I had virtually no facilities at my disposal to great them. It was then midnight ald I thought it was unlikely that 1 of them would survive until morning, and I requested a helicopter for their evacuation. The only question at the other end was, are there any marines wounded. When we replied in the negative, I was refused on the grounds that it was an insecure landing zone [LZ] and they would not come in.

It was perfectly obvious to me, based on experience, that mission would have been flown for a wounded American. Another example occurred in our regiment outside 1 of our night defensive positions where there was fire fight, and this was in a village a mile or so away from an American position, and 1 of the wounded was an American chaplain's asst who, as you all know, is noncombatant who was shot through the chest and somehow the message was mistransmitted so that the helicopter pilot understood that the wounded was VC.

The pilot refused to come into the LZ, and while he was being transported overland to a more secure LZ, he died.

An interesting example, 1 might call it a case of mistaken identity.

Wounded Americans, as you know, are flown directly to large military hospitals with full surgical facilities. In my unit it was the practice to fly wounded VC and NV to regimental command posts for questioning before they could be evacuated, and it was my responsibility as surgeon to provide whatever medical care I could with very limited facilities at my disposal to them while they were awaiting that evacuation.

This brought me to a constant conflict with the regimental St-2 or intelligence officer in the unit, who was virtually never satisfied that he had achieved all the information possible from the POW, and it was only by the flat statement that the POW was likely to die in front of him that I was able to achieve evacuation.

I took this problem with one badly wounded POW directly to Col Patton in the hopes that his intercession would allow me to evacuate this man who I felt very badly that he needed surgery. Patton's reply was a flat statement, which I remember very well, that my job was just to keep that man alive for a few moments so he could be questioned, and after that he could die, it didn't matter to him.

The pervasiveness of the attitude of the Americans over there is, I think, the key to this understanding. That is, what I am trying to do is not point to General Patton as an ogre or somehow uncharacteristic. I am trying to illustrate that the attitude is so widespread that there are none of us here in this room sitting comfortably talking about this issue who faced with the situation themselves could, I believe, with certainty, predict how they would react.

I was never more impressed by this than by the involvement that I found within MITCHELL: You actually never witnessed that?

LIVINGSTON: I actually never witnessed that, although there have certainly been a number of people at various tribunals who have testifyed that they have. There is no doubt of its existence in my mind.

DELLUMS: Congressman Conyers.

CONYERS: I want to comment, Major Livingston, that your statement has been more helpful in putting this in perspective than any I have heard before or during these hearings so ar, and I am impressed with the insight that you have shown about bringing the American people to a fuller realization that it is more than a matter of relating fatalities and the incidents and so forth and so on. I think this committee, by virtue of its being formed, is trying to raise the level of intelligence of the Congress, of government, and, of course, most importantly, the American people. So I see in your testimony an element of courage, and I think it gives us the encouragement required to honestly view this. We are not dealing really in secret matters that need to be revealed in great detail or that we have to go around pretending that there is a question of fact as to whether or not there are these kinds of things going on in Vietnam, and indeed probably have gone on in all wars.

The real question that this committee poses is to ask ourselves as citizens, as human beings, isn't it time we faced the hell of war, isn't it time we adjust ourselves to the fact that war itself is a crime, and can't we as a people muster the courage to say and ultimately do something about it? It is in that sense that I am deeply grateful for your testimony.

LIVINGSTON: Thank you.

DELLUMS: Cngwmn Mink.

MINK: I have just 1 question. In your description of the physical torture of these Vietnamese, do you know of any instance in which the superior officers made any effort to stop this practice and to restore sanity to the level at which these activities were being conducted?

LIVINGSTON: Yes, sure. In the instance that I cited, when sufficient question was raised with the acting regimental commander who was present at that operation, it was stopped. However, I think it is significant that it was stopped on the basis that it was an unproductive method of interrogation rather than with any sense of it being immoral or inhuman or a violation of the laws of land warfare.

Yes, sure, I think particularly in those instances in which publicity is an issue, that is, if the press are present or if there is any indication that this might get out, there are efforts and there are lots of noise made about treating the civilians humanly. In fact, every American, when he arrives in Vietnam, is given a small card of, I guess, 11 rules on what not to do to Vietnamese and to POW's and so on. What is bizarre is the dichotomy, the difference between our protestations of what we are doing there and what our intentions are as opposed to what is actually being done. This is the thing I found so striking.

So it does no good a say we are there to insure the Vietnamese people the right of self-determination a in act we are killing them in large; numbers and destroying their society and displacing them and so on. The absurdity, for example, of dropping 5 million tons of bombs on a country that we are attempting to defend, I think is so patently obvious that only by an intense denial of what has happened can we be persuaded to live with this. So what I think is so prominent in the alienation of the young people today is, perhaps less accustomed or less indoctrinated in the ways of a technological society, they have looked upon Vietnam and seen not only the moral corruption it represents but its essential absurdity, and so have reacted against it less intellectually than just sort of visually.

I think in doing that they have taught us all a lesson in politics, and also a lesson in ends and means, perhaps, that 1 defends himself not by the ends he promotes but by the means he uses.

I think all this has been illustrated for us in Vietnam, but has direct application to this country, and I would hope we would learn from it.

MINK: Thank you very much.

DELLUMS: Congressman Seiberling.

SEIBERLING: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Have you any evidence, Major, that Colonel Patton's attitude was shared by other officers of similarly high position?

LIVINGSTON: I can say that certainly we were visited regularly by General Abrams. It is very interesting if you are fascinated by military dynasties, it is quite interesting to note that General Abrams was a company commander of General Patton, and Colonel Patton achieved command of the 11th Armored Cavalry Rgmnt, which was the only independently operating regiment in Vietnamthis was a plum -largely through the intercession of General Abrams, who is now his patron. Colonel Patton had his set of patrons, his set of up-andcoming young officers in the unit who reflected his society.

General Abrams was a frequent visitor to the unit. I never heard General Abrams sanction anything that could be described as a war crime, but he certainly complimented the unit frequently on its BC, and he came to award General Patton a Distinguished Service Cross for gallantry.

We were under the operat'l control of the 1st Div, and certainly the div commander came down frequently and complimented the unit on what it was doing.

So, I think that what is important in psychological terms, people perform in a way that is reinforced, and What was reinforced in that unit was a dedication to destruction. So, when I would say to get a helicopter, for example, for, let's say, a young Vietnamese boy with a cleft palate to get him evacuated where that could be treated, you know, the priority with which that mission was treated was I think very strong evidence of what we were really about there. So it is very broad.

SEIBERLING: I would like to get back to my specific question, and maybe I could raise it this way. You see, it is very possible when General Patton sad your job is to keep those POWs alive only long enough to have them interrogated and then let them die, that this is a direct violation of the Army manual which makes the CO responsible for observing the Articles of War and the other obligations to protect civilians and wounded POWs and so forth.

So, that is 1 issue.

But what I am concerned about is not only did it happen in this case, but whether this was the attitude of other COs of similar or higher ranks. It just seems to me this is the crux of this whole hearing. I am interested not in the philosophical overtones of it for purposes of this hearing, although I am interested in them as a legislator, but I am interested in whether or not Patton's attitude was typical and, if so, whether or not you have some other evidence of that.

LIVINGSTON: Well, no, not specifically, except in the sense that--I never heard another officer of equivalent rank make a statement like that about the treatment of POWs, nor did I hear that specifically sanctioned by any of Patton's superior officers, no. But the fact looking operationally at what has happened, it is obvious what the attitude was. but I have no more specific information about that.

SEIBERLING: On these atrocities of POW's and similar atrocities, to what extent were such incidents not made the subject of specific Army inquiry or court-martial? In other words, we have had some testimony about inquiries such as the helicopter pilot who ran down the 2 women. If it was invariably the practice to investigate all such incidents and have an official inquiry and possible court-martial, then to that extent the higher-ups were performing their obligations. But it was not the general policy to do that, then we have dereliction possibly, and I would like to get your feelings as to what the normal policy was on this type of situation.

LIVINGSTON: Well, the normal policy was simply not to investigate. Most of the incidents which would be described as war crimes and so on would occur at a relatively low level. There may or may not be senior officers somewhere in the vicinity flying overhead and so on. But the impulse both to cover up anything that might prove embarrassing, again with career motivations, or perhaps even more strikingly the impulse to ignore or not investigate possible explosive kinds of things like that is very great indeed.

Again, it is characteristic not just of the large US Army, but any large bureaucracy. Obviously, there is no future in a 1st LT reporting that an adjutant unit has committed a war crime. There is nothing in it for him except perhaps a good deal of trouble.

I think if 1 examines the whole history of the exposure of the My Lai incident, 1 sees this thread of covering up running through, which makes some sense in terms of the individuals concerned but very little in terms of the war.

SEIBERLING: So What you are saying is the system itself tends to discourage the assumption of responsibility for preventing this sort of thing?

LIVINGSTON: Yes. In other words, the system is so large and so well organized that even an individual who finds what is happening to be morally repugnant in some way is led to question his own values. This is true of anybody in a pathological association environment. The question always raises, am I crazy or i going on here crazy? when it is so large and so we organized as it is in Vietnam, it is very hard for an individual to assert himself.

SEIBERLING: If you were organizing the Army in the light of what has happened, have you any thoughts as to how we could restructure things and redo directives right down to the rank and the so that we would force incidents of this type to be reported and responsibilities to be assumed to correct this before they get out of hand?

LIVINGSTON: No, because what you are doing there is focusing on things like procedures, you see, or you are focusing on-you know, deal have been some proposals that what we need is more training in the laws of land warfare at West Point or more training in basic training so that people don't do this.

But you accept my hypothesis, which is what we are doing there is in no way different than what we do everywhere, then, obviously, the problem lies much deeper. The problem is not a lecture that you give somebody saying it is wrong to kill civilians. The problem is by the time the young men get to Vietnam, they are well accustomed to dehumanizing other people, and when we step off that plane and hear the civilians referred to as gooks and see how technologically underdeveloped they are and develop a contempt for them and so on, then the problem is not within the organization, it is not an organizat'l issue, the problem is very much within what one might call the consciousness of the people who are participating.

SEIBERLING: but we had an inspector general's organization that was today divorced from command responsibilities and answerable to a separate unit, would this help?

LIVINGSTON: I doubt it. The reason I characterized the participation as being so broad was that it involved not just the situations, as I have told you, but let's say the civilians who were in Vietnam in large number, that is, working for USAID and so on. They themselves were not immune from these same sorts of things. Again, I think the problem does not lie in some sort of reorganization. I think the problem lies very much with changing the conscience of society about this.

DELLUMS: I would like to acknowledge the presence of Congressman Koch of New York.

KOCH: I want to commend those of you who have a worked so hard and have persevered so long in your endeavors to get a public hearing. There are very few people who would have worked as long and as hard as you have and ultimately obtained this hearing. I am also distressed that the armed Services Committee hasn't provided the kind of hearing which would have permitted you to state your positions before a group of members who were not already of the position that the war in Vietnam is immoral and unconstitutional. So in effect, while it is true that in this case you have very sympathetic cgmn listening to you, I think the Armed Services Committee would have rendered a greater service to the country a they had permitted you to tell your stories before them in an atmosphere where there would have been greater examination and cross-examination and subpoena power that we don't have available to us, and it would have provided the country with an insight into a problem that it unfortunately has been shielded from. Notwithstanding the fact that our hearing will not provide the same kind of forum for you and is the kind that they would have done, I am pleased to be a part of the hearing and to be with you today.

MITCHELL: Would the gentleman yield, Mr. Chairman?

KOCH: Of course.

MITCHELL: While I completely agree with you, I would like to point out that in my mind this committee serves as that initial function of getting this testimony together and perhaps moving us to what really ought to be done in the Congress.

KOCH: I agree with you. It may be what we are doing here today will cause the Armed Services Committee to hold hearings so that ultimately they can bring in legislation on this matter.

DELLUMS: Thank you, Congressman Koch. That is precisely 1 of our reasons for being here. We certainly plan to make this testimony available to the Armed Services Committee, and I am hopeful that after some careful scrutiny, they will do precisely that. Dr. Livingston, I think it is rather obvious from the comments and the questions that we deeply appreciate your coming forward this morning and the articulate nature of your presentation. I would like to thank you on behalf of myself and my colleagues for your courage and integrity in the presentation. Thank you very much.

LIVINGSTON: Thank you.

DELLUMS: Our next witness this morning is Captain Robert B. Johnson.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT B JOHNSON Capt, U.S. Army, West Point, Class of 1965.

JOHNSON: Because the 3 men who follow me have specific testimony about war crimes initiated by 2 generals, I shall be very specific and very brief.

In 1965, I was taking a class in West Point on land warfare, even by a major who had returned from Vietnam after being wounded, and he showed us the slides and told us in a joking way how American pilots and other pilots in Vietnam would send each other parts of VC bodies--heads, angers and ears--as jokes, wrapped as Christmas presents.

He also told us a good way to get POWs to talk was to take 2 up in a helicopter and throw 1 out, and the other talked immediately. He said it in a very serious vein. I rec'd no meaningful instruction whatever on the law of land warfare while I was in West Point. I did not know what the law of land warfare was until I returned from Vietnam in 69.

I arrived on 3-1-68 in Vietnam. I became the adviser for the 1st Bn of the 25th Inf Div. We took a POW, 1 of the lead companies, took a POW. He was brought back to the Bn command 1st, which was mobile. He came back beaten very badly already when most of the men in the HQ's Company continued to beat and kick the man almost to death.

When it became time to remove the POW to a regimental command post, I had to take him across the river. In the middle of the river, he was thrown out and shot to death.

The reaction when I talked to my colleagues--I was present while the whole thing went on, I was the senior officer there--the reaction of the people there on the base camp was, we, this thing happens all the time, and after all, Asians know how to treat Asians. Another occasion, about 2 weeks later on a combat operation, about 20 miles south of Danang, we took a number of POW's again, and 1 of the POWs we took was wounded.

Before we left, the Bn commander, Vietnamese Bn Commander in my presence, took out a .45 and shot to death the wounded POW.

While our operation was going on, which is about 2 to 5 miles south of Danang, 90% of the surrounding countryside was a free-fire zone. It was understood by me, by all of us in tactical Operations Center and elsewhere, that we were allowed to shoot anything that moves in that area.

We had preplanned and random strikes going into the surrounding countryside on a routine basis. In the afternoons, 1 could hear the strikes on 1 particular place, Barrier Island, coming in about every 5 minutes. Artillery was shot randomly into the surrounding countryside. On 1 of our 1st major combat operations, we bombed, strafed, hit with artillery, a particular village complex for approximately 3 hours, and then moved up. When I got to the village, there was nothing there but civilians. I only went through a very small part of the village. All I saw there were civilians.

It became clear to me that harassment and interdiction of was not designed to interdict the enemy, but rather to terrorize and intimidate the surrounding villagers in an effort to get them to move into detention camps along Route One.

We dropped leaflets in much of the surrounding countryside to thousands of people. On 1 side of the leaflet I remember there was a picture of a B-52 bomber, and the other side said in Vietnamese, "Come to the New Life Hamlet, Come to peace, freedom and justice." Of course, the message was clear to the people in the countryside: leave your homes or we will kill you. I guess I participated in about 13 search and destroy operations. On all these ops we systematically destroyed every home and every bit of rice that we couldn't carry in civilian villages. We could not burn the hooches, we would blow them up with dynamite. As I said, we did this on a routine basis. It was part of the policy again to encourage the civilian population to move into the detention camps controlled by American and Saigon forces.

I can remember 1 particular detention camp near Danang that struck me, 1 of the camps where these people were moved in great numbers, and we were near the river at Danang and having a barbeque, cooking steaks and eating, and right next to us was a barbed wire detention camp. Inside of it were mainly children, and we would throw them bits of steak and throw candy and they would fight for it inside this detention camp.

But it became clear to me after my career in Vietnam, that our aim was to separate the people from the guerrillas, thereby eliminating the guerrilla source of strength.

It became clear to me that the FREE-FIRE ZONES and the search and destroy tactics were we systematically destroyed villages and routinely bombed the surrounding countryside, it became clear to me that we were waging war not against any abstract ideology, but waging war against the Vietnamese people themselves. Again, 1 more point on the POW issue.

I got kind of the same response when I talked about killing of these POW's in my presence. It was, well, they would have gotten worse treatment back at provincial HQ's anyway. What are your questions?

DELLUMS: Thank you very much, Capt Johnson. You enumerated several types of tactical field policies in your testimony this morning. I just have 1 rather broad question to ask. Could the war in SEA have been fought without having to resort to these types of tactical field policies?

JOHNSON: I don't think so. I think that when one is faced with what is essentially a people's struggle to gain social justice and independence, that the only thing we have available to wage war with is our massive technology.

Of course, there is no cross-communication between American and Vietnamese. When massive technological firepower is applied to what is more or less essentially a people's struggle, when you drop bombs--by the way, in the province I was in, at least 40% of the civilian population was formally dislocated into these detention camps.

When you apply these policies to what is essentially a people's struggle, I think the immediate result must be My Lai and wanton disregard for human the, and especially waging a war against a whole people and a whole culture.

DELLUMS: Thank you very much. Congressman Ryan?

RYAN: You said it was understood in that fire zone, anything which moved was to be shot. How was that understood?

JOHNSON: We, I just understood it.

RYAN: Was . . .

JOHNSON: Pilots understood it fast.

RYAN: Did you fire in a FREE-FIRE ZONES as you understood it at the true?

JOHNSON: I think my 1st initiation to it was on the map, whoever was briefing us when we came in, showed us where we were. "These are the secure hamlet areas. the outlying areas here you see on the map are enemy territory, FREE-FIRE ZONESs.

If these people were not enemy, they would not be out there. If you see them, they are the enemy." The air controllers had the understanding. many times-I remember 1 particular place, Barner Island, where people would wave the South Vietnamese flags at the pilots before they came in with the bombings, and we regarded that as a hoax on the part of the Nat'l Liberation Front to prevent us from bombing it.

RYAN: l7nat I am getting at is, was the air power a used indiscriminately?

JOHNSON: Yes, air and artillery power.

RYAN: That about are by individual soldiers in the infantry to civilians?

JOHNSON: We, that was a little different aspect of it.

RYAN: In what way?

JOHNSON: Rifles don't cause anywhere near the destruction that a bomb causes.

It can easily destroy a whole village. If the bombs didn't destroy the village, when we go through the villages on sweeps, we would destroy them by hand, by are, by the dynamite we carried. A foot soldier was used as another means to terrorize the inhabitants of these villages, to force them to move into detention camps.

RYAN: Were foot soldier used to kill civilians with weapons?

JOHNSON: I wouldn't say that the foot soldier was used to kill civilians.

RYAN: Were not soldiers to kill any civilian who moves?

JOHNSON: I think it was understood that you can shoot anything that moves, and it would be justified. when we arrived at some of our objectives, some of the villages, we clearly recognized some older people, some children, and we asked them to come down. Had they been in the distance, running off, making strange movements, I don't think we would have hesitated.

RYAN: Is it your testimony you would not have shot at point-blank range, women and children?

JOHNSON: No, I never saw that done.

RYAN: Was that policy? To shoot at point-blank women and children?

JOHNSON: No. but I think in some cases, like in My Lai, it was the inevitable consequence of certain policies.

RYAN: In other words, it was natural to know from the policies that were being pursued?

JOHNSON: Yes. I never heard an order, "go out and kill civilians." Rather, the orders are, get a big BC, search and destroy; all you are in a free-fire zone, you can shoot anything that moves.

RYAN: Thank you.

DELLUMS: Congressman Koch?

KOCH: I have met the captain on prior occasions, and I would just make this comment, and that is, he has always been very careful never to overstate on any of the occasions I have met with him. I have been impressed with his testimony before and I am this morning. I would like to ask you this question.

You had reference to advice as to how you dealt with POWs to make them talk, and I think the reference was to throwing a POW, at least 1 of them, out of the helicopter for the purpose of impressing others that it was to their advantage and their-at would keep them alive. Did that kind of incident ever occur in your presence?

JOHNSON: No, it did not. I just personally witnessed the brutal beating and subsequent murder of 2 POWs. but not throwing them. we didn't have any helicopters.

KOCH: The brutal beating, did you describe that this morning?

JOHNSON: Yes, the 1 POW who was captured and brought back to the command post was continually beaten and hit with rifles and so on until he was almost dead. There he was killed by a soldier standing on the side of the river.

KOCH: Subsequently to that beating, or during the beating, was any report made a a higher officer?

JOHNSON: I made a written report. 1st, let me say I gave ITA the underlying attitude. We kind of joked about it. I called in to the major, who was the senior adviser, who was controlling this particular operation.

He heard a shooing. He wanted to know what had happened. I said it was the change in the "status" of 1 POW. His response was, "I understand." KOCH: Was it by a change in your attitude on your part that you came to realize that this kind of conduct was wrong, at a later date, because, wasn't it incumbent then to press the matter with the Army and the regular channels that are provided, as limited as they are?

JOHNSON: I made a written report, and I wasn't morally outraged. I made an objection we could have gotten some valuable information from the man. Again, it was pointed out to me he would have under gone worse treatment at the provincial hq's, anyhow. A whole lot of different things changed my attitude to it, my coming to the realization that we were winning war against the Vietnamese people. It was a very slow, gradual process. I don't know what the key to my change of attitude was, exactly.

KOCH: If I might just pursue that, do I understand, then, because of the nature of the indoctrination that you and others had at the time you came to fight in Vietnam, that this kind of treatment was not something that you thought of as immoral at that particular moment, and it was a question of a change in your attitude and the attitude perhaps of others, that brought you and others to the realization that what in fact was taking place, was criminal in nature but at the time it was talking place, because of your indoctrination, you assumed it was principal, is that a fair statement?

JOHNSON: I would say so. At the time of the torture and the murder of the POW, and the murder of the other POW, and when we were killing these civilian hamlets, my moral kame of reference wasn't, it is wrong to kill POW's, it is right not to. My American of reference was, we are in a combat zone, this is real war, and we have got to get information from POW's.

KOCH: Did there ever come a time when you filed a report, oral or written, which set forth the fact that a war crime had been committed in your presence?

JOHNSON: No. I never really understood the term "war came." KOCH: Terminal action, 1 that you thought has violated whatever rules there are in the operation of war?

JOHNSON: No, I never did.

DELLUMS: Thank you very much. Congresswoman Abzug.

ABZUG: Have you in your experience had any contact with arms of tactical warfare ever utilized against civilians?

JOHNSON: CS gas was used on the surrounding hamlets in the free-fire zones, and there was a lot of defoliation going on, but I was not a personal witness to any of it.

DELLUMS: Congressman Conyers.

CONYERS: Chairman, can I pursue an important question raised by Congressman Koch?

I think it is important that the Capt has stated that he had undergone a change of attitude. I would like to ask a question. Is there any impression on your pat about more servicemen having a change of feeling in terms of Vietnam vets that are participating in the war protests and other like yourself moving forth?

With the activities that are going on in military units that began to demonstrate, it would seem to me that there is a conscience surfacing among many of our military personnel that began to address themselves to this question.

JOHNSON: I think that based on my experience, my level of awareness of what is happening was a year ago when I went to Vietnam, and it gradually increased.

I think because of the length of that war and because many people here in the States talk to the Vietnam veterans now and find out what is happening, many more peoples' awareness is raised before the fact, not after the fact, like mine is. I think in Vietnam today there is a general trend--the hostility which has been traditionally directed against the Vietnamese may still be there, but the hostility the GI now has is directed toward a new target, the officers.

I think there have been hundreds of cases of fragging incidents in Vietnam. I think there is a tendency to focus on a new source for the outlet of frustration of the GI in Vietnam.

CONYERS: Thank you. Do any of the other witnesses have any observations on this question?

LIVINGSTON: Yes, I think it is part of the general rise in consciousness of the whole of the United States in regard to the war, and it is certainly reflected in the military. Just as an example, at Ft Bragg a couple of weeks ago I was talking to some people who were undergoing riot control training preparatory to possible deployment in the demonstrations last week, and their estimate was between 30 and 50% of each unit in the future would participate in that sort of thing. I think there is very definitely a change.

LAUGHLIN: I don't think there is any question about it. I was struck by the fact that during the interviews that were conducted through the veterans here last week, almost to the man they testifyed that they had not undergone some kind of dramatic change, it had been gradual and it had been fairly deeply seated. Of course they had lost a lot of friends, and we all have, we all have, very close friends we love, and it is not something that 1 can kind of wrench out of one's mind, but it should be noted that we did and people are doing that, and almost to a man each man testifyed it was a slow process.

CONYERS: Thank you very much, Chairman.

DELLUMS: Cngwmn Mink.

MINK: Thank you. Captain Johnson, in the Calley trial, 6 of your fellow officers found LT Calley guilty of premeditated murder of 22 Vietnamese civilians. We have to assume from all the testimony and evidence that has been put forth in the trial that these civilians had been captured and were in effect POW's of that unit that had captured that village.

You made a statement that in your opinion the My Lai massacre was the inevitable consequence of certain policies. Would you specify what policy you make reference to with regard to the killing of POWs?

JOHNSON: 1st, the underlying rational policy, that is, that the only good gook is a dead gook. Very similar to the only good Indian is a dead Indian and the only good nigger is a dead nigger.

I think LT Calley took it quite seriously. 2dly, the BC, with BODY COUNT your success. After a, General Koester got credit for the BODY COUNT in Vietnam, 128 dead and only 4 weapons captured. General Westmoreland sent a telegram to the commander of the My Lai massacre. So the BODY COUNT had that input.

Next, the search and destroy policy. With me, I couldn't help but somehow view these Vietnamese as a little less than human when we went in and destroyed their homes. They weren't really homes, they were just hooches. I wouldn't have had the same zeal if we were destroying red brick homes or split level homes in suburbia.

Next is the FREE-FIRE ZONES concept, which leads to the understood policy that in that area they are a enemies and they should be removed. Another policy is to force removal of the civilian populations. We have 5 million refugees in Vietnam. whether we have gone in and forcibly moved them out with marches and helicopters or we have arced them to move on through saturation bombers is immaterial. They are all means to obtain the same end, forcibly remove the civilian population. Given those policies, it is my judgment that things like My Lai are inevitable.

DELLUMS: Congressman Seiberling.

SEIBERLING: Captain Johnson, I am quite impressed with the precision of your statement and the clarity with which you thought this thing through. I just have a couple of questions a highlight this. You say you made a written report of the incident of the beating and the murder of the POW. Was any action ever taken after the report was filed?

JOHNSON: Absolutely none.

SEIBERLING: Do you know of . . .

JOHNSON: The colonel didn't call me to talk about it. I received no reply.

SEIBERLING: Do you know if he received the report?

JOHNSON: I am not sure. I assume he did. I put it SEIBERLING: You talked about the purpose of the FREE-FIRE ZONES. You have mentioned the fact that the FREE-FIRE ZONES and the harassment and interdiction fire at villagers were obviously designed to force the villagers to leave and go to resettlement areas. Did you ever hear anyone in a position of rank indicate expressly that was 1 of the purposes?

JOHNSON: No, I did not, because a few months after I left there was a big report in Stars and Stripes, 1 area very close to us, having got 12,000 people, there was a whole operation planned where all of them at once were forcibly moved to detention camps, not by the bombings but by U.S. Marines and the ARVN troops forcibly removing them to these detention camps. That happened in June, 1968.

SEIBERLING: Did you ever hear of the expression "turkey shoots"?

JOHNSON: I have heard the free-fire zone referred to by the pilots and other people as "Indian Country." SEIBERLING: But you are not familiar with the expression "turkey shoots"?

JOHNSON: I am familiar with it, but where I was operating I didn't hear anyone personally use that term. We used the term "Indian Country." SEIBERLING: What did "Indian Country." refer to?

JOHNSON: I guess it means different things to different people. It is like there are savages out there, there are gooks out there. In the same way we slaughtered the Indian's buffalo, we would slaughter the water buffalo in Vietnam.

SEIBERLING: Was there any indoctrination, official or semi-officially, that incorporated the ideas that these people are gooks or that the only good gook is a dead gook or similar philosophies, or was this just something once you got there you picked it up from the other people who bad been there?

JOHNSON: I just picked it up from other people. Before I went to Vietnam, I remember 1 adviser who had been there before and had been through some tough straits telling me you can't trust any of these. That was not official policy.

I don't think you could find it anywhere that you can't trust the gooks in writing.

SEIBERLING: Do you have any evidence that this was so widespread that it must have been known to people at all levels of command?

JOHNSON: I don't have any specific evidence except my 6 months in the infantry div, an American unit, and the disdain and disgust of the Vietnamese was extremely widespread there.

SEIBERLING: Thank you. I think your statement has been very, very helpful.

DELLUMS: 1 of my colleagues here has asked that I ask you to clarify 1 particular point. In your original testimony you related an incident of a person being beaten and shot. Can you tell me whether he was beaten and shot by South Vietnamese or American forces?

JOHNSON: He was beaten and shot by the South Vietnamese in my presence and the presence of another American.

DELLUMS: Do you think it would serve any purpose to prosecute high-ranking military personnel and civilian leaders for war crimes in Southeast Asia?

JOHNSON: If we are going to prosecute LT Calley, then I think we ought to prosecute a number of generals and a number of civilians. I think LT Calley should be freed and that a massive investigation into the institutional causes that in my judgment led to My Lai is the only solution. Retribution is no answer. Again the idea of guilt, there were so many GIs that served in Vietnam, that they were guilty on their part is kind of absurd because they never thought about guilt, anything like that. They just did what they were told in Vietnam, and they followed the policy set at the highest level.

I think the solution is the kind of thing we are embarked on. I think I would like to see someone introduce legislation calling for amnesty for everyone and then a full open inquiry by the entire Joint Congress of War Crimes, war crime responsibility.

Dellums: Thank you.

CONYERS: That is a critical point, and I am glad the captain made it, because I am coming to understand the complexities of this problem a little more deeply, that is to say, that if we are to feel that every--of course, everyone who commits a crime, it doesn't matter what your state of mind is when you commit it, but at the same time we are to really get at the bottom of this problem, it can't be a matter of trying to determine who in the service is responsible for which acts. I think that the notion that has been put forward here in this gentleman's statement, the 1st time I have heard it, that there ought to be some kind of amnesty so that everyone can come forward and give us the kind of records so that we can go to the institutional charter of the problem that is under examination by your Committee would begin to make sense. It is complex. We are certainly not trying to open this up to prosecute anyone. At the same time, we have got to hear about crimes so that we can assess what their relationship is to what is going on in Vietnam and in America.

So, I welcome the captain's suggestion on this point.

DELLUMS: Thank you, Congressman.

SEIBERLING: May I be permitted to comment on that, Mr Chairman?

DELLUMS: Yes, I would like both Cngwmn Abzug and you to make a brief comment on that.

SEIBERLING: I just want to say it is even more complicated than that, because, as I understand internat'l law, it is beyond the power of the US to waive the provisions of the laws of nations which make it a crime to execute and maltreat civilians. I am not even sure we can declare amnesty even a we wanted to. It may, as a practical matter, be possible because I find it difficult to conceive of anyone other than American courts ever bring Americans to trial in such cases, and yet from a legal standpoint, I don't think we could take that position. So, it is an extremely complicated situation. I just make that point for the record.

DELLUMS: Cngwmn Abzug?

ABZUG: Many people agree that the nature of the war in Vietnam itself is war against the people of Vietnam, and insofar as that is so that the policy of goV't, our government, and the policy of command has been essentially to wipe out the people in Vietnam. However, Captain, within that you have testified and others have testitied here and elsewhere of other people killing POWs and many of the people who have testitied have not testified that they have killed POW's. Within the acts of individuals, there are moral judgments that are made. I wonder, because I think you and I have discussed this before at a press conferences announcing these hearings, I wonder if you, in the course of your service, made any moral judgment to kill innocent children, women, old men, as did LT Calley?

JOHNSON: My hands are clean, you see, because I had a radio and could call in napalm strikes.

ABZUG: You mean you instructed other people to do it?

JOHNSON: I just called in air artillery stakes and they did it. That was part of the policy.

ABZUG: You see, I am not in complete agreement with you. I think that we a know that those responsible for killing innocent civilians probably go up very high on the ladder of the chain of command, but in the testimony and in the activity of men in the Army are those who made a moral judgment to kill innocent victims, and those who made a moral judgment not to, and I don't quite understand whether you treat all acts or not all acts the same or whether you are suggesting that we do apparently? Is that your recommendation?

JOHNSON: I think, given the framework of genocide in Indochina, where we have killed millions of Vietnamese and there are 5 million refugees, it is somewhat absurd to focus on the guilt of any particular individual. When 1 talks about guilt and innocence, it must be from a kind of moral civil righteous position, perhaps with a lack of understanding of the atmosphere that exists, the moral America of reference that exists in Vietnam, and that if 1 can say waste dinks, there no longer is a moral America of reference, there is no longer a moral judgment. If we prosecute LT Calley and we are vigorous about that, we must be just as vigorous about prosecuting Colonel Patton, now General Patton, and from the testimony of the following West Pointers, we must prosecute 2 other generals. I don't hear the same outrage about their conduct. Although they have generated policies which have resulted in de facto genocide, I don't hear the outrage about bringing those men to justice and that I hear about LT Calley and how awful he is.

I see LT Calley as the ultimate institutional victim in this country, the man who thought the whole methodology hook, line and sinker--the man who believed that the only good gook was a dead gook.

ABZUG: There are many who believe that the generals you mentioned and officers should be prosecuted. Would you oppose that?

JOHNSON: Yes, I would. We would learn nothing from it. Again, we would be focusing on the guilt of Westmoreland. Westmoreland doesn't know what guilt means. Westmoreland is in to killing Communists and accomplishing his mission and getting a lot of medals.

He didn't say to himself it is wrong to saturation bomb these people. It is his right to get out of Vietnam and make a moral decision. His framework was simply, it is right to win this war, it is wrong to lose it. That is all.

People can see how Westmoreland and Nixon have institutionally victimized men to believe their own rhetoric. People seem to fail to see how LT Calley is the ultimate victim of the institutional structure of this country.

ABZUG: We, I think that is at the highest levels of the civilian and military leadership in this country. my point is it serves no purpose to prosecute these men, because after aIl, we prosecuted individuals instead of focusing on the root causes of fascism in Nazi Germany and 25 years later the same rules of land warfare that were violated by the Nazi's are now being violated by our country. So what good are the principles? they didn't attempt to make a search and examination of the institutional forces.

LIVINGSTON: The responsibility is with us.

DELLUMS: Congressman Ryan has a brief comment.

RYAN: I simply have 1 comment, and it is this. I do not agree that individual accountability should not be fixed or where there have been violations establish a legal process of the rules of law or a military code. I think they still have to be made to believe that there were those who killed innocent children and those who did not. I think the credibility is a very important matter.

DELLUMS: We are going to divert from the format that we have used earlier.

We will have 3 Capts make brief opening statements, and then we will question them as a group, and that will be Capt Greg Hayward, Capt Ron Bartek and Capt O'Mera. We will begin with Capt Hayward.

STATEMENT OF GREG HAYWARD Capt, U.S. Army West Point, Class oS 1964. Washg'tn, DC HAYWARD: I graduated from the military academy in 1964 and spent 6 years in the Army as an infantry officer. I had 2 tours in Vietnam. my 1st tour was in 1966, and I was a platoon leader for 6 months and a div commander's aid for the 1st div commander and returned to Vietnam in '68, where I was a company commander for 6 months and General Williamson's aide.

He was the CG to the 25th div for my last 6 months in the country.

I would like to tell a few personal experiences and relate them to a policy perspective and then talk a few minutes about some of the questions that have already been asked. We had an area that General Williamson considered a thorn in our side. It was called the Citadel area. It was the home of about 200 to 300 Vietnamese. We had a fire support base called Persian where your 2nd Bn, 12th Infantry, was, and General Williamson decided we were to systematically remove these people from there homes, so we could expand the free-fire zone around the FSB Persian.

We did this by having ambush patrols at night in a the road networks leading in and out of the village. 1 of our units was given the mission to remove the villagers, the civilians from this area. They went through with armored vehicles and started burning these homes and burnings the villages in the Citadel area. The CG's guidance was not, of course, to go through and burn the ho much pressure on the commander of this Bn to perform we and to accomplish his mission that I am sure in his mind that anything went.

This was a dear violation of the rules of land warfare, forcibly moving the civilian population from their homes.

Another instance, specific instance of a violation of the rules of land warfare was when we planned the artillery bombardment of a hospital installation in Cambodia. We had a FSB called Diamond, 2,000 or 3,000 meters inside South Vietnam from Cambodia, and it was there as bait, you will, because that was when we got our best BODY COUNT ratios, when we were attacked a night on our FSBs and we were successful in luring the enemy across the border into attacking us, and we had preplanned artillery are on the 9th VC's div hospital complex in Cambodia. The plan was, should we not need all our air power and artillery power to protect the Diamond are support base, that a portion of that would be allocated to are into Cambodia on this hospital complex--another clear violation of the rules of land warfare.

Now, every soldier who goes to Vietnam is issued a little pocket-sized card, and in many units he is fined if it isn't on his person at all times. Should an inspection come up, he is fined if he doesn't have this card. Listed on the card is the manner in which we are to treat civilians, the manner in which we are to treat POW's. We systematically remove these people from their villages. As you have heard in other testimony, we don't treat our POW's very well, and we are bombing hospitals, which is in all of our lectures and training that we might have had in terms of what goes in warfare, we know that also is a violation. These things added up, you know, in the subjective minds of our soldiers is a dehumanization of the Vietnamese.

Another specific incident, as a company commander in November time frame of 1968, my company was a mechanized company, we were sweeping a road south out of Dau Tieng toward another Bn's base camp. On this sweep we came through a village where we had an ambush patrol the night before from a platoon, from the 1st Bn, 27th Infantry, whose base camp I was sweeping toward.

I found 10, at least 10-plus civilians, women and children, burned to death in their homes in that village, and asked the platoon that was still there what had happened, had they had a big fight the night before? They hadn't. Not a shot was fired in anger from the enemy, but this platoon leader had called in white phosphorous mortar are that night on this village, and he had done it because he saw people moving in the village at night. People get up out of their homes at night just to go to the bathroom. He had his ambush adjacent to this village, and if he did see shadows moving in the village at night he felt because of this BODY COUNT mania, because of this FREE-FIRE ZONES kind of attitude, that he was justified in firing mortar are into that village, which be did. I reported this to the Bn commander, to his command post at 1st, 27th, when I reached it later that day and then saw a systematic effort to hide this atrocity, if you will, and that was because I think that loyalty to your commander is often a greater value than truth in Vietnam. Certainly this LT wasn't being protected, but that Bn commander was being protected when this didn't reach Bgd, it didn't reach the press, it didn't reach the div level, and it never did.

We had in the div and I came across a man named Capt Phelps at 1 time, by reputation only, as a company commander, and we had something in the div called Phelps' Bandits.

This was a platoon organized supposedly from former VC, and they had a great reputation as to getting POWs to talk, and their reputation was in sort of the Project Phoenix Program where we eliminated the VC infrastructure by finding who the VC were in the villages and hamlets, and these people would go in at night and kill them or take them away.

As an aide to the div commander, I ran across Capt Phelps whenever he would come back to the div base camp Cu Chi, the div commander, General Williamson, would invite him as his personal guest that night at the meal.

I did not know of any personal atrocities that Capt Phelps did or didn't do.

I am not sure he did any. His reputation is great, and it is odd that the div commander would give so much prominence to a young man who had this kind of reputation of gaining information from VC at any cost he didn't support this kind of action. I wanted to talk just a moment about Congressman Ryan's question about treating the Vietnamese as less than human. I think several things add up to this. We speak of this constantly in derogatory terms. We relocate them, as I mentioned in the Citadel instance. We give them less than adequate hospital care. We don't call in medevac helicopters for them unless there happen to be also wounded Americans.

We have this great emphasis on BC, which our generals are promoted on, and generals who do not produce BODY COUNT are not promoted, and when we intentionally violate the rules that we have on our MACV cards that outline how we are to treat civilians, that when you add up a these things, none of them singularly represents a policy of treating the Vietnamese as less than human, but when these are added together, they definitely represent a policy of treating the Vietnamese a less than human. Congressman Ryan also asked a question earlier about BODY COUNT and the distortion of BODY COUNT figures. 1 incident occurred in our Bn when I was an aide to the div commander. Our 3rd Bn, 22nd Infantry, had not been getting the BODY COUNT that the other Bns in the div had, and General Williamson told that Bn commander, LT Colonel Carmichael, that he had better start producing or we would get a Bn commander in that Bn that could produce.

Colonel carmichael got the message loud and clear. Approximately 2 weeks later his firebase was attacked. He called in that night a BODY COUNT of 312 and he had taken 1 wounded. We flew out the next morning, I flew with General Williamson the next morning. We landed and counted the bodies around the parameter of that base camp, and there were 30-plus North Vietnamese bodies and a few wounded POW's.

General Williamson questioned him a little bit further, and said I understood you have 312 BODY COUNT and I see 30-plus here, where are the other bodies? Colonel Carmichael then gave a vague estimate of, we I had an ambush patrol in a particular location on the map and they saw 100 VC moving across an open field that night in preparation for attack and we called in s lot of artillery are out there, and we counted those 100. He gave instances like that which amounted to 312. It was obvious to everybody that was a lie. but General Williamson had put so much pressure on the colonel to produce the BC, the man had no choice. He is 45 years old and he probably has 2 kids to send to college, and General Williamson, recognizing that he bad placed this pressure on the Bn commander, accepted this lie.

There this thing becomes circular. In addition to that, that figure had already been reported to II Field Forces, to LT General Ewell, who had programs being promoted on the "BC mania." General Ewell was the div commander of the 9th div in the Delta. This div amassed an unsurpassed record of BC, and it was based on lies. And everybody in the unit knew it. He would claim kills at night with his sniper teams armed with infrared scopes at 600 meters. You can't kill somebody at 600 meters at night with a rifle unless you are very lucky, and a you could, you can never tell whether it is a civilian or a soldier.

General Ewell was promoted above several officers to the job of Field Force commander, and he used the term not an Indian hunt, but he used the term "killing fish in a barrel," and that is how he described several operations, and I personally heard him talk about "killing fish in a barrel." We put great emphasis on this BC. It seems ironic that General Ewell is our military representative to the Paris Peace Talks. It is hard to understand that he can deal in good faith across a bargaining table now when he made his reputation as an American in Vietnam killing Vietnamese; that he can in good faith bargain. I don't think he is that sort of diplomat that we should have.

DELLUMS: Capt Bartek.

STATEMENT OF RON BARTEK Capt, West Point, Class of 1966. Washg'tn, DC BARTEK: my name is Ron Bartek. I come from a military family and graduated from West point in 1966, went into the infantry and spent 3 years in the infantry, 1 of which was in Korea, and then spent 1 year in Vietnam as an infantry officer and as an intelligence officer. I was intelligence officer for an infantry Bn in the 25th div and then as intelligence officer and briefing officer at div headquarters. I would like to relate 3 incidents which I observed while in Vietnam which indicate to me the level at which these policies and attitudes are created which lend to and promulgate the atmosphere of My Lai and which create a basic conduct of the war which is inconsistent even with our stated objectives in Indochina.

These incidents are, 1st, a commanders' conference by a high-ranking officer, the 2d is an incident of the bombardment of an enemy hospital inside Cambodia that Greg has already mentioned, and the last is an incident of an electrical torture of a man suspected to be a VC sympathizer. The 1st incident really points to the BODY COUNT mania at a very high and revealing level, I think. General Ewell, the man mentioned already, was 1st the commanding general of the 9th Infantry div and then went up to II Field Forces.

His 1st commanders' conference at the 25th Infantry div I was sitting in on.

At that conferences he had the div commander, the Bgd commanders and all the Bn commanders, and I was representing my Bn commander. He spent about 30 minutes giving his formula for success. He began by saying that his unit was only killing, and these are his words, only killing 2,000 of these little bastards a month, and that they were infiltrating 4,000.

Consequently by the end of that month, which I believe was February, 69, he wanted to begin killing 4,000 of these little bastards a month, and then by the end of the following month wanted to kill 6,000. Now, this is at a time, as I said, 1969, when we had officially steered away from our concept of a military victory and started emphasizing pacification, and yet there was no mention of either of those 2 programs.

He gave further guidelines as to how we hoped to kill that many of the little bastards, and also loosened up the reporting procedure considerably. The guidelines he gave was any effort to mass enemy forces into 1 location where we could use our massive firepower. The loosening of the reports came when he said that no longer would you have to put your foot on a man's chest or, as was mentioned earlier, cut off a man's ear. If you put a lot of firepower into an area where you observed an enemy soldier and you swept the area later and you could not find him, you could assume that he was dead.

This led to 2 things. 1st of all, the great pressure on the subordinate commanders. As I said, all the subordinate commanders in the div were there.

To produce that massive figure for BC, plus this loosening of the report, lent to a legitimization of the falsification of reports.

General Ewell to the div commander gave a quota for that month and for the following month. When it filtered down through the Bgds and to the Bn and the Bn level, I had to tell my Bn commander when I went back and briefed him that we had to kill 50 by the end of that month. We did not have a since major fire-fight that month, and we had a legitimately counted 3-body count, and yet I was told to report 50, and I did.

That shows you if you multiply that falsification of 3 to 50 by the number of Bns in Vietnam or under General Ewell's command, you can imagine what kind of reports Congressmen and senators and the President have to go on in forming policy. It also lends to the dehumanization of the Vietnamese people and obviously id. As Greg said, this man is now our chief military adviser to the Paris Peace Talks.

An extension of the same BODY COUNT mania came at the FSB Diamond action which my Bn established that FSB near the Cambodian border as bait and we were told if asked by newsmen or anybody from the States why we were there 3,000 meters from the border, it was to protect the poor, innocent farmers to our rear and of course drew chuckles from all the Capts and the majors in the briefing. But it was obvious, and it was part of the plan, that we were baiting the people from the sanctuary zones which we later went into.

The hospital was about a mile 1/2, as I recall, inside Cambodia. We had very hard intelligence indicating where it was. It was "an underground hospital, as Greg mentioned. We predesignated fire support from the div level-- this is a major general allocating out his resources-- for the bombardment of that hospital, and Capt O'Mera and I both recall reports coming back in as to the destruction of that hospital. The last incident I would like to relate is that of 1 that has been alluded to several times, and that is the torture of POWs. I do not find it strange to see us torturing POWs in Vietnam.

When I went through the Rangers' School at Fort Benning--this was in 1966--I was submitted to about 7 hours of torture myself as part of the program.

Having been captured by the guerrilla, the jungle guerrillas which are actually Vietnam veterans, I was submitted to being staked out, and the methods have already been described, having a cloth with a little wire embedded in it forced over my nose so I could not breathe through my nose, and 5 gallons of water used to pour down my throat when I tried to breathe through my mouth.

There were other methods I was stripped naked and led to believe I was going to be hung.

For 7 hours this went on. As I stated, this was Vietnam veterans with the stated objective of teaching me that every man can be broken. This was obvious specifically in Vietnam.

I did witness an old Vietnamese man brought in by the Bn commander. He had been picked up in the area in action but was unarmed himself and in no other way implicated than his proximity to the action. I was told to interrogate the man. I had a Vietnamese interpreter and talked to him. I was convinced after 15 minutes' interrogation that he was an innocent civilian. I told my Bn commander that. He said, "What did you do, just talk to the man again?" Because I had done similar things before. 'I said, "Yes, I did." He said, "I want you to go back there and interrogate him," and the implication was clear because we had talked about this before, as I said.

I went back in the bunker and just talked to him again and reported once again that he was an innocent civilian. He was not satisfied with that, and he wanted the Bgd intelligence team to come out. This is the LT Col talking to me. The Bgd intelligence team came out, this team worked for a full colonel. The 1st thing they asked for was the field telephone, the type of field telephone that has 2 hot terminals. You connect the wires and you can talk. In this case the hot wires were connected 1 to the man's groin and 1 to the small of his back; his hands and feet were both tied. Right out in the middle of the FSB, right next to the Bn commander's headquarters, in full view of all the American soldiers on the FSB, the man was subjected to torture for about 15 minutes, at which time that Bgd interrogation team determined he was an innocent civilian. The man was released and sent back to his village, I am sure not with very kind words for American involvement in Vietnam.

I would like to address just 1 point that Parren Mitchell from Baltimore brought up, and that was what effect the brutalizing of the war has on Americans. We have to all assess the effect on ourselves, and we can feel, and I have talked to others about it, the subtleties that have creeped into our own minds and into our own emotions when we look at a Vietnamese. There is a certain repulsion there. Certainly we are intellectually committed to erasing it, but it is a difficult thing to do. That was again the effect of the policies in Vietnam.

Finally, I saw it work on a classmate of mine, a man I had graduated from West Point with. I met him in a helicopter 1 day returning from an operation.

I recognized him. He was piloting the aircraft. I said, "Hello, Jim, how long have you been in the country?" He said, "I only have 2 weeks left." I know his wife and I knew he had a son. I said, "I bet you the very happy to soon be going home to your wife and son." He said, "You know, I thought about extending here." I asked him why.

The reply was, believe it or not, "Well, I really the killing gooks." That was a man of probably greater intelligence than myself. So those are the 3 incidents, and really I see them as bringing up to me the fact that the basic conduct of the war in Vietnam is not what the American public dinks it is.

Was are not protecting anyone from anyone else. Was are brutalizing Americans, we are brutalizing Vietnamese. Was have been illustrated by the political/ military realities of Vietnam into adopting measures, like free-fire zones and search and destroy, that brutalize Americans and brutalize Vietnamese rather than admitting our mistake and righting it.

DELLUMS: Thank you very much, Capt.

Capt O'Mera.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL O'MERA Capt, US Army O'MERA: My name is Mike O'Mera. I was in Vietnam from January, 1969, to February, 1970. I had the rank of Capt.

I resigned my commission January 20, 1970, when I returned from Vietnam. I worked in the Tactical Operations Center of the 25th Infantry div at Cu Chi from April, 1969, until I departed Vietnam.

I can corroborate Ron Bartek and Greg Hayward's testimony concerning the BC.

I will go briefly into that, because I was responsible for receiving reports from the Bgd, posting them on the maps in the Tactical Operations Center, briefing the div commanders, the Bgd commanders, the general staff once a day and passing these reports on to II Field Force, General Ewell's HQ's, Having served in this reporting chain, I personally know of many instances where the BODY COUNT was inflated.

But I think we have to understand why this BODY COUNT was initiated, as Capt Bartek so ably stated. The only measure of success in Vietnam at this time seemed to be BC, and the command emphasis on body count was so tremendous it was felt very much at the lowest level, that is, the company level.

Due to this, you have Bn commanders, Bgd commanders, and we had a div commander who had no alternative but to send their men out every single day, in many cases on night combat patrols, for the purpose of making contact with the enemy. This everyday routine I am convinced led to hundreds of poorly planned, poorly executed and ill-conceived operations of the men on the ground. I say poorly executed not in any way to be derogatory to the man on the ground, the infantry man, or the platoon leader or the company commander such as Capt Hayward was.

I can say this because when you send a man out every single day, a certain amount of fatigue sets in, he becomes careless, and all he is a walking target. When you send a man into areas that are booby trapped, and we all know that booby traps are a tremendous killer in Vietnam and have killed a great number of men in Vietnam, you then begin to wonder of the advisability of sending men out every day who are obviously tired and who are not careful and cautious.

But there was no alternative. The Bn commanders had no alternative, the Bgd commanders had no alternative. The div commander had no alternative because he was told to produce BC, and the only way he could do it was to make their ground units as bait.

They made their ground units bait by sending them into the swamps, into the jungles, into the rice paddies where they would search for the enemy and at night set up a night logger or a combat patrol position, and from this position they were most likely to be attacked. This is where the enemy would most likely hit them. They were bait. They were there strictly to make contact with the enemy and hopefully not take any casualties, but unfortunately in every 1 I can ever recall they did take casualties and great BCs did come from it.

As Capt Bartek stated, we drove to Diamond, a few kilometers inside Vietnam along the Cambodian border. I refer to Capt Bartek's reports. As I should have done, I did, I passed it along to II Field Force, and the div was thoroughly commended for its fine effort.

The same as far as FSB Crook. I refer to that report from Capt Hayward.

Eventually the 3rd of the 22nd Infantry reported 400 people killed in FSB Crook action, which was a complete distortion. Yet it was a lie which was accepted because there was just no alternative. There were several ways to increase the BC. 1 was by just increasing the sum just making it up.

You have a contact, you fire artillery, you have some air strikes, and you call in 50 BC. Another way, you come across the graves and you call in the number of graves you find. If you come across dead bodies, you count dead bodies. You sweep the area, recount the numbers, double it, and call it on in.

1 of the most flagrant violations I saw in the reporting chain, there were radars, PPS-4 radars, PPS-5 radars, and ANTPSY 125 radars at the various FSB's and patrol bases in the 25th Infantry div. These radars are operated at night and they detect movement.

we would reference reports constantly and it was usually a 2d Bgd policy that I know, they would detect 20 to 25 persons, perhaps it could have been trees moving--it could never be substantiated--20 to 25 persons stationary, no less.

Artillery was fired and the Bgd would report 12 BC. It was practice for them to take half the number on the radar screen and count it as BC.

The next day when troops would sweep the area there would be nothing then.

Yet this was accepted and it was good, because the pressure was on and this is what they had to do. This was the only way they could come up with it.

I could recall a sign in the Tactical Operations Center on the side of the map that read "Contact - Happiness is Heavy Contact." There was a little caption, a beautiful drawing of some bombs bursting. That was the attitude, happiness was heavy contact, because contact led to BC.

The thing which seems so terrible to me was the fact that the lives of Americans were placed 2d to enemy dead. BODY COUNT meant more to commanders than the lives of Americans, and when this I believe takes place, when they are used as bait, when they are not used to get intelligence targets but just out there hoping to be fired upon, how can you expect a GI to feel-what can he feel toward the Vietnamese when he knows what he is being used as and how he is being manipulated?

CONYERS: Could you ask the gentleman to yield for just a moment?

DELLUMS: Yes.

CONYERS: I would like to caution everyone giving testimony here to be as careful as they can not to make statements of fact about assertions which they cannot prove, because it will not help the purpose for which these hearings are called. That is to say, unless we can demonstrate some evidence that we know how a general felt or what his attitude was or what his motivation was, it perhaps makes it more difficult for us to arrive at facts that will lead us to accurate conclusions.

O'MERA: I apologize for--I guess I can say these are my personal observations from briefing the div general every day for 7 months while in Vietnam.

I regret the fact that I could see what was important, and what was important was BC. And the committee may also wish to look into further I believe Americans killed in action, the figure which we have become accustomed to, seen once a week. It is now down to about 50 men dead, which is all right to the American people. It was policy in our div that if a man could make it to a hospital--in other words, he could be immediately evacuated to a hospital and a he was alive at the hospital for a minute, 5 minutes, then he was listed as died of wounds. He was not listed as killed in action. Whenever there was a contact, we had 5 men killed, 35 men wounded, some of those wounded are going to die. You may wish to look into the fact these men who died of wounds, are they currently included in the number of men who have died in Vietnam, as the men who are killed in action in Vietnam.

They were not reported as KIA because it lowered our BODY COUNT kill ratio, and ideally it was 30 to 1. The Americans could kill 30 enemies, and then we could lose 1 man. That was the ratio.

I know Capt Bartek and myself, we both tried to find out if men who died of wounds were eventually put on this list. We called the hospitals concerned.

To their knowledge, they were not. We called II Field Force, and to their knowledge the men who died from wounds were not tallied on to the KIA.

I appreciate the fact that I was able to come. I came at the last minute for corroboration of some testimony, and I THank you for the opportunity to say a few words.

DELLUMS: Thank you.

I would like to thank all 3 of you. I think your testimony has been extraordinary and opens up a whole range of questions obviously. We are caught in a time bind, having to end this particular day of hearings by 1:00. I would just remind my colleagues to use some discretion in the amount of time.

I would like to ask Ron Bartek 1 question. You mentioned in your testimony very specifically General Ewell. The question I would like to ask is, what do you think should be done about General Ewell at the Paris Peace Talks?

BARTEK: As Greg mentioned, I can't see how a man with his attitudes, with his basic perspective of the Vietnam War can be an asset in the pursuit of peace.

I am sure the North Vietnamese there know about General Ewell. I mean, we have got leaflets and so forth with our generals' names on them quite often.

So, I don't see how a man can be there in pursuit of peace with his attitudes, and I don't think he should be there.

DELLUMS: Congressman Ryan.

RYAN: You spoke about, Capt O'Mera, the need to maintain contact in order to be sure that there was some North Vietnamese killed and that in your judgement it was more important to have this BODY COUNT than to protect American lives. To what extent would you say the United States soldiers who were called upon to go out and set up these positions at night in order to attract an attack so that they could then kill the enemy, to what extent did the soldiers themselves come to believe, if at any point they did, that they were being placed in a vulnerable position simply to satisfy some kind of statistical requirement and not to satisfy a real military requirement, and if they came a this conclusion, what was the effect on them and there performance and so forth? Do you understand the gist of my question?

O'MERA: Sir, I can't answer that specifically, since I was sitting behind a desk and maps don't fire back. I did not get to talk with that many infantry men on the ground. I did, however, come very those to specialist Sgts who were pulled out of the field and put on the desk jobs to handle the various paper work involved in the reporting requirements. And speaking directly with these individuals, they were, 1st of all, shocked at the attitude at the div level for the man on the around. In other words, there was an inane joy in the Tactical Operations Center whenever there was a contact. And these men regretted the fact once they were at the div level and could look down and see what the attitude was when they were out there in the field, they regretted it very much, and they were very sorry for it.

HAYWARD: Sir, I would like to comment on that just a moment. General DePuy in 1966, I was a junior aide to him, he received some credit for being the 1st commander a use this particular technique in terms of the troops, feeling that they were bait, in essence. He sent his cavalry squadron down a road called the Minton Road and we replanned artillery are, and we told the Vietnamese that we were going to send an engineer company down this road to repair a bridge because we felt if we told the Vietnamese that the word would get to the VC. Instead of sending an engineer company down the road, we sent an armored cavalry squadron down the road. They were attacked by 3 regmts of the 9th VC div. They took serious casualties, but we got a great BODY COUNT because of our present position, our air, and 4 maneuvered Bns around this site.

The troops in that armored cavalry squadron suffered a great morale setback.

I think that was getting to your point, how do the troops think about their use in this. 1 of the Diamond actions--there was a Diamond I, 2, 3--one indicator of their morale as being used for bait may be that 3 bunkers were over-run with men smoking marijuana in them and nobody on alert at all. The whole unit was demoralized, and I think to a great extent because they felt they were just being used as bait, to lure the enema across the border.

DELLUMS: Congressman Koch.

KOCH: Just a brief observation, because we are running out of time here as we have run out of time in Vietnam. What interests me is, and I have no reason to doubt the statements made by our officials that the North Vietnamese have come into the villages and sought to slaughter the leaders, the infrastructure in the villages, and we in turn have done the same according to your testimony, and I have no reason to doubt that.

It just should make 1 aghast at the savagery that the Vietnamese people have had to submit to on the part of the North Vietnamese cadres, doing what you have described we are doing, and between the 2 of us, we are wiping people out, and it is outrageous.

DELLUMS: Cngwmn Abzug.

ABZUG: In your experience of describing meetings with COs outlining policies you described, in your realization that some of these problems were wrong, how many others in your grouping would you say agreed with you or had this realization in your class officers?

BARTEK: I would say it was very low. I can remember the 3 of us reacting in similar ways in that same div HQs. I can remember observing the same glee, though, of the general atmosphere of the div HQs when we got a telephone call saying there was a unit in contact and there was a big fight going on.

I can remember talking to the people in my Bn about the brutalization of the war, and the only favorable responses I got were from the Bn chaplain and oddly enough from 1 artillery officer that was working with us. I sensed very little sympathy from anyone else. In fact, I sensed a good deal of hostility from other officers who thought I was leaving the mainstream of the Army by not wanting to participate fully in the war, and they thought I was a little bit less than heroic and so forth. I would say that our reaction is in the minority.

HAYWARD: I would agree with that at the time. Recently I have received 4 calls from classmates of mine across the country, all of whom are still in the Army and who plan to make a career in the Army. They were sympathetic.

Many of them were trying to find grounds of agreement. It wasn't a hostile atmosphere at all. I expected that. I expected to really have to back my position and fall back on small talk so that we could end the conversation pleasantly, but that wasn't the case. They were sort of searching for an agreement. It is surprising, but most of people all entered the conversation with, be careful what you do, I don't want to see you get hurt. For instance, if you ever want to get a government job, 1 of them told me, that requires a security clearance, you probably won't get it. They failed to see the irony.

They believe the myth that we are fighting in Vietnam for a democracy and for freedom of speech, and yet they themselves fear speaking out where they come back to this country that is supposed to stand for that ideal.

LIVINGSTON: I saw the same thing. I saw and sensed hostility there, but since being back I have received several phone calls from classmates giving sympathy.

JOHNSON: These 3 men can corroborate the plan by the 25th Infantry div staff led by Major General Williamson to bomb a hospital in Cambodia. Talk about killing helpless people! Where is moral outrage? Where is the demand that General Williamson be put on trial? It is kind of ironic that we are able to pass by this systematic destruction of helpless people and yet focus on a man like LT William Calley.

RYAN: The response to that is that there is evidence to be established against those who are responsible.

CONYERS: I merely wanted to thank all of the witnesses for their specific and detailed purpose that brings us here today, and I want to applaud your integrity and courage.

DELLUMS: Thank you. I would like to make 1 brief comment to the press. We have made every effort, the Congressmen, staff and volunteers, to make these hearings over today and the next 3 days highly creditable, and the DD-2 14 separation papers of the witnesses are available to you for your own inspection.

I would like to then thank all of you gentlemen for coming forward and testifying. I think Congressman Conyers has already stated the feeling of the Chair and the other members who joined us this morning our sincere thanks for your integrity and courage, and making the very specific kind of testimony and in dealing with us philosophically as well.

DELLUMS (HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES) WAR CRIMES HEARINGS
4-28-71, Washg'tn, DC
Testimony Of Daniel Barnes 1/20 Bn, Americal Div

BARNES: My name is Daniel Barnes. I lived a life like any other normal kid. I quit schl in the 11-grade for some unknown reason and instead I went into the Army when I was 18. The idea I had was that my brothers had been in and they had served and they didn't say too much about it so it was a usual thing like following the country and following the family tradition and so on. So I went in with the idea of going into the Army that it was more of a privilege rather than more of a sacrifice, which is what it turned out to be.

I went in with the respect for it and so on. After getting through basic training where the main word was, "Kill Kill," all the time, they then pushed it into your head 24 hours/day.

Everything you said - even before you sat down to eat your meals, you had to stand up and scream, "Kill," before you could sit down and eat. Which I didn't think was very right.

In 3-69 after a 10-day leave they graciously gave me I went to Vnam and was assigned to the AmcalDiv and I went through the training schl that Gary was talking about before. I can recall some things that he was saying about how there was no dink like a dead dink. All the things they were talking about, and still the constant push for, "Kill. Kill. Kill," all the time.

You run into things that you don't like or you don't want to do. But this was the war.

So you would follow this all the way through. Then I was 1st assigned to Alpha Co and I was in the field for a month during which I saw nothing, I was just traveling from here to there. Then I was like drafted for the recon cmpy, to go into the 4/2 I in about May. Now when I 1st got into the recon cmpy, they had a patch on their clothes that some of them wore, I would say the old-timers that had been in the country longer, they wore a patch of a VC, and it was yellow and black and it was showing a VC in the midst of an explosion. But anyway, most of the guys wore them which, to me, didn't seem right. But when I went there I saw there was a Bn, and it had a chart there about the VC kills and how many kills each had, and recon was the highest in kills of all the cmpys that I had seen there. So I figured that I was probably going to run into a lot of action and that type of thing.

About in August 1 nite we were stationed on a hill 15 miles south of Duc Pho, just below a vill. We were there to watch the vill to see if there were any people coming in and out of the vill during the nite. For some reason the people that worked during the day had left about 5 o'clock. They all went home someplace else so there was supposed to be no 1 in the vill that nite. That nite they had spotted with the starlight scope, a nite device used to spot people or any object, but they spotted 2 people crossing the road into this vill. They called in the mortars immediately, which is about the same thing as arty batteries. But they fired approx a 4-round barrage, which was unnecessary, but they did it anyway. Besides being off target they burned about 4-5 hooches during the nite. The next morning the whole platoon moved across and down the hill and on across the road to check out this vill and we went in and checked it out and we couldn't find anything. No bodies. No blood. Nothing. Just a couple of burned-down hooches. Well, we reported this to the LT and his exact words were, "Leave nothing standing.

Burn the whole thing down." So we made torches out of rags and sticks and we used gasoline and we started burning the hooches down. By this time the people that were in the vill started coming back and naturally, like anybody would, they put up a big fight about the burning down of their houses and things. Well, they came and they started, you know, grabbing to try to grab the torches away from us, and crying and yelling, you know? Trying to grab the torches. At 1st it was just pushing, just pushing them away, and then it got to be pushing a Little harder with the rifles and it progressed. It got to be where a couple people got killed. I did not see the people being killed but there were 4-5 bodies laying on the ground. and myself, I was involved in burning these vills. Now the feeling at that time was that it was just a way of relieving yourself, where you had no way of relieving yourself and with all the pressures and everything in the military and the pressures of the war itself, and being scared 24 hours a day, and not sleeping, and being bitten by mosquitoes 24 hours/day and getting cold and so on, you are so aggravated and so fed up that it was just unbelievable. Now you had to take it out, you had to take your aggravations out on something. It was a real problem. You didn't let it just sit there.

lf they had said to burn down the hooches, it would relieve what you have in yourself and you just naturally did it. We went into this vill and an old man was sitting there, he was inside and he was about 70-80, and he was dressed in white clothes. He was the only man in the vill that I saw and I went in with another guy and this other guy started tearing the things down off the wall and things and naturally the old man protested. Now this other guy pushed the old man away and shot him in the head. That was really something.

It is really hard to explain the feeling of seeing someone falling for no reason at all, just really"it is really a bad act in the sense of the word to put it in that way. He was just laying there trying to stop us and to protect his home, and he was killed worthlessly. It shocked the hell out of me, which is the least I can say as to what it actually did.

Every hooch was burned down. The people started, of course, leaving the vill with what possessions that they had.

But the feeling of the guys was that the killing was nothing. It was nothing to them. It was just like going and locking your car door. That is the feeling that they showed. They showed no emotion for it at all. It really was so inhumane.

The emotion I felt actually was unbelievable. You know, its the 1st time I had ever seen anyone killed in person. If it was with a reason, then it might have been a little different. But it wasn't. It wasn't worth anything. Whether he was seventy, or whether he was 2. It didn't seem to matter. He was still killed. I just know it was an unbelievable thing. After that there were, while the vill was burning, the Col came flying over in his chopper, flying low. I guess he spotted the smoke from an LZ that was close by and he came over and I had the radio at the time so I could hear what was going on and he asked, "Whats going on down there?" The LT said, "Everythings all right. Don't worry about it." and the Col said, "Well, are you sure everythings all right?" and the guy said, "You know what I mean. Don't worry about it." and the Col said, "Okay, take it easy." and the Col flew off. That was the last we heard about it.

Approx 4-5 people were killed in that vill plus people that were burned by white phosphorus grenades that they were throwing at the hooches, plus the beatings and so on. For actually no reason at all this happened.

Another incident that I remember was the LZ had gotten pretty much fire.

The LZ Debbie. After a rocket and mortar attack the VC tried to get up a hill and a couple of them made it in. But quite a few guys were on there and they were really messed up bad, plus there had been a few that were killed.

Well, they found about 3-4 in the morning. This happened at nite, of course. In the morning they found 3-4 dead VC that were around the perimeter and they put them in choppers and flew maybe 150-200 feet above the vill and pushed the dead bodies out on to the suspected VC vill.

It is a terrorist tactic where if you do this you give them the message, "If you mess around with us, this is what we're going to do to you." That type of thing. It is a very gross warning. You could see the people, where the chopper was pushing these bodies out onto the vill, and they came back with the chopper empty so you can imagine that they dumped them all.

A few other incidents that were major were on the interrogations where we had been chasing footprints of a VC. He went into a vill and a woman and an old man were there and there was some animals around and so on. Well, they started to interrogate her and she naturally was, the word was "no bik" which meant that she didn't want to say anything. So she kept saying "Nothing. Nothing." "No bik. No bik." So they decided that they would throw her down a well, so they did it. 2-3 guys dumped her down a well and she was screaming and hollering and an old man came out from somewhere, I don't know where. But he was screaming and yelling because they had thrown her down the well. So they threw him down too. Well, they were both down the well then.

Then along with those 2 they started throwing in, well, there was a pig that went down the well, and a couple of ducks, and a few other things. They tried to get a calf, but it wouldn't get in there. So they had this calf halfway in there, stuck in the well. It seemed funny at the time - I don't know why, but just it was an unreal realization of what was really happening there. What they felt down there. The terror in their minds. What was felt with us was absolutely myself was absolutely nothing. Later when I thought of it, it was really something else.

As I walked away, I walked around the corner, I heard an explosion and I came back and there was scattered debris and bricks from the well all over the place. So I figured that someone had thrown down the well a grenade that caused the explosion, most likely a grenade.

Some other incidents were that we were in the rice bowl, a place called the rice bowl which is a U-shaped flatlands area with mountains around it.

Well, we were on nite patrol, sleeping in the day and moving at nite. We went into a vill and interrogated a man, if you call it that. They woke him up at nite there and threw him out of bed on the floor and threw a hundred million questions at him which, of course, he didn't understand any of it.

He was an old man. They found a shed there and like they opened the door and threw him in, and shot him, then closed the door. They just left him there.

Most of the incidents I saw in Vnam, and I didn't see as many as a lot of people did because after a real good friend of mine was killed I protested to go in the field and I was lucky to not be court-martialed.

But the way I felt about everything was that - the way I felt about everything that had happened and some of the things I had heard and seen and in really thinking about some of the things that had happened there, it was unbelievable, it was an unbelievable feeling of more guilt than anything because not because I was part of it, but because all Amers were part of it. I talked to an old man once there and I started talking with him and he didn't think the Amers ought to be there because it wasn't up to him, of course, to decide on a democratic govt. He didn't care if it was democratic or communistic. He didn't care as long as he could get up in the morning, plow his rice fields, and carry on a daily life and do everything like this. He wanted to eat at nite and just live a simple life, which is all he wanted.

He didn't want any more war or any part of it. But it was forced upon him.

He was the middleman, so to speak, and he got the wrong end of it.

No matter which way it came from he got the wrong end of it, whether it was from us or from the VC. He was terrorized from both ways. That is mostly what I have to say.

DELLUMS: We thank both you, Barnes, and Villarreal, for your testimony. Villarreal, I wanted to ask you a question: How did you, as a member of a minority group of Amer, react to the attitudes of the US troops going in and treating the people in this way?

VILLARREAL: Well, 1st of all, I guess they are indoctrinated and that is sort of a racist type thing that of course the gooks are gooks and they are inferior to us therefore, you just hear this statement. Well, if you kill 10 gooks for 1 Amer thats all right because thats how much they are worth. They would say that anybody would go along with that because thats what an Amer was worth, was worth so much more. The feeling is that if, of course, everybody condones it, only the fact that they are inferior to us, that they are something less than us, well, thats unbelievable. That their lives have really no meaning and this, of course, is the attitude that is shown to you and the 1s indoctrinated with it, this is indoctrinated into you from the 1st time you get into the Army until the time you leave. When you get there, this is the attitude that you find.

DELLUMS: Thank you.Barnes, many members of the Congress will publicly say that what you have told us today or in previous days are incidents, aberrations, isolated cases. How would you answer that?

BARNES: Well, nothing that happens in Vnam is an isolated case because it has happened before. Everyone is experienced in this in 1 way or another.

Now when you talk about the Congress, and they say that these are isolated things, where are the Congressman who sit up here, who should be listening to this, to listen to the so-called isolated cases, where are they to listen to what we have to say for a change? There are - none of them here.

DELLUMS: Thank you. I would like to, before I turn the floor over to Congressman Conyers, I would like to introduce my distinguished colleague from San Francisco, California, Congressman Phillip Burton. The floor is yours, Mr Conyers.

CONYERS: May I ask all the gentlemen if it would be a fair conclusion that if this Committee arrived at the opinion that all of the atrocities and instances of brutality that have been related here have been perpetrated in Vnam and are and have been condoned either directly or by indirection through the highest members of the military chain of cmnd? Would that be a reasonable conclusion for this Committee to arrive at in your judgment? and you may comment on this. If you desire to comment, you may.

VILLARREAL: I would say that not only at the highest level, but even here.

For example, it seems like a common joke was that if you ever had any problem, to just tell it to your Congressman.

Now as a personal experience I have right now, yesterday and the day before, I asked my Congressman to at least come down and listen. Now he is on the floor upstairs here. So I just wonder what effect it would have had for me to have written a letter to him. Right now he won't walk down 1 flight of stairs to come and listen to this. He doesn't want to listen, therefore apparently he knows all about it. and in a sense everybody is condoning it.

The responsibility - well, the people that make the policy, of course.

Thank you.

CONYERS: Would anyone else care to respond to that?

BARNES: I think that most of the high cmnd knew about the things that were happening and the " reasons that they didn't say too much about it or nothing was processed through about it was that the main thing was that the object was to go into Vnam, and the object was to most of the high cmnd, it was to kill. That was the thing. To come in and - I don't mean destroy in the sense of the word which is what they did really, but if a couple of civilians got in the way, "Thats not a big matter. Thats the price of war." Thats how they considered it. If they heard of mass murders usually it was an overpass, and it didn't have too much effect, that type of thing. They didn't care about it. They didn't have no feelings for the people at all.

Which is why most of it went on, of course.

BATTLES: The question was, do we feel as though the higher-ranking officials are the 1s responsible. Well, when you have, as we did, a couple 100 Vnam vets talking about this, many having been to Vnam, and if you heard the conversation, and the work of the Citizens Comm'n Inquiry here on Vnam down here on the Mall, also when the Vnam vets were here, and they of course after having gone through Vnam, and conducted themselves very well, and with the number of state representatives that they had from the different walks of life and the fact that they didn't run around doing these things in the US before they went over there, and these things happened as a result of this war, and they are from all different training camps all over the USA what else can it be? What else?

I would like someone to give me an alternative. What are they the result of? I would like to know that. Really. The question is just - its not a very good question. " It is just so plain. You know?

Yes. Definitely. But who are they? I would like to know who pulls the strings in this war.

CONYERS: Anyone else? Any observations on this question?

DELLUMS: Apparently not right now. Congressman Burton, the floor is yours.

BURTON: Did you rpt to any superior NCO or officer any of these incidents?

BARNES: Incidents that happened were - the NCOs like the E-7s and the Sgts and so on and so forth were in on this as much as the lower ranking. I mean, as far as that was concerned, they were in the platoon itself. But as far as going in and telling anyone about it like a Col or something, well he flew over it. He knew what happened. I didn't have to tell him anything. He knew about it. He understood what happened. As soon as he said, "Its all right, don't worry about it." Well, with that attitude, you figure if you said anything it wouldn't get you anywhere. and the people that you live with, well, these are the people that you live with and have lived with for maybe 2-3 months and you have slept in the same bunker and you ate with them and you grubbed with them and you were just as dirty as they were and just as filthy and shared the same rotten experiences and the crap that they went through. You went through it yourself. But you can't turn around and say that its not right for that person to kill. They may turn on you at some time and say that, "Thats too bad. What will you do about it?" That type of thing. How do you know if some nite when you're sleeping that this guy won't knife you or shoot you? Not saying that he would, but he has a rifle. I could have shot that old man, but he did it. I know better.

The way I felt was that he saw a lot of this. Now the recon is going to be in and out of there and as far as the People were concerned, well, there had been just so many changes in the recon unit that every time it went out there were 3-4 guys who were new. You would always get 3-4 guys who would get messed up and 3-4 new guys would come in. This would continue. Or the whole platoon might get wiped out and you would start all over from scratch.

It was the feeling that you were taking your anxieties out on these people.

BURTON: Is this the 1st public occasion that you have related the testimony that you have given us today?

BARNES: Well, I never had a chance to day - I didn't know the channels to go through to say anything about it. When I came from Vnam I got more of when I was in Seattle going home, there was a woman there who was asking what outfit I was in and she was saying, isn't that the AmcalDiv that Calley was in and the comment was made that, "You are another 1 of those killers." Thats 1 of the statements that I got from 1 of them. So I figured that if I started talking it would get me 1-2 places possibly. I would be with the rest of the guys who were laying dead in their graves, or it would get me absolutely nowhere. So mostly I just have told friends in our talking or just around myself as far as that goes. I haven't had a chance to speak publicly about it, no.

BURTON: What were the dominant factors that led you to decide to give this testimony?

BARNES: I think the most dominating factor was when the 1st day I called, and they said, "Raise your right hand. That was the 1st thing. Now when I came in the mili, what really the military was all about was what got to me. I think if you're going to have a military org it shouldn't be run by military well, but its not my place to talk about that. The military in the sense of the word, like you have to serve. You have to serve for your country because you live in your country, you have to serve for it, but do I have to go to Vnam to kill these innocent people for no reason at all?

For no reason at all, and should I go on that type of thing. Why can't I question? I was there, I know what it is.

BURTON: How long have you been out of the service?

BARNES: Since Oct. I stayed 6 months at Ft Hood after I got out of Vnam.

I was going to extend in Vnam, but I decided not to.

BURTON: Did you want to say something?

BATTLES: Well, you had a question, like was it reported. Well, there is a thing called the chain of cmnd in the mili, and if there are 2-3 higher-ranking people in your unit, the people who participated in it along with you, its just up to them to do that sort of thing. That is the chain of cmnd. and you can get court martialed if you don't follow the chain of cmnd. You are in a possible court martial situation in a combat zone for many reasons in Vnam while these atrocities are being committed and you don't want to question a heck of a lot of these goings - on around you - because you just follow suit. Because thats the way it is.

I think we should question - we should question the things that are going on underneath.

Dellums (House of Representatives) War Crimes Hearings Wednesday, 4-28-71, Washg'tn, DC Testimony of Spec/4 Gary Battles The Committee met at 9:45am in the Caucus Room, Cannon House Office Building, the Honorable Ronald V Dellums, Chmn of the Committee, presiding.

Present: Representatives James Abourezk, Herman Badillo, Phillip Burton, John Conyers, Jr, Donald W Riegel, Jr, Benjamin S Rosenthal and John F Seiberling.

DELLUMS: The Committee will be in order. We have with us this morning to my far right, Congressman Ben Rosenthal from NY, Conyers, and to my far left Herman Badillo from NY and Congressman Seiberling from OH.

This morning we will hear testimony from 9 former members of the C and D Companies of the Americal Division, I/20 Bn, 11th Bgd, Americal Div, the Div that Lt Calley was in; and testimony will be from the young men approx 1 year after he left. For the last 2 days we have had an overview of atrocities in SEA. The objective here was to put the whole thing in a macrocosm. Today we will look at specific instances of SOPs by what may be termed a typical infy unit that served in SEA. We will ask our witnesses wherever possible to made brief opening statements and to delay the details until we open it up for questions from the congressmen.

If there are any other opening statements by and members of the panel here, you may do so now.

SEIBERLING: Mr Chmn, I would simply like to ask each of the witnesses to, in the course testimony if they can, focus on 2 things: 1, to try to be as specific as possible in terms of what they actually saw or what they actually learned firsthand secondly, to try to the best of their ability to give their impression as to the extent to which the things they describe were generally known among people in their unit, or people in Vietnam and, in particular, higher levels of cmnd. If we are to accomplish what I think we need to accomplish in terms of bringing out the extent of cmnd responsibility, then we would like to get the impressions as to the extent to which higher elements of cmnd should have known or did not know of the kind of thing that was going on that you are about to describe. Thank you.

DELLUMS: Before we begin, I might indicate to the press that we have Xerox copies of the DD-214 separation papers for all the witnesses here this morning. They will be made available to you so you can ascertain whatever info you need from that. Our 1st witness this morning is Mr Gary Battles.

Statement Of Gary Battles E/4, APC Driver, 11th Bgd, Americal Div, College Park, Maryland

BATTLES: Good morning. My name is Gary Battles, and I will say that I grew up in Ohio, around East Cleveland. I graduated from high schl, having participated in track and the normal things that people do in high schl. I went to Ohio State Univ'y. I was drafted from there because I could not continue my education. You had to maintain certain credit hours and I was - I just didn't have the money, so it was either the draft and so on and so forth. I didn't really realize what I was getting into when I went into the Armed Services. My parents believed in it, I suppose. I had respect for the USA and respect for the Army and I was just. I just went by what I was told. So I went into the Army. The 1st thing I noticed in the Army was like marching around singing songs about killing, and I saw signs around certain places on the camp that said VC-BREAKFAST OF CHAMPIONS.

DELLUMS: Where was this?

BATTLES: That was at Ft Dix, NJ. and I didn't like this at all. If Amer was such a good country, why should it have to be upheld in this kind of a way?

I made it through basic training with difficulty. I didn't like stabbing a dummy with a bayonet. I just couldn't see it. I don't like killing. I went to AIT and from there I went to Vietnam. Upon arrival in the Americal Div, we were sent to a briefing camp. We had 7-8 days to see what it was like in Vietnam, to learn bow to stay alive, so to speak, at this training camp. It was a refresher, to get used to the climate, and so on.

During this period they had classes and at every 1 of the classes there was a microphone in front of the speaker, just like in front of me - but we were told that "the only good gook is a dead gook, and the more gooks you can kill, the more slant-eyes you can kill in Vietnam, that is the less you will have to worry about them killing you at night.

We were told that men, women and children would put a rubber band around a hand grenade, pull the pin, and throw it into a gasoline tank, and the gasoline would eat away the rubber band and the hand grenade would blow up, and blow up the truck.

Now I started questioning my presence in Vietnam at this time. If the Vietnamese children were after someone in a village, what am I doing there?

But again as going into the Army, I just followed suit. I went through the training.

I remember a man, he was an E-8, I believe it was, who demonstrated different ways of making sure that people were dead. He didn't only kill them, he told us how you could assure that they were dead. He told us how to take your fingers and bend your fingers - and if you were double-jointed it was much better, but if you could extend your fingers and bend them back and down, and gouge a person's eyes out, that this was a way that you could tell he was dead. He told us how to crack the rib cage and pull the heart out of a man.

It made me sick.

But we all went through the Americal Div, and I believe everyone here at this table was at a training camp, and they remember the man. Is that agreed or not agreed?

CONYERS: Mr Chmn, can the Chmn show that all the witnesses have agreed with that statement?

DELLUMS: Can we have an indication here?

CONYERS: All right, so it would be excluding the gentleman to your left.

VILLARREAL: No, I don't know the gentleman.

CONYERS: Well, we are trying to have the record show this.

BATTLES: I don't want to bring out nationalities or anything, but he did tell us how to stay alive, and he did show us these things. Things that he told me happened in the field in Vietnam in the infy, which is the reason, of course, that I am here today, because I don't like what i did, I don't like what I saw, or I don't like what I participated in.

After getting - They took a plane and they flew us to our base camps, and I got my gear and things and I went on a truck with my squad then to go out to a small ARVN compound and we were supposed to help the ARVN's hold this little compound. I wasn't sent to the field immediately for duty, just out of Duc Pho.

Now this is the 11th Bgd. Now on the way there members of my squad, we were looking over the rice paddies, and I had "big eyes" at the time. I saw people working in the rice paddies and 1 of the fellows asked me how I felt about them, what I felt of Vietnam.

I said, "Well, from what I learned I guess I shouldn't trust anyone." He said, "In my opinion we should start sniping at them right now." That is the way it was when I got here and that is the way it is now. and from all the reports of the enemy in the area, it is going to be worse in the upcoming months." He also said, "As long as you keep the attitude like what we have and members of this squad and members of this company have, the men will trust you and you follow suit and you will be all right." and I thought, well, that means I am going to have to be - you know-sort of vicious, and I just questioned this.

These are the people that are here to know, and who work on the pacification progs. The people to build orphanages, etc, for the betterment of RVN. My question is, why am I supposed to be hating them? It was the genl consensus though of the company, you know, and after getting to this ARVN compound, the ARVN's I found out didn't like us and we didn't like them. That is the way it was.

When we got fired on, some of the men in the company at the time, you know, shot at the ARVN's when they ran. That was the problem. I am sure people would agree of seeing some instances of that, too.

About 12-14 days later, 5-3, I, about, our company, Charlie Company, had made contact and 11 of their men had been killed at the time, and we were sent to help them out. Now we all got on line with APC's and we were told not to fire, but we were just on line like the Redcoats, a squad of men. There was an APC and a squad of men, and we were facing the jungle. We were told to march and not shoot until we were fired on, and I thought that someone is just going to get hit here. Someone will have to go down and before we knew what was going on, that's what happened. What happened was, we started marching forward and immediately some men were killed and we all hit the ground and we - I don't know.

Every time I start talking about this it really gets to me that I have to sit and tell the people what is going on in Vietnam.

I am glad for the people that did come, like the people that came here today, I am glad they came here. and II break down about in the middle of this.

But I would like to ask a question myself before I go on.

Where are some more people that care about this? Where are the people who are pulling the strings in this war? I mean, it only baffles me. It really does.

Well, 9 of us showed up here and not too many of you showed up for this today.

DELLUMS: I might just give you 1 brief response to that. Every single member of the Congress has been invited to these proceedings. I think some of these in answer to your question - it is obvious, I think, there are members of the Congress who would like to be here who have other things to do, but I think there are many congressmen

BATTLES: Well, a will go to the incidents and I will get off the air. The thing that 1st blew my mind in Vietnam was on 6-10. Our Company C came in choppers. We got out and marched into a jungle area. Now we marched in and the 1st 4-5 men were killed like immediately. I think it was 6 men killed.

After these 6 were killed everything was really, really hectic. We had poor radio contact, we didn't know where our own men were, and we got down behind rice paddy dikes, and they then called in arty. and they called in bombers too and the napalm.

Well, we backed out and the men being attacked - we had men up near the front where the bombs were falling and the arty was flying in, and our Col was then flying overhead. the called in saying, "Excellent, excellent. You have made contact. I want a body count." Well, we had a man, for example, who was having a heart attack. Now I had the radio, and I told him that we have a man 19 years old having a heart attack and we don't know where the medic is. and we couldn't see what we were firing at. He said, "I don't care about that. I want a body-count." My response was, I got on the radio and I said, "you don't care about that?

Like who does care about that?" and I threw the radio down and I started putting out some fire myself.

After this it went on for about a 1/2 hour or 45 minutes and we anyway got everyone back up and 1 of the men said that there was an old woman and a child back there who were preparing rice. and I know I saw them. know when we walked in a saw them.

and he said, "Shall we go back and do a job on them?" and the Capt just nodded his head. So they went back, 7-8 men in the squad, and these men were rather bitter, like their friends had been killed, and they went back and threw the old woman and the child down the well and threw 2 grenades in on top of them.

Now after this happened

ROSENTHAL: How old was the child?

BATTLES: The child was approx 7 years old. It is hard to tell. They are dirty, and, of course, they are carrying rice and working. The woman, she had to be in her 80' though. She was really old. After we got organized we were told to go to certain places across the rice paddies. and in starting out into the paddies, you could see that there was jungle on the sides and the front. Now it was a U-shaped area ideal for ambush. Well, I brought it to the attention of the company and they did nothing about it. So we started across and sure enough we had an ambush. Now more men were killed. That's about that incident, that about tells about what I have to tell about that.

Now other incidents that occurred were just like 1 morning where we went into a village and this was in Aug. We went into a vill and it was a FREE-FIRE ZONES now and we went into the vill and people started running. It was the early hours, still dark. We almost shot each other, like we were in 2 columns, and the people started running, and 1 guy was shot here. They said that he was grabbing some sort of a pistol belt, and he had ammunition in it, but I never saw the pistol belt. He was shot and there were men, you know, searching the hooches.

Now as soon as this happened the vill was designated as an enemy vill, so we started destroying the food, burning the hooches, and killing the cattle, and that was just genl policy. Like we did that all the time. Every vill that we went into. We killed the animals, and other guys in their testimony, like, you know, they feel up the women. You know, like also urinating in the food. These are the things that happened every day.

I don't really know - I don't have anything more to say really.

DELLUMS: I commend you for your testimony and appreciate your courage in coming here. I think your testimony is very shattering. I would like to turn it over now to members of the panel for questioning. Mr Conyers?

CONYERS: What we want established here, sir, is to what extent these activities were condoned or approved by higher military authority?

BATTLES: I'll give you a specific incident: I can give you these all day though, but I was in a recon unit later on. It was 2 o'clock in the morning and we had landed at LZ Bronco. We didn't know where Bravo Company was. But we started moving across the river, and they shot and killed 1 of our men, and wounded 2. and I thought at the time that those were our own men.

Sure enough, we waited until daylight and we slowly got up and waved to each other and, of course, felt like a bunch of fools. I was really upset because the man who got killed - well I had just shaken his hand and told him to stay by me. He went through the hedgerow before I did and that's the reason he got killed.

Well, we heard a rustling in the bunker, the foxhole at the river bank, and we then - everyone else was afraid then.

I was rather angry and upset, and I went over and it was - it was supposed to be designated as an area for VC. Well, I went up and I shoved my weapon in the hole, and I went through 1 clip, threw the clip away, and threw in 2 grenades on top of that. Well, we backed up and we set up security, and they are saying, "Excellent. Excellent." The PRU said that there are probably VC in the hole, so that's why I did it.

Well, we backed away and I was getting complimented for what I had done, and we then explored this. We found that 3 men were still alive and I don't remember seeing a weapon in that hole. Pardon me, 3 men were dead, 2 men were alive, and it was the Bn cmdr who came in the chopper and some lieutenants who were working with the professional recon units, and they decided - I don't know if they were God - but 1 of the 2, both of the men were too wounded to take back and to have them patched up, so 8 rounds were put into 1 of the men's head and I think the other 1 just died. It wasn't just on the chopper.

CONYERS: These were Vietnamese?

BATTLES: Yes, and all I heard about later was that it was - I don't know how they determined it. There were no papers, no weapons or anything. All they had was a transistor radio in this hole with them. I almost got a Silver Star for doing this.

But I was told later that they were from the 300th Bn of VC, or some VC unit. All they were really is Vietnamese. In a FREE-FIRE ZONES, near the mountains, I saw a child and a woman, were working - well, you know, like we had sniper fire, and we sniped back. But a woman and a child were running across, and the Capt goes, you know, "There. They are running." Well, FREE-FIRE ZONES zone, anyone running in Vietnam - well, if they are running they are wrong. They are enemy. and we shot. Like a whole squad opened up, and I don't think they really hit them. But then 1 guy drew up a careful bead and the woman went down. The next morning we went out and we could see the cap of the child that was bloodied and you could see where the mother had dragged the child away.

Well, my squad happened to be in front. That was it.

1 incident on the river bank near the South China Sea, our company was moving along and there was a man like 2-300 yards in front of us. He came out of a vill and started running across, you know, across the paddies and he started then getting down on hands and knees and running, and we were told to open up on him. This wasn't even a FREE-FIRE ZONES, by the way. There were people along there, and it was not a FREE-FIRE ZONES.

Well, the squad in front opened up and myself and another man took off, and we ran off after him when the firing stopped, and as he swam across the river, the guy I was with shot him and hit him.

Well, we went out, and - well, he had gone under, the water current had taken him under and we couldn't find him. Well, there were 2 of us out there, and I know I didn't find any ID and I know he didn't, and when we got back to the CP we learned that some ID was produced, and it was told that he was a LT of blah, blah, blah. That was another incident. This happens all the time.

On the bunker lines, you know, for calling in mortars on water buffalo and cattle and so on. You know people are waiting up to 7 o'clock - is the magic number. At that time everyone goes into the hooches and at 7 you call it in and the shit hits the fan.

CONYERS: The question I ask you - and it will apply to every witness that comes on after you - is it from these incidents, which apparently without number you could recite before this committee, that there is a genl policy of genocide being practiced on the Vietnamese by Amer

BATTLES: well, I don't need any notes for that answer.

CONYERS: Is that correct?

BATTLES: That is correct. I just pulled my tour in Vietnam. It's 1 big atrocity. I don't need any notes for that. After 8-10 months I just then refused to fight any further. I just - I had done a good job and I got my medals and so on. I just saw what I was really doing. The whole thing was based on, you know, rank. The more bodies you got, the better you were. You get your RandR according to the more killed you get. If you got confirmed kills - well, we had a club called the Super Killers. It didn't matter how you got them. We had "SK" embroidered on our clothes, and we were respected by the officers. We could get away with more stuff than the others in any of these places because we were like' noted as really doing a good job.

CONYERS: The 2d question to you and to every successive witness here that this Committee is concerned with is, where does responsibility attach over and above the individual servicemen who were committing these atrocities? In other words, where does the responsibility for this policy of genocide come from?

BATTLES: I would like to know myself who is responsible for the war. I know it's not me. I know it's not Lt Calley because I am sure he wouldn't have made the point to get a ticket on the airplane to go to Vietnam and do the things like he did in My Lai. The result of Regtation and just the way things are in Vietnam, is the reason for that. That's what happened. The guilt doesn't enter my mind on something that happened with Calley. Guilt doesn't enter the picture. The fact that the war is going on - that is the guilt.

In today's society with all the advances we have, it is hard for me to believe that something like this is still going on.

DELLUMS: Congressmen Rosenthal.

ROSENTHAL: How do you react from the comment that I have heard from some people that "War is hell, has always been hell, people get killed, women and children get killed if they happen to be there. If they do, that's unfortunate. Now, how do you react to that?

BATTLES: I don't even believe in, well, I came home, I think, about in the 4th grade as a child with a black eye. and I was told that, of course, "You don't fight to solve your problems." Well, when I was in basic training, I asked my mother what I should do, "I have to stab a bayonet in human silhouettes," and I asked her that question and she said that "That's the way it is." Well, if that's true I think something should be done.

ROSENTHAL: When your mother said that "That's the way it is," that is what I am trying to convey to you. Wh at is your reaction to that?

BATTLES: Well, the reason I am here is that I am trying to change the way it is.

ROSENTHAL: You don't think that's the way it ought to be?

BATTLES: Certainly not. Do you?

ROSENTHAL: No, I don't.

CONYERS: That's why he is here.

BATTLES: Exactly.

ROSENTHAL: Do you think we are all guilty? Rather than say guilty, let's say responsible.

BATTLES: Every poll I ever saw in the US, whether it be 5 people on the street or a million in a larger city, the majority of the people in the USA are not for this war. They either want out, or, well, they want out. and if this is a democracy, and a majority want out of Vietnam, why are we in Vietnam?

That's what I would like to know.

ROSENTHAL: Just 1 more question: How do you think it's possible that Amer boys can do the things you told us about?

BATTLES: Well, it's a way of life.

ROSENTHAL: How can they kill women and children?

BATTLES: Well, it's a way of life in Vietnam from the time you get there. I didn't want to do the things I did. I didn't want to participate. I was following orders though. If you are in the front squad and they say, "Disperse," and you get on line, and you fire at people running, you know, that's your job. If you are an infyman that is your job. My mom said at a PTA meeting that some boys are trained to be engineers and they come on home as engineers. Now what do you do with what do you do if you are trained as a killer? Do you join the Mafia?

ROSENTHAL: Well, Viet me ask 1 more question: What does your mother think of all this now?

BATTLES: Well, she is a very, very changed person from what she used to be. From my letters and other people's letters, she has certainly changed.

ROSENTHAL: Thank you, Mr Chmn.

DELLUMS: Thank you. We have also been joined, to our far right, by Mr William Ryan from NY.

RYAN: Thank you. You described the killings of the woman and the child in the well. Was that reported to any higher authority?

BATTLES: I imagine there was in the body-count. Any time we are

RYAN: Well, except as a statistic, was it reported as a killing of an elderly woman and a 7 year-old child, and something that should not ever have happened?

BATTLES: To tell you for sure, I can't say. It wasn't my job to do that. I was relatively new and I was, frankly, shocked. I was just absolutely shocked that it happened.

RYAN: I am sorry, I did not hear what Div you were in?

BATTLES: I was in the Americal Div, 11th Bgd, I/20.

RYAN: Now let me ask this as a genl question, maybe you can't answer it, maybe you can: It has been my impression of reading accounts of activities in Vietnam and talking with servicemen and of what we have read of the Calley trial, that Amer soldiers varied from outfit to outfit. That it was some Divs that were more prone to engage in this type of activity that you described, more so than other Divs. Now my impression is that this is a function of the attitude of those people in the particular Divs. Now is there any merit in my impression?

BATTLES: If Calley incident happened when it did, which I imagine it did and the stories I got in the unit were between the time Calley was there and the time that I got there, that would be true. I have called men from my unit that had 10-11 months in the country and I tried to get them to come and testify about dragging people behind armored personnel carriers, and of going into a vill and taking a chair out from underneath them after having strung them up for hanging. We found our stamp of the unit on the foreheads of some of the bodies to show that our unit had been through the area, and that was when I 1st got into the unit. If Calley's incident happened when it happened, and when I was there the things that were happening and when I left the things that were happening - like we have had testimony Like the soldiers' special inquiry of last 12 - where people from all over Vietnam,,from different units, and newsmen would ask, "You have been out now for 2 years, why bring it up now?" Well, these - people just didn't know what the proper channels were to take to get it out to the public. I am sure and there is no doubt in my mind that is the way the war is run in Vietnam.

RYAN: Well, would you say it was different in the Americal Div than it was in some other div's?

BATTLES: I couldn't say. I talked to Marines, and I heard Marine testimony, and I had friends in different divs, and I can tell you it's all the same.

RYAN: Congressmen Seiberling?

SEIBERLING: Mr Battles, I certainly do commend you for your forthrightness and your courage in coming here. I just would like to go back to a couple of thins, a couple of these incidents. The 1 where the woman and the child were thrown down the well. Do I understand correctly that this was checked out with the Capt before this incident occurred?

BATTLES: Well, you mean like the Capt was personal friends of 2 men who had gotten killed. It was just a nod of the head. That's all. That's just the way things are in Vietnam. There isn't any procedure. Like you don't have a written thing when you are out there being fired at and so on.

Like we thought everything was ok and the choppers came in to pick up the dead bodies and the wounded, and they started getting shot at and everything and he contact was bad, the communications were bad and it wasn't like a written permission thing or anything. It was just nod of the head, and of course, they are there fixing rice, and of course they, I guess, had more bowls of rice than for the 2 of them, therefore they were just VC.

That's the way it is. But the way I saw Vietnam was that we go through and do the things we do, and if the VC go through and do what they do, what do the people have to do? Where can they go? Where can they turn to? The war is just that way. We ate chicken-heads in the vill hooch in 1 of those places, and on the same night that man snuck into our perimeter with an M-18 and 80 rounds of ammunition for an M-14 and he was the vill chief, and we thought, the only reason we set up there near his vill was that because he had been good to us during the day. Now that puts a lot of questions in my mind. Someone who supposedly wears 1 face during the day, and agrees with us, and feeds us, and then at night he tries to kill us.

You know, who is the enemy? Apparently the whole Vietnamese people are the enemy. That's the way I saw it and that's the way I was trained to treat them, and that's the way it was.

I see my Capt, like 2-3 different Capts, in the field, after leaving a day perimeter, we would leave our food boxes and trash and so on. and of course children would come up to look through it. and they would shoot at the children, they would see the children coming and they would shoot at the feet of the children coming up to the food. Now I can't give particular incidents of killings, but I am sure that they got dirt spatters from the rocks being thrown up and things like that. I have seen booby traps set up where they would take a C-ration box, and turn it upside down and put a mousetrap device inside so when it is picked up it goes off. Under the C-ration box is the mousetrap device.

SEIBERLING: Was any effort made by anyone to rpt this incident or other similar incidents to higher headquarters?

BATTLES: No.

SEIBERLING: Thank you very much.

DELLUMs: Congressmen Abourezki

ABOUREZKI: Now the booby trap in the C ration box, that was done so that no matter who came along, they would get it?

BATTLES: Well, just the act of doing it. Who is to say who was going to come along?

ABOUREZKI: Well, what I am trying to get at is that whoever did it didn't really care, is that what it means?

BATTLES: Apparently not. How does he know who is going to come along? The way I understand it, and maybe I am wrong, but I thought it was against the Geneva Convention. There is no front there in Vietnam. The people are crisscrossing constantly, working in the fields and so on, carrying on daily life.

You can't really tell who is going to come around. You set a booby trap in a place where they are not going to go, I should think, and it would be all right. All the FREE-FIRE ZONESs that I saw that were supposed to be FREE-FIRE ZONESs were not ' supposed to be inhabited by any people there, and there are people in FREE-FIRE ZONESs.

There have to be. If we had done this on most occasions, what we were supposed to be doing, we would have killed a heck of a lot more people than we did. But we came up to people in vills and

CONYERS: What were you supposed to do?

BATTLES: Well, in a FREE-FIRE ZONES anything that moves gets killed. You don't ask any questions. If you are on point there is no question about it. The FREE-FIRE ZONES is inhabited by enemy.

That is what happens in a FREE-FIRE ZONES. But we didn't always obey orders. We can't just kill these people, they are people. So it is a FREE-FIRE ZONES and if they are working in the field, this killing is supposed to take place. But we simply harassed them. We hit them with rifles, cut their wheat bags, you know, they carry the food on a stick like the people do in the Orient. So we would cut those bags open or push them over a hill into a river or something. We just couldn't go as far as to kill them, because they are humans, they have humanity left in them.

ABOUREZKI: Well, the FREE-FIRE ZONES is determined to be in enemy area, is that right?

BATTLES: Yes, we have maps of our area where the FREE-FIRE ZONES s were.

ABOUREZKI: Who determined that?

BATTLES: Well, I followed orders. I learned more than I should have in Vietnam as it was. I can't say who does it. I would like to know. I really would. I would like to see what kind of a guy he is, what he eats for breakfast. Breakfast of Champions - VC. Maybe he eats VC. a don't know.

DELLUMS: Congressmen Badillo?

BADILLO: What you are talking about is 6-69 and up to 2-70? Is that correct?

BATTLES: Yes.

BADILLO: That was the period when there was supposed to be Vietnamization of the war. Were you working with any RVNese troops?

BATTLES: Yes, we worked with RVNese troops and they worked with us until we made contact and then we were working alone.

BADILLO: Did the RVNese kill like the rest?

BATTLES: well, I have seen cases where they twist the arms of some of these people. Now they are their own people, and here we are going into Vietnam - well, I don't know where they get the info that a certain vill was an enemy vill. But they would twist their arms, and they would rip the blouses off the women. Sure. They did the same things we did.

BADILLO: Did they kill them?

BATTLES: Well, I don't remember any incidents where they, themselves did kill them. But I see them, I have seen t"hem drag barbed wire across the palms of the hands of 10 - year - old child. They would be dragging barbed wire across his hands. In 1 incident - there is a guy that can testify with this, who was in the same unit that I was - here he was thrown down a well 4-5 times. We thought a VC might be in the vill where we had killed some people, so we threw the boy down the well 4-5 times. Well, he would crawl back up, and he would be thrown back in. There he would be at the bottom of the well looking up at us from the well. Or we would hold a boulder over the well, and we would be yelling in English, "Find rifle." Well, he's looking up at us and he doesn't know what to do.

BADILLO: Did you notice any difference in the behavior of the RVNese troops and the Amer troops in respect to civilians?

BATTLES: Well, they held hands and kissed a lot and ran when the fire broke out and that's all I know of.

DELLUMS: Well, I would like to, on behalf of myself and the Committee, commend you for your testimony and I realize that it takes courage and great feeling, and I know it is difficult to put into the words the facts that you have outlined. I think all of us clearly understand the agony that you feel and I am very happy that you came forward today because the Amer people have to understand our involvement in SEA. Thank you very much.

SEIBERLING: You have expressed the proper concern as to why there aren't more people who are concerned. 1 of the ways that we are going to try to straighten out this mess, and have the confidence of our people in this country, is to bring out the facts. So far there is a conspiracy on the part of the military to keep from airing their dirty linen in public and after 4 years in the Army as an officer I know that this a natural reaction. But we are going to see that the facts are brought out whatever they may be and your contribution is greatly appreciated, and I have faith now in the Amer people and I have faith in our process that when the facts are brought out the Congress itself will ultimately take some action that is appropriate to take to prevent this from happening in the future. I think you have contributed a great deal, thank you very much.

BATTLES: My contributing - well, my mother wrote me a letter, you know, and the CID had been visiting the house and they had tapped the phone. This is the Land of the Free and Home of the Brave. My opinion is that you have to be awfully brave to be free and to tell the truth of what has happened in Vietnam.

SEIBERLING: Well, you are not alone in the phone tapping. We have it here in the Congress.

DELLUMS: The 2d witness we will hear from is Mr Dan Notley.

Dellums (House of Representatives) War Crimes Hearings Wednesday, 4-28-71, Washg'tn, DC Testimony Of Daniel Notley E/6, 1/20 Bn, I 1th Bgd, Americal Div St Paul, Minnesota

NOTLEY: My name is Daniel Notley, and my home right now is St Paul, MN. However, I was raised in Oklahoma and I am kind of like Battles, I was raised in a good home. I have no complaints about the way I was raised. I just about had everything I really wanted. My parents were middle class Protestants.

My father served in WWII and Korea and from the time I was a little kid I was always given toy guns as some of my toys. I used to wear my father's army helmet around the house.

My parents had pictures of him wearing his uniforms and so on. The Amer Soldier, the Amer Army was an institution to be glorified. I like war movies because this was the Amer way.

John Wayne was always right. I never heard people referred to as a Japanese person, they were always Japs or Nips, or other people were called Krauts, and this type of thing. The whole process I went through was just complete disassociation with anyone in the world that was not Amer.

I couldn't relate to them as being human. So I went into schl, into college, and I graduated from high schl and then went to the Univ'y of OK for 2 and a 1/2 years and a had some financial problems at that point. I had to quit schl and I moved to MN to get a job and there I got drafted into the Army.

Now I didn't want to go. I was beginning to wonder about the Vietnam War myself. I supported it, of course, when I started in college. I can tell you the only speech I ever got an A on in a speech class was a speech in support of our policy in Vietnam.

But I had begun to question things. There were some things that didn't seem right. and I had a choice, you might say. I actually went home and talked to my parents about it, and I didn't know whether I wanted to go or not. It was sort of a conflict within myself and when I confronted my parents with this they were in complete shock.

They accused me of being duped by a Communist, rather. That my father had served in 2 wars, and why couldn't I serve in a war and this whole process of course is the Americanization process that you have from the time you were born.

So rather than shame my parents and bring disgrace on my family by leaving my country - which I didn't want to do by going to Canada or to jail decided I would do my duty. I was drafted in 8-68.

I had my basic training in the infy at Ft Polk, LA. I went through most of the training as the other guys went through. The complete dehumanization of a person in preparation for the VW.

Now in this training they referred to the Vietnamese as dinks, or gooks. The impression was what they were something less than human.

I had a DI in AIT reply to a question, "What is it like over there?" and he told us, he said, "It is like hunting rabbits and squirrels." That is all it meant to his. That is all the emotion he had about it.

So I shipped off for Vietnam. a was assigned to the Americal Div Echo Company. It was a light infy Bgd. I was in the recon platoon and my impression of the recon platoon had been that sort - it was a sort of a sneak, peek and retreat operation.

Our only job was to search out the enemy and to pull back and let the regular line companies go in and do the job.

But from the beginning we didn't operate like that. We were more or less when I went into the platoon the guys were bragging that we had more kills in our platoon than any other platoon in the area.

People were happy about it. It was a big thing to be - big thing to the guys in the recon platoon that they were proud of and it was because we were hard core. Just like being a Green Beret or something. I was at this point very wide - eyed and naive, like, here I am, I am really going to get down on some of these VC, and show them where it's at.

Well, we went to the field for about the 1st month and a 1/2 and I expected the 1st day to get in a big fire fight. The fighting just wasn't what I imagined it to be, however, after watching all these movements. It was occasional sniper fare and so on.

But it was, it got really frustrating. 1 day we were called to the rear and were told okay, we have a big - there is a big mission and the whole Bn is coming Combat Assault [CA] into this valley. They told us - I remember it was a chopper airlift. They told us there was a Regt of NV coming in right away and my reaction was that "This is it. This is what war really is. This is what is going to be a pitched battle." and these people, they do this to you. A lot of times they give you these intelligence reports blown out of proportion and they get you so piped up and scared, that you are ready to go.

It is like a football player before a football game. They are just able to do that to you. They do this to get you psyched up to get you to do anything. People are throwing 3 and 4 bandoliers of ammo over their shoulders, and a couple extra grenades because "this is it." So we made a CA into the valley and apparently the 1st company had gone in, had received sniper fire, so they had called in some rockets, and they burned up a couple of hooches.

Well, anyway, we got in there and nothing happened for a couple of days.

Things were getting tense though because Charlie Company found a cache of weapons in a cave, about 300 rifles I guess.

Delta Company was in the mountains looking for a NV hospital that was supposed to be there. Well, anyway, 1 day they told us back in a hurry that D Comp was getting close to this hospital and they wanted us to move down the valley about 6kms away and set up to block: these main trails coming out of the mountains, to block off any escape route of any Vietnamese trying to escape. Well, in moving down the valley, down this main trail we hit a booby trap and 2 guys got wounded pretty badly and we dusted there off and my squad had set still, we sat there a day for an ambush at the trail junction, between the junction of the trail and the stream.

This was after the people had hit the booby trap and had been dusted off.

So the rest of the people went on down the trail to look for a night defense position to see where we could set up that night.

Okay. Later on in the evening, they called us and told us to move in and link up with them. So we moved down the trail and as we did we were moving off to 1 side because we had hit 1 booby trap and we didn't want to hit another 1 and the guy in front stepped on 1 and he actually kicked it and He kicked it with a trip wire - it had a wire attached to it, and it didn't go off.

It is like the style that has the paper fuses in them and they sort of get wet and they don't go off. This 1 was a dud, and it didn't go off and we then called up and told the other platoon about it.

They said, "Well, we just moved down the trail and it wasn't there, and we came through there." Well, there was a vill about 200 meters away and they said, "Well, we saw a guy in white in this vill." Well, this whole vill is deserted except they said they saw 1 guy, and he was out wandering around when we left. Because they could see the vill from the other side, and we could see it from this side.

So my squad leader assumed - well, we blew the booby trap in place, we put a grenade next to it and blew it up, and then my squad leader assumed that this guy had set the booby trap. So he went into the vill and the guy was in the hooch I guess, so we really couldn't see what happened.

But he walked up to the hooch and opened the door and fired into the hooch.

We assumed he killed this guy. So we burned down the hooches and linked up with the platoon at that point. We sat in the same spot for about 3 days and there were a couple of main trail junctions coming out of the mountains there and we set a booby trap on this trail.

Now this trail is there, well, it's so well used that it was a trench with banks on it about 6 feet high on both sides and it was cover.ed over. It was a double canopy jungle trail, and of course we couldn't see the daylight.

So people could move through the mountain without being spotted until they got to the bottom of the mountain. They just couldn't see us either.

After 3 days the booby trap went off and it was at that point getting dark so we ran up there and there was a body there. There was a NV body with a uniform and everything, but we couldn't tell much else.

and we didn't want to follow him that night, so we waited until the next morning and the next morning we went out there and the body was there. Now the guy had a cleaning kit for his rifle on him, but the bandages were laying everywhere. The wound dressings were there, and there were scrapings on the around like they had been dragging litters.

Now what these people were trying to do was to get out of the hospital than we knew was up there and we had blocked the road off, we had blocked off the escape and as they came down they hit the booby trap and they turned around and took off.

Now, my squad leader was so elated over this he wanted to find these people. This was supposedly a Regtal-size hospital. Now we went on a 6-man patrol chasing a Regtal-size hospital up in the mountains for about 3 hours.

He wanted to find these people. Now we could have gotten wiped out, but we were like crawling on hands and knees chasing them. We couldn't find them so we gave up and went back. It was really funny to me.

This is the way things were and they told me that when you were new in the country - I was still new meat, they say, "Man, you haven't seen anything yet. Just keep your eyes and ears open and your mouth shut. You will be all right." Well, that's true. If a guy has been in the country 11 months and is still alive, I am thinking he must know what he is doing. So the next day we were not doing anything, just sitting around the camp playing cards, and I decided to go down to this stream and get some water, and go on this water patrol and I had 1st gathered up the people's canteens, together with about 4 other guys, about 5 of us, and we went down to the stream to get water.

Before we went somebody said, stay off the trails, so you don't get caught in 1 of the booby traps. Well, we said, "Okay," and we went to the stream which was about 200 meters away.

As we walked down 10 this stream I heard an explosion about 50 meters to my right on the trail across the stream. At 1st 1 thought we were taking incoming rounds and pretty soon I heard GI's down there talking.

Well, what had happened was that 2 guys had decided to follow us and instead of following us they went down the trail and they hit a booby trap and 1 of them was killed and 1 was seriously wounded.

Now the man who was killed - 1st, I would say in a platoon you generally have somebody who is close to everybody. This was the kind of a guy where you would go in a vill and the other people would be pushing the Vietnamese people around or beating them up.

This guy would have the kids in the hooch playing and singing with them. He really refused to an extent to get involved. He was there and he did his job, but he would rather play with the kids and laugh and sing with them.

We really respected him for it and the Bn cmdr liked him, too. They were on a 1st-name basis. Now, this guy was dead all of a sudden and it was a shock because he was the person that no 1 thought would ever get killed.

Everybody was in shock and the platoon leader was mad, pissed off, and the next morning we got up and the LT said, you know, "There is a vill over here and there is people in it." He said, "These people are responsible for this man's death," and he told the 2d squad that "I want you to go in there." He said, "I want some kills." So 2d squad moved out of the patrol. They went into the vill, got outside the vill, and they called us and they said that there were men running or invading so to speak out the back side of the vill up into the mountains.

Well, the LT said, "Let's get Arty on them." Well, they gave up the coordinates and called in arty and leveled this whole vill. They called in a lot of white phosphorous which is good for burning hooches and this kind of thing.

So they moved into the vill and the LT kept calling, "Have you got any kills?

Have you got any kills?" This was part of the body-count mayhem which in all honesty exists there. like we had an area in a cmnd area and there was a chart on the wall indicating the number of kills, and weapons captured and so on. This was the way we measured whether we were winning.

If we killed 10 of them for every 1 of us we were winning. This was the psychology of the whole thing.

Now it's really ridiculous but you can become involved in it and become a part of it. That is your environment. That is the way of thinking. That is the way you can only relate to yourself.

So this 2d squad went into the vill and the LT kept calling and asking if they had any kills. They said that they hadn't, that they had just a water buffalo.

So the LT go t mad and told them to come back. So they came back. Now I don't know why he thought the men were going to come back to this vill, but apparently he was convinced that they were, he convinced himself that the NVietnamese were going to come back and we were going to catch them napping.

He told us to go ill and he wanted some kills. So I, like I was living, I expected to find VC in there, and there was going to be a fire-fight.

Now I was waiting for this thing to happen, for the war to start for me. I didn't realize it had been going on all along. It wasn't what I thought it was going to be.

So we moved out on our patrol and I was carrying an M-79 - They gave that to the "new meat." The new guys carried that because it was - nobody wanted to carry it. It was cumbersome, and you had to carry extra rounds and you were relatively insecure with it and I had another weapon which was a sort of like a shotgun and you had the rounds with that.

So we moved into the vill and as we approached the vill, everything was like burnt down. There was a group of people on this 1 end of the vill, about 10 women and kids and there weren't any men.

We didn't see anyone running out of the vill. As we moved into the vill, like I was about 4th back in line, or I was about 5th. There were 3 guys up front and 2 point men and the squad leader and the radio operator.

Now, I was behind the radio op and as we moved into the vill nobody said anything but all of a sudden these guys started shooting. They were shooting women and kids. Now there weren't any men there. But these men were just shooting. They didn't say anything, and I was in a state of shock almost.

CONYERS: How many were shot?

NOTLEY: Well, I am not through yet, man. They killed these 10 people, you know, about approx 10 people. like I was - it was so traumatic, you know, I couldn't believe it. I was like in a state of shock and these guys did this so systematically like it was something done so many times before, it was easy. It didn't bother them, any of them, at least it didn't appear to bother any of them.

Now these guys were old-timers, they had been there for a long time, you know? It was just cut and dried like it was understood that this was going to happen. I didn't know. But there it is. Bam. It's happening.

So they moved around the trail - it was an s-shaped trail into the vill, and they moved to the other side of this bamboo stand - well, they knew we would get the People in the vill that were running, but I'll never understand why they didn't run. Why they didn't take off after they saw that the 1st 10 people were killed.

But there was like 10 more people there. and they - though people were standing there and they were standing there quietly, and they had already killed 10My squad leader, well, he looked at me and he told me that there comes a time when people have to commit themselves or get involved and become 1 of them, and to become 1 of them he told me, "Well, this is a good time for you to try your cannister rounds." Well, I was scared fair 1 thing and I was upset, I was in shock plus I was scared because the whole thing, well, he said, "This is a good time for you to try out your cannister rounds." It was like, it seemed as though he was saying, "All right, the rest of us have committed ourselves. Now it's time for you to commit yourself and if you don't you are not 1 of us and if you are not 1 of us you are 1 of them.

Well, I was actually scared for my life. Because this is not an unusual thing. I was really scared for my life. From my own people. Well, the people were standing about 20 meters away, and I pointed my cannister round at them and just before I pulled the trigger I deflected the barrel toward the ground and I shot and it was - there was dust flow and as I shot the dust flow I looked away and I looked back and everybody was still standing.

I may have hit somebody but I didn't - I can't swear that I didn't because I didn't want to anyway, but as soon as I did this the rest of the squad opened up and killed all these people, too.

At that point I walked - I isolated myself from the rest of the platoon. I stayed by this bamboo stand shaking like I was in shock and they got another bunch of people and killed them and in all it was about 30 people killed in this vill and there weren't any men there at all.

There were some male children, but there were women and children only.

So after this was over we left the vill, they called in a body-count something like 13 VC, and NV. Now where they got the body-count I'll never know.

As we were leaving, the FAC was flying overhead, and he was calling in, he wanted to know if we wanted air strikes in there. and they said, "Yes, sure." So they put in some napalm on the vill and they made about 4 runs at it. Now we got back to the - well, I didn't sleep at all we got back to the perimeter and I just isolated myself. I didn't really understand what had happened.

the vill. Now the LT saw what had happened. He didn't say anything about it, though. I really don't know what he ever felt about it. But he didn't say anything.

I thought to myself, the shit is going to hit the fan now, you know? like this is wrong. This isn't what it's all about. I really expected something to happen. I expected something to come of it.

So anyway they told us that the Bn cmdr was coming in. Then I thought, "Well, this is it. This is where some people are going to go to jail." Well, the Bn cmdr flew over the vill and unless he is blind, well, he must have seen the bodies. I was securing the LZ outside the vill and I know he landed outside the vill in an open area and he was standing at a point where he could see the last bunch of people that had been killed and if he would have just looked I am sure he would have seen it.

He was probably 30-40 meters from where they were. They found a child still alive at that time. It was laying in a pile of bodies but it had not been shot. They brought the child up to the Bn cmdr and he could talk Vietnamese, and he talked to the child and the child told him the VC had done it.

I guess this is why the kid said it. That's why the people didn't run. I guess they just didn't expect this from us. I don't know.

So the Bn cmdr took the kid and got on the chopper and he told us, he gave us a "well done," that we had done what we were supposed to do.

Now this had been a FREE-FIRE ZONES and, you know, he commented about Les. This was the guy that was killed. Now he got into his chopper and he flew off like nothing had happened.

Well, we moved back to our perimeter and they called in for some choppers and they said, "Well, you guys have done a good job and you need a rest." So they sent us to the rear for a couple of days to rest up.

But also to substantiate my story, there is a guy down here in D Comp, the company that was in the mountains looking for the NV hospital. Now 1 of their platoons moved through the vill that same day and when we called in the body-count, you know, they confirmed it.

But they saw what had happened. They saw the bodies. So this thing was not a secret among the squad. It was not even a secret among the platoon. It wasn't even a secret in the Bn. The cmdr knew it. Yet nothing was done about it.

From this point on this was my - this was the point of my initial realization of what we were doing over there because instances like this do happen all the time.

But not on such a large scale. like they have, maybe, 1-2 people.

But what difference does it make if it is 1-2 or whether it's 30? You know the crime has been done and it is condoned, or it is covered up, and you get the impression that if this was not right, that someone would make an attempt to stop it, and since no 1 makes an attempt to stop it, this is the way it is supposed to be.

From the time you are in basic training and AIT you develop such a paranoia of Vietnamese people that it is incredible. They tell you that you can kill the enemy but don't kill civilians. But they never define what a civilian is. In a guerrilla war, they have to survive like anybody else. Any insurgents are dependent on the natives, the civilians, for intelligence info and food and medicines. That insurgency cannot exist without that support of these people.

So in actuality all the people were VC, you know? But just because they weren't card-carrying members of the NLF or that they carried weapons or anything, I guess that's what made them civilians. But this was the whole thing.

You didn't trust anybody. They didn't want you to trust them. They said, "Don't trust your mama san, that irons your fatigues in the rear." and they said, "Don't trust anybody because you can't trust any of them," and you just get so paranoid about these people, and you get so frustrated and so angry, well, you can't vent your frustration at the Army, or at the time you couldn't very much.

The only natural alternative was through a process of dehumanization in respect to the Vietnamese people.

Now the Army purposely harasses you. They direct your frustrations then to this end. This is how they can do what they do.

Now since the Calley thing has come out, you notice more and more troops have refused to go to the field and more are fragging their cmnding officers. This is a turnabout which is fair play. GI's are starting to vent their frustration on the institutions and the people that have frustrated them rather than on the Vietnamese people. I think this is really scaring them. They have created a monster and now it has turned on them.

I am ashamed of ever being a part of anything like this. I'm ashamed of any institution, anything like that. The whole thing is so racist, and so inhuman that it is unbelievable. It is hard for me to really - it is an emotional thing. A thing you feel.

It is hard for me to convey to anyone this whole process that you know you have gone through. You can see it step by step. like a lot of us have been accused of - well, Melvin Laird will accuse the press of making instant analysis of the Laotian campaign because "you can't see the overall picture." But if you look at the Winter Soldier Council that we had, that was not a restricted thing. That was overall. You had people from every Div of every military unit in Vietnam.

Now when you put all the pieces together there is the big puzzle. This is what is happening. This is what's condoned. They let these things happen.

like we have gone through a whole process of completely - of losing any or a lot of the human ideals we have and the feeling for people.

They completely strip you of it. You are somebody's trigger finger. There were people in our Bn who liked to refer to the recon platoon as "the Col's personal killer platoon." If there was a dangerous mission or a mission where people were going to have to be killed, it would be us going out. We always went in 1st because he knew that he could get us - you know, he could get us to do that.

Progs like, you know, it was - I don't know whether you were familiar with the Phoenix project or not, but right before I left to come home I went for a in-country RandR and I was in Tan Son Nhut AFB near Saigon and the recon platoon operated - they got their orders from the S-2 officer. This was an intelligence section.

Now the S-2 officer whom I knew was in Tan Son Nhut and he was leaving for somewhere and I asked him, "Where are you going?" I was a platoon Sgt at the time. I went from E-2 to E-6 while over there as a result of losing a lot of people.

But he said, "I am going down to Vung Tau." I said, "What for? A 3-day country?

No," he said, "I am going to be educated on the Phoenix Proj." Well, I thought they hard stopped Phoenix. Yet he was going down there. Now Phoenix, if I am not mistaken, is a prog in which assassination of vill leaders is taught in order to eliminate vill leaders, VC cadre and support for the VC. Now any grassroots framework of all the NLF support among the people has to be eliminated. They assassinate the leaders, by walking in at night, they assassinate them and leave. Plus the fact that, you know, like pacification. The Amer Indians went through pacification progs a long time ago, I guess.

But you just completely uproot the people regardless of whether it will destroy their culture or not, and you move them in this way to a concentration camp which is almost what they are, and if you can remove all people from the VC areas then theoretically you can defeat VC.

Well, we are fighting the whole people over there, really. It's hard to explain. like you are fighting everybody. You are even fighting the ARVN's.

You are not getting support from the RVNese soldiers at all. In case anybody wants to know, I have a map here and it has the vill on it and I have a 6digit grid here. Do you want me to enter that into the testimony?

DELLUMS: Yes, thank you. That will be entered in the record.

NOTLEY: A map in Quang Ngai Province. and the vill is Mo Buc map sheets.

Sheet number 6738I. The name of the vill is Truoung Khanh - 11. Now the 6digit grid is 638442.

DELLUMS: Can you give me the precise date that incident occurred?

NOTLEY: On or about 4-18-69, within a day of that, I am not exactly sure but I got that date because I myself was really upset after this friend of ours had been killed and I wrote a letter to my wife that morning, you know, saying that, well, telling how upset I was about it and everything.

Then you know that afternoon we went in and I looked through the letters yesterday and I found the letter that I had written that date and it was dated 418. So that is how I arrive at that date.

DELLUMS: It is very difficult to put into words the impact of your testimony. I think you have been able to communicate accurately the circumstances that happened to you and your own feelings involved. I would just like to as 1 person commend you for your courage to come before us here and I understand, I believe, the pain you have even to remember these details.

Remembering the details of the act of killing human beings.

I would like to ask you 1 question: In your estimation does the use of conventional warfare in a people's struggle such as the struggle that is taking place in SEA end up to inevitably end in the deaths of 10,000's innocent men, women and children?

NOTLEY: It always does. When you are fighting a people's struggle for liberation for these people as it has been since I945, well - they have been denied rights, they have been denied the right of self-determination.

Well, you have this mass of support among the people which even Eisenhower admitted was at least an 80% factor of the populace.

Now, if you are going to defeat that, if you have to defeat the movement, you know, for self-determination and identity for the people, you have to defeat it where the support is and that is with the people, and because an insurgent army cannot exist without the people, this is where you go to fight it.

Our Amer revolutionaries could not have existed without the support of our own people. It would have been impossible for them to survive. Things are very, very difficult for the NV and the NLF as it is for resupplying and all that.

But the process of sheer genocide to eliminate their support is calculated, and it is a very calculated elimination. We have become much more sophisticated about it than the Germans were with the Jews. We can do it with B-52 strikes.

The whole fallacy of the thing that Nixon is trying to pacify the Amer people with is by withdrawing combat troops. Yet he triples the B-52 strikes and you would not believe, it is an unbelievable devastation that these things have. I mean this is just - things are not any different now than they were 2 years ago.

Tactics have been changed just a little because it was - the way it was going left a sour taste in the mouth of the people. But I guess it's easier to do it from 50,000 feet. Because you don't have to look at the corpses, you don't have to listen to the women and kids crying.

CONYERS: Where did this massacre that you are rpt'g to us take place?

NOTLEY: Truoung Khanh II hamlet, Quang Ngai Province. On or about 4-18-69?

CONYERS: Approx 30 people were killed?

NOTLEY: That's right, women and children.

CONYERS: Who was the highest ranking officer that you know had knowledge of this?

NOTLEY: A LtCol. He must have known, he was in the vill the next day. Unless he just couldn't smell. I mean, you could smell bodies from the napalm and unless he was absolutely stone blind - which I know he was not - there was no way he could have kept from knowing that. Everybody knew that in the Bn. Everybody.

CONYERS: Did anyone ever raise the question of this incident to you afterwards?

NOTLEY: Well people made references of it to me and like, well only recently, if you want to know the truth now, this is the 1st time I have been able to talk about it. I did not tell my wife about it until last night.

I could not talk about it. I had to walk away when I was asked about it.

CONYERS: But there were no officers or no 1 in the military chain of cmnd that ever questioned you about it?

NOTLEY: You mean like an investigation, a CID or anything?

CONYERS: Yes.

NOTLEY: Never. There was no attempt at finding out what had happened. It was accepted as it was.

CONYERS: How many men in the Bn, can you estimate?

NOTLEY: Well, in our Bn? Well, there are 4 infy companies and a heavy weapons company which I guess was, which consisted of a recon platoon and 1 other plus a radar platoon. I don't know really.

CONYERS: Over or under a 1,000 men?

NOTLEY: Well, it's closer to a 1,000 people in a Bn. I couldn't say exactly though. With all the support personnel, truck drivers, cooks, medics and so on.

CONYERS: Is it fair to say that this never before was revealed, never investigated, never reported, and was known then by at least a 1,000 men?

NOTLEY: Well, I would say a majority of those people knew it.

CONYERS: Right. Then if you were to count surrounding military units who may have heard about it through indirect ways, would it be fair to say that this was the - this was a matter that members of the Amer forces at least amounting to the 1,000's knew about?

NOTLEY: Yes.

CONYERS: Have you heard of other incidents similar to this?

NOTLEY: Yes, I have. When you come in contact with people from other Divs, you come across this. Now I went to Cam Rahn Bay before I went on RandR I was at Danang before I went on leave and while you are waiting for your plane, you sit around at night talking to guys from other Divs. Now people are always talking about these things. It goes on all the time. People are not shocked by it any more. After your initiation to the realities of war, this war anyhow - because I can't speak of any other war I have never been involved in, but after the initial realization you just become numb to these things. Your emotions can't take it.

You don't shock any more so you are tempted to just numb yourself and it gets to the point that it doesn't bother you until your buddy gets killed. But Vietnamese getting killed doesn't seem to bother you. You become so dehumanized, you become a stone. You do your job good because if you don't you get in trouble and nobody wants to go to Long Binh Jail. It goes on everywhere all the time. This is going on right now. People are just a Little more careful about it right now because of what is going on here today.

CONYERS: Don't you think because of what is going on here today that more members of the Amer armed forces are going to come before more committees of this kind?

NOTLEY: I certainly hope so. I was really scared of coming down here because I didn't know what to expect.

CONYERS: Now the final question, Mr Notley, where do you think the responsibility for the comm'n of these atrocities resides?

NOTLEY: Well, it depends on whether you want to define this as a physical liability. Now the perpetration by men of the rank of E-5 and below are in that category, of course. But I got the impression when it happened that it had been done so many times, and the people had told me like they used to work around the LZ area in what is now the 196-AO, and they were burning vills as far as you could see and the tank cmdr would fly overhead and say, "Okay, enough fun for today." It was just a joke for him, you know? and this wasn't the 1st time that they have ripped off a lot of people like this. There was 1 guy in our platoon, when I got there he was going home in a month or so. Well, he was referred to as a short - timer but he had a job in the rear at that time as a clerk, or as a truck driver or something. Well, I was never in the field with him anyhow. I never saw him operate.

But everybody in the platoon told me that this guy had ninety - 3 personal kills and I knew at the time that it was amazing. I know now - well, I never saw, I never saw 93 confirmed VC when I was over there. Let alone 1 man killing 93 by himself. So I know in my own mind that this is something, this figure had to include a lot of people. This was known to everybody, to the Bn cmdr included. This incident is not rare. It is not unusual. It goes on in varying degrees every day.

CONYERS: Well, I want to thank you for coming in. You have my highest respect.

NOTLEY: Pardon me?

CONYERS: I said I want to thank you and you have my highest respect.

DELLUMS: Congressmen Seiberling.

SEIBERLING: 1 want to commend you also, Mr Notley, and I just want to pin down some of the details here. How many people were in this squad at the time of this incident in the vill?

NOTLEY: There were about - actually in the squad there were 6 people, but 8-10 of us went because we had a couple guys that were, they had been transferred into our platoon from other line companies and they wanted to go in, or go along for 1 reason or another. So about 10 of us went into the vill.

SEIBERLING: So about 8-10 servicemen actually witnessed this?

NOTLEY: Right. As far as I can remember. Only about 4 people, 4-5 people actually participated as far as firing their weapons. About 1/2 of them did not. 1/2 of them were like me. They were in a state of shock. Really. it was a traumatic experience.

SEIBERLING: Who was the highest ranking"what was the highest rank of anyone present?

NOTLEY: E-5.

SEIBERLING: Well that is what? A Sgt?

NOTLEY: Yes, the squad leader. As a matter of fact, there were, well, 2 other people were there, 2 other Sgts doing the shooting. There was 1 other but he was not participating.

SEIBERLING: I understand there was no possible fire from the vill at all at that time?

NOTLEY: None. The only hostility we encountered was a booby trap right outside the vill where the man was killed. So I guess somebody somewhere determined that this was the enemy vill. So this was the FREE-FIRE ZONES. Because we had a man killed and 1 wounded here, and that this booby trap had been put out obviously by somebody from that vill, therefore, you know, this had to be the FREE-FIRE ZONES. The thing of it is, and I want to reiterate it, is that when I went in - being naive as I was - I was expected to make contact. But I was scared. I expected that there would be VC or NVA because 1 had been seen in that area that morning.

SEIBERLING: Well, the booby trap, how long before this incident had it gone off? How long before you went into the vill?

NOTLEY. Well, this was late in the evening before. We didn't go in that evening because it was getting dark and they wanted to wait until the next morning.

SEIBERLING: Well, so it was the day before actually?

NOTLEY: Yes, the booby trap exploded the day before, right.

SEIBERLING: If necessary, I assume you could name the people who were in this squad with you?

NOTLEY: Yes.

SEIBERLING: and what their designation for the squad was? The 1st squad or what?

NOTLEY: It was the 1st squad.

SEIBERLING: Thank you.

DELLUMs: Congressmen Badillo?

BADILLO: Were the men who fired on the people vets? That is, were they more experienced men than the 1's who did not fire?

NOTLEY: Yes.

BADILLO: Is this the case in all the other incidents that you were involved in?

NOTLEY: Yes, generally. The people just - the young people don't get involved because it's, you know, you are just afraid to commit yourself because you really don't know what you are doing.

BADILLO: Did you find the same attitude or a different attitude on the part of the RVNese involved in the combat?

NOTLEY: The RVNese, the experiences I have had, they are as brutal to their own people, if not more so, than we are. I have seen the RVNese hit a woman in the head with the barrel of an M-79, busting her head wide open. I have seen RVNese Nat'l Police tie a man's thumbs together, and this was about a 16-year-old boy, which is military age for the VC. He was a 16-year-old boy and they tied his thumbs together behind his back, and they tied his ankles together and they tied his ankles to his thumbs. Sort of hog-tied him and they tied a rope, in hog-tying him, and they threw the rope over a tree limb, lifted him up in the air, and slapped and hit him and interrogated him. They beat the man severely, and they started slicing on his ear, you know, as if he were going to cut the man's ear off. I have seen RVNese take a switch - not a stick, but a switch - and beat a man almost to death with just a switch.

They beat him so badly he was lying on the ground shaking. He was having convulsions. This was the process of interrogation.

There were military intelligence people standing right there watching - or rather a military intelligence man. Nobody did anything to stop it. This is the way they did things.

BADILLO: Thank you.

DELLUMS: I would like to ask you, would you identify the squad, the unit, the company involved in the incident that you testified to this morning and also can you give me, if you recall, the name of the highest ranking officer, cmnding officer that is, of the Americal Div at that time?

NOTLEY: The highest ranking officer of the Americal Div? You mean the Div Genl?

DELLUMS: Yes.

NOTLEY: Well, I honestly don't remember the man's name but - just a minute. The man here who is the man who was in the other company that went through, he said it was Genl Ramsey. I myself don't remember personally. I don't remember personally. The unit was Echo Company, Recon Platoon 4/21 11th Bgd, Americal Div, 1st Squad.

DELLUMS: Well, can you give it slower?

NOTLEY: E Company, Recon Platoon, 4/21, 11th Infy Bgd, Americal Div, 1st Squad.

DELLUMS: Thank you. Before we go on, Mr Battles, did you have a comment that you would like to make?

BATTLES: I have 1 thing I would like to say. You had a question on where the responsibility lies. I was in direct association with some West Point graduates, and the responsibility lies, well, West Point is taught, correct me if I'm wrong, that the highest - ranking man is responsible for the actions of his men. Now this squad was headed - well, I think that's irrelevant.

DELLUMS: Thank you. There is a Mr John Beitzel here to corroborate the testimony of Mr Notley. If he chooses to come forward and make a statement that has not been made you may do so at this time.

Dellums (House of Representatives) War Crimes Hearings Wednesday, 4-28-71, Washg'tn, DC Testimony Of John Beitzel 1/20, D Comp, with Bgd, Americal Div Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

BEITZEL: My name is John Beitzel and I was in D Comp and we were working in support of Echo Company. I would just like to corroborate the testimony that he gave. We were, for some reason, on the same frequency at that time.

Our radio was on the same frequency as Echo Company and I remember distinctly hearing a body-count of 13.

Later on 1 of our platoons - I think the 1st Platoon - they went in support of E-Company and they went in and they saw what happened and they called back over the radio that E-Company, they could confirm the body-count that they gave.

They said there were 9 women, 3 children and a baby. Now from what Dan Notley said, I believe they saw only 1 section of the group of people that were killed. I distinctly remember it was around 4-18. That's all I can say. We were in contact with the company. We were in the same area. We were about 3,000 meters away though. We were in radio contact with them. Most of our company knew about the incident. That's all.

DELLUMS: Thank you very much. I appreciate that.

CONYERS: Can I ask a question?

DELLUMS: Yes, Mr Conyers.

CONYERS: Mr Beitzel, you heard Dan Notley's statement here today?

BEITZEL: Yes, I did.

CONYERS: Is there any part of it about which you have personal knowledge that you think may be such that it would be in error, that you disagree with part of his statement or there is a question?

BEITZEL: The only thing I remember afterwards was that there was a debate as to whether they called in artillery in on the vill and whether it was the artillery that killed the civilians or whether it was the squad that killed the civilians, as though the artillery, you know, was less of a crime or something. But we knew about it. I mean, everything that he said as far as my knowledge was concerned was correct.

CONYERS: The massacre, the deaths that resulted occurred from weapon fire from Amer soldiers?

BEITZEL: Well, what I am saying is later on there was a debate in our company whether it was artillery or was it the squad that had done it. Because we were not right there. So we didn't know what actually happened.

CONYERS: Okay.

BEITZEL: We heard the body-count on the radio. We were on the same frequency.

DELLUMS: Thank you. There have been some requests to have Mr Notley go back through this incident 1 more time, but - I frankly am not disposed to ask you to do that. I think it much too painful for you to even have to account this incident the 1st time. I have tried to sit here for 2 1/2 days of hearings so far.

As everybody knows, I think you know where I am on the war, and the insanity of it. I have tried to sit here as an objective chmn, but it seems to me that to look at this table and these young people, and they haven't been on this earth very long, they're not yet I believe 23 years old as human beings. My question is, what the hell is this country doing to young people to train them to go out and kill other innocent people? The question is, what the hell is wrong with this country? What is wrong with the military establishment? The Administration? and the representatives to the US Congress? and other people who are responsible for involvement in Indochina who haven't stood up and said 1 damn thing about the fact that we are sending 1,000's of young people to SEA to get killed, or be killed, because many of them don't understand and don't desire involvement in it. I think it is cruel and shocking and horrible that we find 435 congressmen in the USA with only a handful of them having the guts to stand up and say the involvement in Indochina is insane.

What do we care about our young people when we send them to go to SEA and then have the self-righteous guts to get up on the floor and vote down $750 million in revenue for education? How patronizing can the leadership of this country be when it says that Amer is wonderful and we are concerned about the future of this nation, and we don't give a damn about our young people except how much can we find, how many rounds can they pump into innocent men, women and children?

I think it is shocking and insane. The question everyone in Amer ought to raise is, where are the 435 congressmen who sit around with political ambitions positioning themselves for reflection? People involved on ego trips and personal aggrandizement. They couldn't care less except for the votes.

I am very sorry, but I tried desperately, I did not want to use this chair as a platform, but when you hear the young people come forward and give these horrible stories, then I think the establishment has to be challenged and challenged very fundamentally. and those petty personalities, and those mediocres who call themselves US congressmen ought to get off their behinds and get us out of Indochina.

(applause) Well, we have 2 people now who will testify before the Committee.

I might add 1 other thing, that we have a time factor here, But I don't care about the time factor this morning. a would like to say to you young men that we will sit here no matter what rules of the House might be that we will break, and we will sit here until you have said what you have to say and the Amer people hear you. I don't give a damn what the leadership of this Congress does about it because I think they have been too weak - kneed about our involvement in Indochina in the 1st place and we will be here all day if necessary.

(applause) Our next 2 witnesses will be 1st, Mr Guadalupe G Villarreal and Mr Daniel Barnes. Mr Villarreal.

Dellums (House of Representatives) War Crimes Hearings Wednesday, 4-28-71, Washg'tn, DC Testimony Of Guadalupe G Villarreal D Company - 6 Light Infantry Bgd, Americal Div Racine, WI

VILLARREAL: My name is Guadalupe Villarreal. I am from Racine, Wisconsin.

I was drafted in 1967 and I served in Vietnam for 1 year. I arrived there in 12-67 and served to 12-68. I was assigned to Company A, 1st Bn, 29th Infy, I96 Light Infy Bgd.

In being assigned to my company I was also told that I was very fortunate to be in this company because as usual the thing that is said is of course that this company has the highest body-count in the Bn.

This I think is the usual thing said to a new guy that arrives in any company. Also I was sort of, I don't know, impressed or something. But I they of course told me that the name of the company was "The Death Family" and at a later date this name was changed to "Black Death," at which time patches were made available to anyone who wanted them and they could wear them, of course.

Now this patch depicted a death symbol with a sickle with blood dripping down, and this kind of thing. This is nothing usually of course not allowed.

I mean, say in the States. This is something that is like, well, it is breaking the uniform, but yet because you are doing this is allowed over there.

This makes you feel that you are more like death. This is what you are supposed to do.

I will try to be very brief and I will give an idea as to what the usual orientation was that was given. 1st of all, you should not trust anybody. At no time would you consider them, you might say as anything but gooks and of course then the next thing was that the only good gook was a dead gook.

This I think was common knowledge that everyone refers to them as gooks.

Another thing was that of course the air strikes were behind you so you had nothing to worry about. Everything was available to you.

The next thing was of course to keep up the good work and of course this meant that you had to keep up the reputation of the company to keep the high body-count up. We operated in the hills south of Danang and north of An Khe.

This is 30 miles south of Danang.

Now the standard, you might say, operating procedures were of course the search and destroy mission. This of course meant that you usually burned every hooch to the ground. You destroyed all source of food.

Now, no distinction was ever made as to what should be considered as the mere subsistence for the people. You just destroyed everything. Whether they starved was not important because this is something that supposedly might come to the hands of the VC.

Another standing operation procedure was the FREE-FIRE ZONES. In the FREE-FIRE ZONES, as you know, you shoot anybody that runs or invades you in any kind of way. It is funny, or - well, 1 can't explain it but in the genl area we worked around this and I would say maybe it was an 80-mile-sq area.

Within this 80-mile-sq there was 1 vill classified as "friendly" and then of course this only extended to 200 meters beyond you might say the perimeter of this vill.

So this area was mostly all FREE-FIRE ZONES. So it was with this understanding that it was a FREE-FIRE ZONES that everything was fair game. If at any time you saw people in any way trying to avoid you or run away or make suspicious movements, that was free game. You could go ahead and shoot them and kill them.

What strikes me is that how did these rules come about? You would think that of course the people would live in this non - FREE-FIRE ZONES. But yet 100's of people lived outside of this and of course these people, even though they had their hooches there, they were still considered to be sympathizers, or regular VC. So of course they were all free game.

This of course means that anybody of draftable age is considered to be this free game. This is classifications which are used to describe them because it would seem all of a sudden everybody becomes an expert at determining age over there. What constitutes draftable age.

and that of course was somebody able to carry an arm.

This could be a 10-year-old to 50-year-old. Just supposedly you knew who they were supposed to be.

Now these people, for example, there was 3 things that happened: they would be killed, beaten up, or usually they were killed. Otherwise they were beaten up and interrogated out in the field.

They would be whipped or you might say pistol whipped or whatever and they usually - I can't recall of any instances there, but they were sent back to the base camp to the FSB. Of course they were again beaten up and such.

That just gives you a SOP as far as that.

I would like to go to another subject and make it brief, but I would go into specific incidents. 1 took place in 4-68 when a supposed ambush was set up in broad daylight. If you can understand that. It is a war, and you just can't do this. You can't ambush in broad daylight but this of course is done.

At the time I was by the company CP and we heard some firing. Well, we went back to where the firing was and I was told to escort a medic back to take care of any wounded people.

When we got back, there were 4 dead people, 4 women and 1 little kid, too.

But I guess their only mistake was that they came up behind the company and they were trying to be relocated. They wanted to be flown out to a refugee camp that they had there.

Yet we got a 4-body-count out of it. I don't understand it. This was the situation with the men, women and children and yet they counted them as a body-count. There was 1 woman and 1 kid who were badly wounded. They were evacuated. I sort of can't be dramatic about it because it just happened. Nothing was ever said.

Nothing was ever questioned.

CONYERS: Well, what happened?

VILLARREAL: Well, these 4 people were killed. 1 man, a woman and a little kid in a supposed ambush, in broad daylight. Now this is impossible. You don't do this. Anyway, as far as getting to specific incidents again, another was we had received sniper fire and we called in artillery and of course there was this 1 group of hooches there and they were all hit by arty.

There was nobody killed because they all went into their bunkers on the river but there was 1 in particular, 1 particular woman and that for some reason she was walking along 1/2 - running across a dike and she was shot.

I personally - I guess I took part personally in the firing only because you were told to. You were told, "Here, you got to do it." Everybody was shooting, and if you were not to do it, you know, they were yelling, "What the hell you doing there?" That was the method. Anyway, when we checked her out it turned out she was an old woman. At the time it struck me because I really thought for somehow, some reason a was personally responsible in this incident.

It happened with a resupply shipment, and on that day the Bn chaplain came in and had services for the guys - at which time I went up to talk to him and I said that it was kind of - I was kind of guilty and I wanted to talk to somebody about it.

Suddenly I felt, I really felt bad and all he said was, "Well, we all see things in war that we don't like, that we don't want to see." and he said, "Well, could you help it?" and I told him that yes, I could, I guess I could.

Maybe I shouldn't have shot. and he says, "Well, it could have been VC, right?" and I said, "Yes, it could have been." But he sort of rationalized it away and he gave me the statement of "Let's pray to God that He will give us courage and strength to carry on with the mission." Now this upset my thinking with the religion. He was praying for God to give us courage and strength to keep doing what we were doing.

Well, from there on I never attended any more services. But another instance I would like to relate is, when the VC were brought to the support base, they were of course hooded with sandbags over their heads and they were tied around their necks and dragged all the way up the hill.

Then of course they would be set up by the Bn Cmdr's bunker. They would set out there in the sun and the people would go around them and kick them and such.

On 2 occasions I saw that 2 scout teams with scout dogs would be led up to him to bite him and this particular thing - I don't know.

After hearing all this it seems like this is all insignificant, and it doesn't - it isn't as bad as killing 30 people. But I just want to relate it because this is what did happen.

Another incident that was common practice was of course where the squad leaders and asst squad leaders would practice to call in arty, because you never knew supposedly when you would have to do that.

But what you do is you set on a hill and everybody would get their maps out and they would choose, actually choose hooches at random. No attention was paid to whether they were occupied or not. For the most part they were not.

However, what you would do is shut up your map. Now you have the forward observer there and then you call in a training mission. You call for a phosphorous round to effectively burn out some hooch, and you give your coordinates there and you adjust your elevation and such and you call in the arty.

All of this was to give you training as to how if at any time you had to call it in, you would know how to do it.

But no attention was ever paid to the people. They could have chosen trees or hills or something characteristic of the land but no, they would rather choose hooches because that would be like killing 2 birds with 1 stone where you could get the training mission in and also kill somebody, I imagine.

CONYERS: Excuse me, for the record, hooch is a Vietnamese home, is that correct?

VILLARREAL: That is correct. and of course since supposedly again this is going back to this thing about the FREE-FIRE ZONES, since it was a FREE-FIRE ZONES, that meant that nobody should be there and even if they were there they weren't supposed to be there. So therefore that made it all right.

In order to give everybody else a chance to get their say in, I guess that's about all I will say now. Thank you.

DELLUMS: Thank you very much for your testimony. I would like to introduce Congressmen Don Riegel (R-Michigan). Thank you very much for coming.

Dellums (House of Representatives) War Crimes Hearings Thursday, 4-29-71, Washg'tn, DC Testimony of Kenneth Campbell Lance-Cpl, Forward Observer, "A" Battery, 1st Bn, 1st Marine Div Philadelphia, PN

CAMPBELL: I went into the USMC 2 weeks after graduating from high schl. I was born and raised in Philadelphia.

1st of all, I would like to give just a little bit of background info and tell you where my heart was and where my mind was when I went into the Marine Corps. I went into USMC specifically to go to Vietnam. I wanted to fight for my country, I wanted to keep Communism from spreading, and most of the other reasons that people would enlist in any service.

I got my chance to go to Vietnam. I was in Vietnam from 2-68 to 3-69 with the 1st Marine Div. I was a corporal in the USMC and my job was a field arty scout observer from Bravo Company, 1st Bn, 1st Marine Regt, 1st Marine Div.

That job consisted of calling in arty, supporting the infy company I was with arty, and 1st of all I would like to go back and explain a little bit of observation schl.

In Forward Observer [FO] schl we were taught constantly that arty was our weapon and was the greatest killer on the battlefield, we were to be proud of this. When we go out on the ranges, there would be man-made objects out there, old car bodies, tank bodies, and so forth and so on, and for 2 weeks we took turns calling in arty on these objects and went from 1 end of the range to the other destroying every man-made object there. This was our training, you know, just destroy man-made objects and all of the time we would sort of pretend or what ever that they were VC strongholds or vills or what not.

Then when I went to Vietnam I found out that a lot of the things I was taught in FO schl were supposed to be discarded, to throw away the book. I was r.ever taught anything about the Geneva Convention as far as the use of arty goes. It was constantly blow away this, blow away this.

When I was in Vietnam I learned how to use arty very well, and an incident in 8-68 when I was in Con Thien, which is just about 2 miles south of the DMZ, I went up to an observation post on the northern part of the area there, Con Thien area, and using a pair of ships' binoculars, which are huge binoculars, 20 by 120 power, I started scanning everything north of my position.

I noticed 2 vills - the 1st day I went up there I noticed only 1. Then later on I noticed another 1. But this 1st 1 I observed people working in the fields, going in and out of their hooches there were about 20-30 hooches, small grass huts. I noticed no military action going on there.

We had received no fire. This vill was north of the DMZ, outside of the demilitarized 1, actually in NV. I estimated it at about 15,000 meters north of the position I was at.

I went back to my FCSS bunker, which is the: fire support coordination center where all air, arty and ground ops are coordinated. and I went back there to talk to my lt, who had been my team cmdr a couple of months before, and who had been promoted to that position. Hence he was a personal friend of mine. I told him about the vill. and I asked him if I could fire on it.

and he said, "Sure, go ahead." and he said, "There should not be any question in your mind, don't worry about it, don't worry about whether you should fire on this vill, because it probably undoubtedly is feeding the NVC with rice therefore, they are sympathizers, they are the enemy." He said if it is cleared through Bn and Div then I will clear it and it will be all right to fire. The reason it would have to be cleared through the Div would be because I had to use long-range and heavy arty to reach that position, it was that far away from me.

I went back up to the OP, I called in 175-mm arty, I called in white phosphorus plus 8-inch arty to burn the houses I called in 175mm high-explosive, point detonating rounds which exploded on the ground on impact. I called in variable time fuze high-explosive rounds, which explode about 20 meters above the ground killing everything hat is either standing, lying, sitting down or crawling. This was so if any of them got into the trenches or holes the shrapnel would come down and hit them instead of exploding on the ground and missing them.

I used everything I was taught to use in FO schl. I used every method I could to kill anything that was there. I called in that arty for several hours. I destroyed most of the houses.

As far as casualties go, a could tell people were walking around, but I could not, from that distance, make out whether they were killed or just wounded. But they went down. and when that arty explodes above the ground, especially arty as large as 175mm rounds and using VT, this stuff goes down, and if there are people lying on the ground trying to get away from it, there is very little chance of getting away from it.

About 20-30 people dropped to the ground, and I only observed 1 get up and run and make it to a shelter. The rest of them, for the rest of the hours I continued to call in arty, never got up. Therefore, I estimated a casualty figure of about 20 confirmed kills. This body-count went to the battery that was a]ing.

The next day I went back up to the OP, checked out the area again with those binoculars, and found another vill a few 1,000 meters to the left, as I was looking north, which is to the west of the other vill. Again this was north of the DMZ. and I started calling arty, faring on that too.

Again this was cleared from Bn through Regt through Div. They have the little maps in their bunkers that have everything there, vills and whatever. The coordinates I sent down, there is no way that they could have not known that these were vills, but they gave the okay anyway, and if they gave the ok at Regt and Div, it was all right with me.

So I continued to call in arty and destroyed that vill too and went back and called in arty on the 1 I had called in on before and sort of finished up the job. like I said, I would estimate the casualties as maybe 20-30, I do not know. I know a lot of people went down, and I only saw 1 get up and make it to shelter.

This was not the only incident. It was not the only time I had called in arty on a vill. But it was the only time I called in arty on a vill that we had received no fire from or there was no evidence of military ops.

I also observed engineers wiring enemy bodies. They would wire them up with plastic explosives, C4, 20, 30, 40 pounds of C4. This was on Operation Meade River in 11-68, in the Dodge City Tam Ky area south of Danang. I also observed very much mistreatment of civilians, throwing C ration cans at little kids, knocking mama-sans off the road as we rode by in jeeps and trucks

CONYERS: Knocking them off with what?

CAMPBELL: With rifle butts, anything we could extend out from the vehicle.

Our .50's, anything. As we would arrive by at 30-40mph the mama-sans would be going down with their poles with stuff hanging from them, walking down the roads, and we would hit them with rifle butts and things.

I also saw POWs, in Operation Meade River, the refusal to take POWs. We had a Bn order that after we had gotten a few POWs not to take POWs if they came up to us and their hands, it looked like their fingers were curled, we were supposed to shoot them on sight. If their fingers were extended, their hands open, we were supposed to take them. and the rationale for this was given that they might have a grenade in their hands, so don't take chances.

A lot of guys never even bothered to see whether the fingers were uncurled or what, they just shot them, said it looked like they might have had something in their hand. Besides, the distance, maybe 3-400 meters away, walking toward us, you could not tell whether the hands were curled or not, and the guys just shot them anyway. That is about the extent of the testimony I have. I could go into it in detail if you would like.

DELLUMS: Thank you very much for your testimony, Mr Campbell. Congressmen Seiberling has to go to a committee meeting and he would like to ask you a question before he leaves. We have also been joined by Cngswmn Abzug from NY. Congressmen Seiberling.

SEIBERLING: I commend you, sir, for your candor and your courage in appearing here. I just have 1 ques tion with respect to this last order you mentioned. Was that a written or oral order?

CAMPBELL: That was a verbal order that came down from the Col of the Bn, 1st Bn, 1st Marines, went to the company cmdrs. I was at the briefing of the platoon cmdrs by the company cmdr when he gave this order to the platoon cmdrs.

SEIBERLING: Was there no qualification in the order that they should only be shot when they had their hands curled if they were within range to throw grenades, or were there any limitations of any sort?

CAMPBELL: There was no limitation on range. If they looked like they might have something in their hands, the order was to kill them.

SEIBERLING: Even though it was beyond the range where they could possibly throw a grenade?

CAMPBELL: There was nothing said about range at all.

SEIBERLING: Thank you.

DELLUMS: We have been joined by Congressmen Jonathan Bingham from NY. Cngswmn Chisholm.

CHISHOLM: 1st of all, in terms of the overall training or preparation, was there ever anything that was said on the part of your superiors or generals or Cols with respect to the sanctity of human life, even where children and/or women were relatively helpless in the situation? Was there any discussion ever centering on the sanctity of human life? Because this is 1 of the things we talk about so much in this nation.

CAMPBELL: The best way I think I can answer that question is to say that there were classes where the instructors cautioned us not to just shoot anything and to be careful. and you know, to preserve civilian lives and to treat the civilians decently. - But these classes, well, there weren't many of them, and they were so short and they were so overshadowed by all of the other classes where the instructors constantly, you know, taught us "blow them away, blow them away," and I would also like to point out that the people who instructed us were NCOs, and most, if not all, were Vietnam vets. and they would train us by the book as far as the class goes, they would tell us all of these little points the book says.

Then they would turn around and tell us stories, their stories, which did not quite go along with what they taught us. They would tell us stories of blowing away civilians, of what to expect in Vietnam, and they would always refer to the Vietnamese as gooks, and slant eyes and dinks, and we got the overall picture, at least I did, and I believe most of the other guys got the impression, you know, you cannot trust anybody, and as long as nobody is watching to be hard, tough, and to have no feeling, blow them away. It was always blow them away.

CHISHOLM: 1 last question. Would you say then that under the circumstances as the whole situation escalated, and as men became more desperate under a great deal of stress and strain, that there was absolutely no time to talk about or think about human life as such? The circumstances were, in other words, we might get killed, so we may as well get rid of them? It was a desperate situation, would you say, in terms of the escalation? Or was it a kind of attitude they had against these people maybe because of the fact that they do represent a different ethnic group or come from a different part of the world? I am very interested in that whole approach or attitude, because I have gotten it individually from many persons.

CAMPBELL: At certain times, if you excuse the expression, when the shit hit the fan, yes, it was a matter of us or them. and this was when people were really on edge, when the strain was really great. But all of the other times when we were not going through this strain there was still the attitude, there was always the attitude - it developed in boot camp, it developed in ITR, it developed in staging Bn before we went over and it developed all of the way through the time we were in Vietnam - we hated these people, we were taught to hate these people, they were gooks, slants, dinks, they were Orientals, inferior to us, they chewed betel nuts, they were ugly, you know, they ate lice out of each other's hair, they were not as good as us.

and you could not trust them.

I did not think it was racist then, but I certainly - do now. We just hated the whole people. They were all gooks. We were not taught to just call the VC-NVA gooks. The instructors, the Vietnam vet, these people we looked up to as like next to God, they always referred to all of these people as gooks and we picked this up from them. and that is the feeling we had all of the way through Vietnam.

ABZUG: I may have missed some of the testimony, since I came in the middle of it, but as I came in you were talking about you had spoken to your CO and been granted permission to target these vills. I am rather interested in knowing what preceded that. Had you been given instructions to spot the vills 1st and then call in, #1? and #2, what was the nature of your rpt to the CO? and #3, what was his reply to you in terms of instructions?

CAMPBELL: Okay. Well, just by the nature of my job I was to spot vills. I am an arty scout observer, that is my job. I went to an observation post in Con Thien which is just below the DMZ, and I spotted vills. They were - well, in 2 different days there were 2 vills I spotted north of the DMZ, in the lower part of NV, and I went back to the officer, liaison officer in charge of the FSCC, fire support coordination center, and I told him exactly what I saw and that is that there were vills where people were walking around.

and he asked me if I saw any troops. I said "No." He seemed disappointed. I was disappointed when I could not see any troops there.

I told him, you know, they were working the fields and stuff. and I asked him if I should fire on them, you know, if I should call in arty on these vills. He stopped for a few seconds, thought about it, and said yes, go ahead. He said they are probably feeding the NVA with rice anyway, so therefore they are enemies, they are supporting the enemy, they are enemy.

He said as long as there is no flak, there is no hassle in getting it cleared through the Regt and Div, which I would have to do to get long-range arty cleared, as long as they clear it there, he said, it is all right with me.

I got it cleared through Regt and Div. These people knew what I was firing at, the coordinates I gave was the middle of vills. They had this on their maps, they cleared it, he cleared it, and I fired them.

ABZUG: But was it he who sought permission from the CO or was it you?

CAMPBELL: I sought permission from him 1st of all face to face. Then when I went back to the OP I called the mission in over the radio. This was relayed by radio through his Bn coordination center, then it was sent on to Regt, Div, and they okayed it, and then sent the message back down through the radio to me that I could indeed fire on it.

ABZUG: You did not give the firing instructions, did you?

CAMPBELL: It depends on what instructions you are talking about. I gave the coordinates for the vill, and I told them what I wanted fired on I told them where I wanted it fired I told them why I wanted it fired.

ABZUG: Prior to this, in spotting vills what instructions were you given for the purpose of spotting vills, and which vills you were to rpt on and which vills you were to act on?

CAMPBELL: It was very vague. I mean, it started in FO schl, and all of the way through until the time and during the time I was in Vietnam. There was very little instruction about the use of arty as far as inhabited vills go. But the overall theme was to destruct. It was constantly drilled into us that arty was the greatest killer on the battlefield and to use it every chance we could.

We were supposed to be proud of the of act that we were in arty. and anything, any instructions about being careful about civilians was sort of like on the side, it was completely overshadowed by the fact that we were there to kill and we had the best killer in our hands. We had responsibility, and that, you know, we had life and death ar do not know how many times they told us we had the power of life and death in our hands. and it was not like a warning, it was something we were supposed to be proud of, and we were proud of it, and we used it every chance we could.

When we got to Vietnam, or at least when I got to Vietnam personally, the rest of the FO I talked to, specifically the FO I relieved for Bravo Company, told. me about the mass destruction of Hue City with arty. and he told me in a very proud way, he was proud of destroying a good portion of Hue City with arty.

I got there 2-24, I was there when they came back from Hue City, when the Marines came back from Hue City, and a talked with these people about Hue City. and this FO told me how he called in arty on all of these houses. It was - he was proud of it, it was that simple. He had his chance to use the greatest killer on the battlefield and he used it well. He destroyed, and that was the idea, destroy, blow away, constantly blow away. This was the theme the whole time I was in Vietnam, to destruct. They were only gooks anyway, why worry about them?

DELLUMS: Thank you. Congressmen Bingham.

BINGHAM: Thank you, Mr Chmn. 1st of all, I would like to commend you, Mr Chmn, and your colleagues for arranging these hearings. I have been following the results as they have been reported and it seems to me you are bringing out some very important matters indeed. It is a crying shame in my judgment that no official committee of the House has seen fit to conduct hearings of this sort. They should have. But failing that, I think you are performing a real service here.

I am sorry that I missed the opening statement of this witness. I gather from what you say, sir, that at the time you were engaged in these activities you saw nothing wrong in it is that correct?

CAMPBELL: No, I thought everything was right about it. I mean, the people who instructed me, the people I was not only taking orders from, or advice, these people "knew their shit." That means they had been in combat, they had experienced it all. and, like, these people were on a pedestal, I looked up to them.

and I believed everything they told me. I figured this was, you know, another way of stopping Communism, and protecting my country, and I felt nothing wrong with it except there was 1 time at the end of that 2d mission I called in on the 2d vill that I began wondering what am I doing? You know. It went through my mind, what am I doing? and it shook me for a while and my radioman, who I had become very close to, never said anything, but he just stared at me and the look on his face, you know, the idea that he conveyed to me was the same question I had, what are you doing? you know.

and this rattled me, but going back to the old USMC idea of being hard, I just pushed it to the back of my mind. I knew I could not think about it too long or else I would not be hard anymore, I would not be 1 of the elite killers anymore if I started having feelings. Besides this I rationalized it, I mean, this is what they had told me, nobody questioned it, it was the thing to do. I did not have any serious questions about it all of the way up until that time and even though I did not h ave questions then, I just had to put it in the back of my mind, because I would have been a weakling.

BINGHAM: When did you become convinced 1hat this was wrong? What were the circumstances of that? Was that after you left Vietnam?

CAMPBELL: I did not admit it to myself that the whole thing was wrong, not just the calling in of arty on that specific vill, but the whole gig in Vietnam was wrong until well after I was back from Vietnam. It was playing on me all of the time, you know, it would constantly come up in my mind, questions, doubts. and I was able to keep pushing them back into the back of my mind. But they kept growing and kept nagging at my mind more and more until finally I started running into other people who had the same questions, and even though I recognized they pretty much felt the same way I did, they were going through some of the same things I was, and after I got back from Vietnam I never told anybody about this except other Vietnam vets, because I knew other people could not understand. But it was quite a bit of time after I came back from Vietnam that I finally realized, or I finally admitted it to myself that what I had done was pretty gross.

BINGHAM: Would you have any comments to make about the relationship of your arty fire against these vills and the use of air power against occupied areas? Did you have experience with the use of air power also? Bombing?

CAMPBELL: I never called in air strikes, but the air controller that calls in air strikes and myself had just about the same job. We were pretty close to each other in the company and, you know, the only difference was 1 was shot out of a gun and 1 was dropped from a plane. It was the same idea, the same feelings, the same attitudes. I do not know if that answers your question.

BINGHAM: Yes, it does. Thank you.

DELLUMS: Thank you. You testified to the destruction of 2 vills. I would like to get a little specific info. Can you identify the unit or platoon or company, Bn, etc?

CAMPBELL: I was in Bravo Company, 1st Bn, 1st Marine Regt, 1st Marine Div, and that was the company I scouted for as an arty scout observer. Technically I belonged to Alpha Battery, 1st Bn, 11th Marine Regt, 1st Marine Div, which was an arty battery. They lent me out for 11 of the 13 months I was in Vietnam to this infy company to support them. and it was, the incident happened, about the 2d-3d week of 8-68.

DELLUMS: My next question is, was there any provocation or any military reason at all for the destruction of these 2 vills?

CAMPBELL: Well, the reason that I used was - well, actually the idea for this reason was given to ma by the LT I talked to was the fact that they here probably feeding, undoubtedly feeding the NVA troops that came through that area with rice. But other than that I saw no troops, we had received no fire from it, it was just a vill sitting there.

DELLUMS: As you probably are aware, yesterday we had some very shocking testimony about the killing of 30 Vietnamese women and children in a vill In your opinion, is there any difference in the unit walking into a vill and shooting down women and children and the type of destruction that you described in our testimony?

CAMPBELL: The only difference I can see is in a My Lai type of thing there are many people pulling the trigger, whereas in the use of arty there is 1 person actually pulling the trigger, actually spotting the people and pulling the trigger and that is the FO, and that is myself, with the consent of higher authority. Other than that, I do not think there is any difference. The people are dead just the same.

DELLUMS: I would imagine that most Amer people believe as they view the war that the US and RVNese people are on 1 side as 1 group, and the enemy or the VC is on the other side. But having sat through 3 days now of testimony, it appears to me that it becomes extremely difficult to determine who is the civilian and who is the combatant, given the nature of the testimony.

and this is the question I would like to ask you: Does the use of conventional warfare in a struggle such as the struggle going on in SEA dictate the kind of atrocities that you have testified to and many other people before you have testified to?

CAMPBELL: I think the type of warfare and also, you know, the policies that are passed down to the individual troops, you know, FREE-FIRE ZONES's, I do not know how many times I fired arty in a FREE-FIRE ZONES where everything in there was supposed to be enemy, where I knew myself there were quite a few civilians. These type of things. and also the training we get before we go there and while we are there, all lend to the atrocities. Conventional warfare, the use of arty and air power, I think it is ridiculous to try to use that in a guerrilla war because just from, well, just from, I don't know, luck, whatever you want to call it, bad luck, there is always bound to be a certain percentage of civilians killed by the use of heavy arms such as arty and air power. I mean, how can you kill a guerrilla among a bunch of civilians by dropping bombs?

DELLUMS: I would like to ask in extension of that, are you familiar with the term that the only good gook is a dead gook?

CAMPBELL: I am very familiar with that.

DELLUMS: In your personal opinion and experience, did that term refer not only to VC but to RVNese people as well?

CAMPBELL: That was the genl attitude. "The only good gook was a dead gook," and that referred to Vietnamese, to gooks, you know. like I said, gooks were anybody, anybody with slanted eyes, they were not just vc and NVA. So, therefore, if the only good gook is a dead gook, then the only good Vietnamese is a dead Vietnamese. like if you could get away with it, you know, blow them away.

DELLUMS: Thank you.

CHISHOLM: I would like to ask you, on the basis of your testimony it would seem that the racism which is so inherent in the bloodstream of our nation in a very real sense was transported abroad and became a part of the total practices and training of our men for this war against the so-called gooks.

In other words, what I am saying is that it is not only a question of what has happened in Vietnam, but it is also a question of a total overall foreign policy and racial policy toward people. and would you say that seems to be the overall philosophy?

CAMPBELL: Well, I do not know about the overall foreign policy, but I know in Indochina that is the idea, you know that they are inferior to us, and that pretty well sums it up. When you go into combat and you have got a rifle in your hands and you believe every slant eye around you is inferior, you are not exactly going to treat them with kid gloves.

CHISHOLM: Thank you.

DELLUMS: I would like to, on behalf of myself and the members of the panel, commend you for your courage and thank you very much for your testimony. We deeply appreciate you coming before us.

Dellums (House of Representatives) War Crimes Hearings Wednesday, 4-28-71, Washg'tn, DC Testimony Of Thomas Cole 1/20, D Comp, 11th Bgd, Americal Div Amherst, OH

COLE: My name is Thomas Cole, I am from Amherst, OH, and I also was in D Comp, I/20, 11th Bgd, Americal Div.

I am 23 years old and I was drafted in the Army. I was in the mortar platoon there which we didn't participate in many patrols or any night ambushes as such. But I did witness a lot of atrocities of sorts and I also witnessed disrespect to the Vietnamese people. Now there was 1 instance I think which is probably fairly important when we were coming in on standdown. This was about in May, about 5-20-70).

Our company had been out in the field for approx 3 months. We were getting a rest period here. We had loaded our trucks. There was about 5 trucks and 2 APC's.

Everyone got on the trucks then and they took out their smoke grenades and CS grenades, and we went to Mo Duc IV and Mo Duc III and we left behind in the shops CS grenades and smoke grenades going.

In fact, we threw grenades up into the straw roofs so some of these shops burned down immediately. There was no effort to reprimand us.

The next time we came in for stand-down they told us to put our smoke grenades and CS grenades away.

Another instance back in 4-67 I got a rear job, in a mortar platoon and in the Bgd fire base, LZ Bronco. It was on a hill called Montezuma. At the time it was about the middle of Apr. We got a call for fire anyway. It was 6:30pm, still daylight. Well, they said that there was VC out there and they called in to us so we fired out there and killed off 7 of them.

Well, the word came back that we killed 7 rice farmers carrying their hose, trying to make it back to the vill. You know, these people didn't carry any wrist watches, so they didn't have any idea what time it would be.

Well, we set up this 6am-6pm, curfew time. at was set up for them. If they were out working their fields, even if it was in broad daylight, they were liable to get killed and we did kill these 7 people.

I think there were 3 men and 4 women. Of course, you never saw the bodies because we fired the mission from I500 meters away.

In 3-70 we were again pulling security for some engineers, building a road out to what was known as the Gaza Strip.

BURTON: Do you have any 1st-hand knowledge whether the 7 persons that were killed were reported for purposes of body-count?

COLE: They were simply called in - all I know is the fire mission was called in. We fired the mission. We got confirmed kills back about 3 minutes later after we fired the mission. We confirmed our kills. Everybody was very elated and was celebrating. "We got 7 VC," and all that.

The next morning they came down and told us that they had killed 7 civilians.

Everyone was still very elated, however, to have killed somebody.

BURTON: The point I am trying to confirm is, and I fully believe in my mind, and I am not trying to le ad your testimony because if you don't know 1st hand you simply don't know, but whether or not these kills were reported and then if so after the determination was made that they were not combatants, I wonder whether th(re was a change, something to change the body-count, areas that reported?

If you know, fine. If you don't know personally, th en that's the end of that. I thought I would see if you (lid happen to have any knowledge with respect to that.

COLE: No, I don't. I don't know if it was recorded as a body-count.

A lot of times civilians have been killed. and then some other unit would find them and count them as their body-count, and we would lose credit for something and someone else would get the credit. There is such a race for body-count over there, you know.

BURTON: There is 1 thing that may well have been done, and I have been meaning to assign someone on my staff to do it. If it has been done, I wonder well, if it has been done I hope that I find out who it was who did it to I can get the results.

But I would like to total up the daily body-count numbers or weekly numbers as they were reported and I would suspect that we have killed or wounded 5-10 times at least the total number of people that have ever been represented to the Congress as being part of the VC or part of the Northern lets.

If that is something that has not been done, Mr Chmn, I might suggest that we collectively try to get some people or some person just to wade through the DoD daily or weekly casualty figures with reference to the "enemy," and I would suspect that ave are up to a million, or 2-3 million Vietnamese people who we have asserted were in effect combatants who have been either killed, maimed, or otherwise disabled in the conflict.

DELLUMS: Your point is well taken, Congressmen Burton. We will explore the possibility of getting that info. Mr Cole.

COLE: Getting back to the rice farmers: This is an opinion of mine now and nothing more, but due to the fact that they were out after 6 o'clock, somebody somewhere - I mean that's enough to confirm them as VC. Someone, of course, has already made that decision.

That's all you need because they were out after curfew time. So I imagine somebody or some other unit got the credit for them.

We most credit for them. People were really proud of killing people over there. They would fight over it. not fight physically but they would fight verbally over getting credit for kills.

Well, this 1 incident back in 12-69, this was the day after Christmas, and we had been moving from our LZ Liz. Now we had a big Christmas party there and so forth.

Well, we were moving back into the flat 515 valley, and the man behind me, well, be stopped - well, we stopped for a rest for about an hour and we stopped and the guy behind me was talking to this rice farmer, this old man about 65 years old and all of a sudden he started picking on the man. You know, calling him a dink, pushing him down in the dirt, threatening to hit him with the hoe.

I asked him, a asked the guy to leave him alone, that he was a rice farmer only and that the guy couldn't do anything to us. and the guy said, "He is only a dink." He says, "Think of the people that have been killed here." Well, I had an argument with him and I said to myself, the heck with it. I will forget it. I moved away so I wouldn't have to watch it.

I came back later to get my pack and the rest and this guy had ripped the farmer's beard off. Nothing was ever done about it. Nobody says anything about things 1ike this because it's commonplace. People are treated - these civilians who walk along, you push them in the paddies and so forth. You stick their head in the well or underneath a bucket of water, and you hold them there, you terrorize them. Just general terrorism.

In 7-70, our company had set up in a day logger and it was sending out patrols. Some guys were in the CP messing around and this Vietnamese family well, at 1st they were friendly. This 1 guy thought he would play a joke on them so he went and urinated in their food and it became great fun making these people eat it and nobody tried to stand up for the people at all.

So I mean, it made me sick. So I just left. But these practices go on all the time. It is just a genl disrespect for the Vietnamese people. You know, they are less than human, is the attitude.

BURTON: Were those Amer or RVNese people?

COLE: They were Amers that did this. These incidents are just so common.

All of us can talk of this for 3-4 weeks and it just goes to show that vie had a kind of racist approach to these people that they weren't that important. They were playthings, something that, well, something for getting your rocks off on, to torture them.

This was encouraged. It was encouraged, I guess, just by the fact of being there. The whole genl attitude toward the people was this. Our fire base wouldn't allow a Vietnamese up there. He wouldn't be allowed up there unless he was a genl or something like that. We wouldn't let them up there because we couldn't trust them and the people didn't want them around.

CONYERS: How did that affect race relations inside the US military forces?

COLE: I don't know. I think a lot of the black soldiers took comfort in the fact that they could show racism to somebody else. They felt that somebody is finally "lower than I am." An attitude that "we can pick on them." There were times that they were sometimes the most guilty people. I excuse it because they were shit on themselves by not getting rank, by not getting - they wouldn't let them on the field with getting the good jobs and so forth. I don't know. It's just a - the stuff went on so much that it was just...

CONYERS: Do you have any other additional observations about the character of race relations between the black and white soldiers other than that?

COLE: Well, within the company there was a segregation kind of a thing.

you know, blacks went to 1 hooch, whites went to another. They wouldn't mix. These things were - the race relations out in the field among the combat troops, they were really good. We got along good. Outside of whatever was brought up among ourselves.

But among the rear areas it was a little different. I am not that familiar with the rear areas, but I got this through 2d-hand knowledge of that. We heard that was different. The people would come back from the rear, especially blacks, they would be extremely bitter with the things that had happened back there.

CONYERS: Then it's your genl impression that the racist practices that were visited upon the Vietnamese had no measurable effect upon the race relations between the black and white soldiers?

COLE: No, I don't think it did. Not really. Except for the fact that the race relations between the black and white, I mean the racist attitude within this country was used to make the black people, you know, really killers. Torturers and so forth.

CONYERS: Mr Chmn, if there is no objection I would like to open that question up to any of the other witnesses that may come before us today. Any of the witnesses that may have testified earlier also. This is 1 of the points that has not been raised, I don't believe.

BATTLES: What is the question?

DELLUMS: Well, the question is, what is the effect of the racist practices visited upon the Vietnamese between the race relations between the black and white Amers?

CONYERS: If you have any observations or experiences on that point to relate to the Committee... would like to know about that.

DELLUMS: That is, if you have any at this time. Mr Battles?"

BATTLES: The only thing that connects in my mind about race is a fellow from my home town camp to Vietnam, and I said after I saw him going out, and he was a black fellow and I said to him, if I was black I would never come in the Army in the 1st place.

It so happens that I was with a guy from Arizona, who was an Indian, and this colored person and I were in the same foxhole, the 3 of us, and things were pretty bad and we felt we were going to be wiped out. So we got down into some conversation like, "you black bastard, what's going to happen now?" He sort of hit me on the shoulder and the Indian says,"Look, you both came to my country."

BURTON: What was that last part?

BATTLES: The Indian-head said, "Look, you both came to my country." I'll tell you, I'm not a bit proud that I am white. But it is a racist war.

These questions keep coming up to us here and it's like, sometimes I feel like as though I am wasting my time.

Here now you want a time and a date. Shouldn't it be more important than other things? Really, Viet's face it. We drive an automobile around, and all the other things that go on around you day in and day out - well, I beg someone to give me an answer why these things go on and if we are killing an enemy, who is the enemy? Who are we?

I don't feel justified. I don't think any man should be justified to say that someone else is an enemy. Within the realm of the war anyhow. We are talking about atrocities to people on our side and I can't even see, I can't distinguish enemies or friends or foes. I just don't know what I am doing here sometimes. But you can start a war in a 2d. But if it takes all this work to bring it to an end, where is the conscience of the Amer people really?

DELLUMS: Your point is well taken. Mr Cole.

Dellums (House of Representatives) War Crimes Hearings Thursday, 4-29-71, Washg'tn, DC Testimony Of Randy Floyd Capt USMC, VMA AW 533, Mag 12, 1st Marine Air Wing Pilot of an A6-A Intruder, Arlington, TX

FLOYD: My name is Randy Floyd. I was a former Marine bomber and fighter pilot. I now live in Arlington, TX, where I attend the Univ'y of TX at Arlington. Until just a few days ago I was active in the Marine Reserves and I was drilling out at the Naval Air Station in Dallas.

I enlisted in the USMC in 7-64, immediately after graduating from high schl. I received my wings and was commissioned and got married in 10-66. My next 14 months were spent at the USMC station at Cherry Point, NC, training in the A6-A Intruder jet bomber, prior to going to Vietnam.

The primary objective of this training was to increase each pilot's bombing accuracy and improve his delivery techniques for radar computerized bombing and visual bombing.

Never during the course of my enlisted service in boot camp and in infy training nor during any cadet days in flight training nor as an officer did I receive any instruction regarding the Hague or Geneva Conventions, the Nuremberg Principles, or the treatment of POWs.

In boot camp and in flight training I was given extensive instructions on the code of conduct which says briefly that I should never surrender myself or those under me as long as we had the means to resist. lf I was captured, I was to give only my name, rank, serial number and date of birth. It was my duty if captured to try to escape.

Much was made of the traitorist Amer POWs in Korea, who were "sinisterly brainwashed by those vicious Korean Commies." A trainee is taught to fear and hate all Asians because he is told they are cruel and have no regard for human are. We were told of innumerable tortures our Japanese, Korean, and Vietnamese enemies used on POWs. We were shown booby traps and told that every Vietnamese, regardless of sex or age, was our potential killer, which amounted to saying that all Vietnamese were our enemies.

Throughout my military life unquestioning immediate obedience to all orders given me was pounded into my head. There was never a distinction drawn between what constituted a legal or illegal order.

As all vets know, military training is very repetitive, but not once was I told to be aware of the legality of orders. Just as many Amers find it difficult to believe that deliberate lies could emanate from the White House or the Pentagon, most soldiers can't conceive of an illegal order. "My country right or wrong" has been pablum since grade schl.

In 2-68 I was sent to Vietnam and was assigned as a squadron pilot to Marine Attack All Weather Squadron 533, Marine Air Group 12, at Chu Lai, Vietnam.

while there I flew 97 combat missions in the A6-A. The A6-A is a 2-crew member bomber aircraft it has 2 engines, its primary mission is radar computerized bombing, and a secondary mission of visual bombing for close air support.

37 of these missions were flown over NV. 4 were flown over Laos, and 56 over I Corps in RVN.

The bulk of my missions over RVN consisted of TPQs and Close Air Support [CAS]'s. TPQs were strato-level ground radar controlled by TPQ-10 radar. On a TPQ I would fly at 20,000 feet with a radarman giving me heading and airspeed instructions. His computer would tell him when to have me drop my bombs. I could never see what I was hitting. The radarman would then read us a set of coordinates, where the bombs should have fallen, and we would take these back and give these to the debriefer after the hop.

Normally we never checked a map to see where they landed. and small variations in airspeed or small errors in his timing in telling me when to drop or my delay could cause a great error in where the bombs hit.

It was not uncommon also to have a section of A6's carrying 56 500lb bombs, to drop these on a suspected sniper. It was kind of a standard joke. This was in CAS and TPQs.

DELLUMS: Pardon me. To drop all 56 bombs on 1 sniper?

FLOYD: Yes. This type of strato-level bombing is against the Nuremberg Principles, which were created after WWII when Dresden was destroyed, I believe, for no militarily significant target.

CAS missions were visual bombing directed by a forward air controller, usually airborne, against enemy forces who were in contact with friendly forces.

The tactical air controller airborne would normally fare a smoke rocket as close to the enemy position as possible, then direct placement of our bombs in relation to the smoke. 1 of the few CAS targets I could physically see was a fairly large vill 5 miles northeast of Dang Ha, just south of the DMZ. The controller told me and my wingman that NVA gunners were atop the 3 tallest buildings in the center of town. He and ARVN forces were 600 meters away from the target and they had USMC advisers with them, so to put on a good show for the Marines.

Between the 2 A6s we had 56 500lb bombs. We put approx 40 into the vill, dropping 4-6 at a time. Civilians were still in the town, most probably, in their shelters. We destroyed the vill.

Another type of mission I flew was called euphemistically Armed Recon, because it went into Laos. There was no recon to it was simply a bombing mission. Its objectives were merely to destroy any supplies, convoys, troops or other living things along and in an area around Route 9 so'east of Khe Sahn into Laos up to Tchepong. It was in 2-68. It was as much of a recon as many of our bombing missions in NV are now. It was not at all recon. I was told that all of this area was NV controlled, so anything was fair game. It was in effect a free drop zone.

DELLUMS: Pardon me. You mentioned that back in '68 when you flew bombing missions in Laos... Was this as far as you know official policy to fly bombing missions into Laos in 68?

FLOYD: Yes, it was. I mean, this was our directed mission. We would load up again with a normal load of 28 500lb bombs or 27 150lb bombs, or 4-5 2,000lb bombs, and we were sent into the area and our primary mission was to look for convoys or virtually any sign of life.

There were also airborne tracks there and aircraft with infrared and sniffer gear who would try to pinpoint some kind of "enemy." and many times this type of gear does not distinguish between any living thing, it picks up odors or some kind of movement. So we would simply destroy whatever was there.

DELLUMS: 1 other question. You mentioned the term "euphemistically called armed reconnaissance." Normally isn't armed reconnaissance when you are on a reconnaissance patrol and receive fire, that you put the fire back?

FLOYD: That is the way I would define it.

DELLUMS: You said this was not a reconnaissance mission back in '68 when you were bombing in Laos, that these were specifically bombing raids in Laos?

FLOYD: Yes. Our aircraft was not a recon aircraft. and we were equipped with full bomb loads and we never came without bombs. We were directed to bomb these targets. So I assume that the reason they called them armed recon was simply again so they could play semantic games and say we were not bombing, we were just running recon fights over Laos.

DELLUMS: Do you have any idea whether the Amer Ambassador knew there were bombing raids taking place in Laos?

FLOYD: I don't have direct knowledge whether he knew it or not. I assume he had full military briefings. After each hop we would go back and write up where we dropped the bombs. So they knew where the bombs were going. Virtually all of NV was a free drop zone. There were no targets forbidden to us in our target areas, which was usually between the I7th and I 8th parallel.

NV was divided up into what are called route packages and each route package is simply a target area. and they went from Route Package I between the I 7th and I 8th parallel up to Route Package 6 Alpha and Bravo around Hanoi.

Rolling Thunders and Tally Has were the 2 types of missions flown by my squadron in NV. Both were always at night, because daylight flights of this type were impossible.

Rolling Thunder was a low-level flight into mid and upper regions of NV, against fixed targets such as a bridge, a power plant, railroad yards, or radio stations. Many of these targets were in civilian and residential areas.

Tally Ho, like a Rolling Thunder, was a flight radar bombing strike. The target was between the I7th and 18th parallel. The primary objective was to destroy all supply traffic.

The A6 radar picks up radar significant moving targets such as trucks, cars, buses, trains, barges, even bicycles if they had enough metal to be radar significant. Normally we could roam the entire route package looking for movers, what were called movers. Sometimes I would be restricted to a smaller area in Route Pack I, because of other US aircraft working in areas around Route Pack I.

Secondary targets when we found no movers were targets that were hit night after night. These are the same assigned targets. We would be assigned 1 secondary target to hit, if we found no movers. This might be a suspected truck park which had been hit for a month of nights, or it might be a ferry crossing, or it might be a road or a gun emplacement. If we found we had any ordnance left or we tried to drop it and the ordnance did not drop, malfunctioned, there was an ordnance drop zone 50 miles out to sea, but this was rarely used. Primarily it was used when you had ordnance that hung up and you wanted to go out and jettison it, But if you found no movers, and you had bombs left after hitting the secondary target or something, or if you just felt like hitting something else, you would go and drop the bombs somewhere else, wherever you liked in NV, in the target area.

Many times a lot of the pilots would drop on gun emplacements that they knew where the hot areas were, so they could stand off and radar bomb these areas, or there was an airfield at Dong Hoi, which was the largest city between the 17th and 18th parallel, and they would bomb that airfield repeatedly.

They bombed the town of Dong Hoa whenever we found movers in the town, we went ahead and bombed them there also.

So this in essence was bombing nonmilitary targets. It was simply "don't waste ordnance," just drop it in NV, that was only logical.

DELLUMS: So any left - over bombs, you bombed nonstrategic nonmilitary targets with?

FLOYD: You bombed whatever you felt like basically.

DELLUMS: Was there a policy that you were not to return with any bombs?

FLOYD: Right, we couldn't come back and land with bombs except - under normal conditions we could do it, but it was not a safe thing to do ordinarily. So unless the bomb simply would not come off, we would get rid of them normally in NV. All ordnance drops were reported up the chain of cmnd by debriefs after every hop. So although there were no written orders to bomb civilians, the tacit approval of the 1st Marine Air Wing and the 7th Air Force Hqs who sent down fragmentary orders giving us our mission had the effect of promulgating these atrocities as policy.

Most of the men I knew in Vietnam didn't really care about the politics or policies of the war. They simply wanted to survive their tour in Indochina and go home and get out of the Service.

The most important goal of the field grade officers and above was to further their military career. This was done in several ways. It was act up so that most field grade officers, especially LT Col and above, would get some kind of cmnd billet while in Vietnam. Thus leadership and experience were not prerequisites for cmnd. They simply tried to get everyone a cmnd of some sort.

Also most field grade officers were assured of getting some kind of award for valor, whether they had earned it or not.

A vast number of the awards were jokes. Good statistics was another way to make a unit cmdr look good. The infy had their body-counts, and the Air Wing had the number of sorties flown, tons of bombs dropped, and hours flown. It is all very like a game.

I was a Marine pilot and a good 1. I was also an unwitting pawn of my govt's inhuman imperialistic policy in SEA. For my part in this war against the Vietnamese and Laotian people I am ashamed and sorry. and I am revolted by my govt which commits genocide because it is good business.

The policies and laws of our country must be changed, never again to allow property rights to be held above human rights.

DELLUMS: a would like to thank you very much for the courage of your testimony and the preparation and details. We are deeply appreciative of the fact that you came forward today. I have 1 question before I turn it over to the panel. In 3-68 Pres Johnson publicly declared a halt to the bombing of NV.

Did you ever fly any bombing missions after 3-68 into NV?

FLOYD: Yes, sir. What I think you are talking about, we had a number of inexperienced crews come into my squadron. So we no longer flew Rolling Thunders, which were supposedly the hottest missions and the most dangerous.

Okay, we were scheduled to resume Rolling Thunders on 4-1-68. and the bombing pause down to the 20th parallel came on 3-31, the day before. So after that we were restricted to between the 17th and 18th parallel with the USAF. That was an USAF and USMC area. The Navy had between the 18th and 19th. and supposedly no 1 was bombing between the 19th and 20th. I don't know for sure. Another thing, after I got back, I came home I had a short tour of 5 months, I was injured and I got back to Cherry Point and was an instructor, I believe sometime in the fall of '68 people were coming back from Vietnam saying that the bulk of their missions were being flown into Laos. The bulk of the A6 squadron missions were being flown into Laos. and this again amounted to armed recon, where they were simply bombing anything and everything, many times blowing the tops off of hills, trying to blow roads up or something, again most of the sorties were into Laos.

DELLUMS: Thank you. Before I turn the floor over to Congressmen Mikva, I would like to introduce my distinguished colleague from Wisconsin, Congressmen Bob Kastenmeier, on my far right. Congressmen Mikva.

MIKVA: Capt, you enlisted in the USMC in '66?

FLOYD: Yes, I did.

MIKVA: How Long a tour did you have?

FLOYD: It was a 3-year tour.

MIKVA: At the time you went into the USMC, it was your choice, I presume.

You decided that is where you wanted to be, is that correct?

FLOYD: Yes. I enlisted a month after I graduated from high schl. I didn't know what a wanted to do in college, or study, so I decided to do this. I enlisted with a friend of mine on the buddy system, he was going in and more or less talked me into it.

MIKVA: Had you at that time ever given any thought to a USMC career?

FLOYD: No, not really. I never was mili-oriented.

MIKVA: When you received your wings, how long after that before you went to SEA?

FLOYD: I received my wings in 10-66, and I went to Vietnam in 2-68.

MIKVA: Between '66 and '68 you were here in this country?

FLOYD: Yes. I had probably a total of about 45-50 days leave at the beginning and the end of that period of time. and the rest of it was spent at Cherry Point, NC, where I was transitioning to the A6-A and training in the A6.

MIKVA: You mentioned something about Nuremberg and I didn't catch it. Was anything ever said about Nuremberg during your career in an official way?

FLOYD: I mentioned in the testimony that we were never instructed or it was never even discussed in any formal way, none of the conventions of war, Geneva, The Hague, or Nuremberg. Nothing was ever discussed. The only thing relating to rules of war was the Code of Conduct, which came out after the Korean War when we had so many defectors. and this was hit hard, both in boot camp and in flight training.

MIKVA: When a was in the Air Corps we used to have a course called survival training, which had to do with what happened if you were shot down behind the lines and they would give you some description of the people. What kind of description did you get, or was there something similar to that given you during training?

FLOYD: A lot of the pilots got survival training. The only survival training I received was in preflight, which is the 12 weeks of academic study prior to starting flying. We had about a 3-day survival trip after that, which was very basic and rudimentary. There was no discussion of the Vietnamese people. I would say probably 2/3ds of the pilots or less than half, about half, received some kind of survival schl, about a week's schl, prior to going to SEA. and then Probably another quarter of the people received some kind of survival schl while in SEA. They went to the North of Japan or the Philippines. I don't know. I didn't go to those schls.

MIKVA: and there were no manuals issued which described the NV people?

FLOYD: No, we were given no formal training as to what the Vietnamese people were like, what kind of culture they had or anything. So there was no way for me to identify with them as people, because I knew nothing about them, nothing at all.

ABOUREZKI: You made a statement that on these bombing runs into Laos, you called them armed recon, but they were actually bombing runs, and your mission was to destroy supplies, enemy soldiers, supply routes, and you said other living things. More specifically, what do you mean by other living things?

FLOYD: Basically I said this was an NVA - controlled area, so any cattle you saw there, I bombed cattle 1 time on a bridge, anything living you could bomb. Many times we would go out and most of our missions were at night. 1 time I had 1 in the daylight, but most of them were at night. So you would find a campfire, something like that, and you would bomb those.

In reading more about it after I came back and thinking about it, probably the campfires were civilians, because the NVA had better sense than to light a campfire when there was constant aircraft overhead, bombing missions. 24 hours a day there were aircraft scheduled for all parts of the area, so they wouldn't have lit campfires.

ABOUREZKI: So far as you know and from what you were told by your superiors in the USMC, the areas you were sent to bomb were mostly enemy areas, is that right? Were they were patrolled by enemy troops?

FLOYD: Yes, most of the areas were, like NV was all enemy territory

ABOUREZKI: I am referring to Laos specifically now.

FLOYD: well, the area we had in Laos was NVA controlled. this was the area south, probably 15-20 miles so'east of Khe Sahn, around Route 9, into Laos, up to Tchepong. and this was the area of the a0 Chi Minh trail, this was all NVA controlled.

ABOUREZKI: were you given any info about the possibility of Laos, Laotian civilians being in that area?

FLOYD: No, this was never discussed.

ABOUREZKI: Whether there were or weren't any, it wasn't discussed?

FLOYD: Right. It was just never brought up.

KASTENMEIER: I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate Congressmen Dellums on the very important hearings as well as to say I was deeply impressed by Floyd's testimony. I have really just 1 question.

In terms of the view expressed in the conclusion of your remarks, was this a point of view you held in 1968 at the time you were in Indochina, or was this an attitude or point of view which developed subsequently?

I ask the question to understand whether you felt confronted by the same perhaps moral dilemma then.

FLOYD: No, I don't think I was confronted with it. Perhaps it was kind of a self-defense mechanism, or whatever. But I came out of a conservative anti-Communist oriented type high schl. and I had no exposure to any other type of political thought. and I went through the military indoctrination, we saw all of the anti-Communist films, all of the glorious WWII and Korean films.

Really, an alternative to what I was doing simply did not occur to me, because to go to jail, to refuse to go to Vietnam, or to avoid the draft, something like this, or desert, would have been an atrocious crime to me.

While I was in Vietnam I remember I think probably only 1 other individual and I who ever discussed Vietnam, and I didn't know that much about it, I didn't know historically about it, I didn't know the policies, and probably the extent of my feelings at that time were that Ho Chi Minh was a nat'list leader. I think by this time the spectre of Communism didn't really bother me that much. and I felt that the people would be much better off under him, under his regime, regardless of whether it was a Communist regime or not, than under the Saigon govt, which seemed to be simply an economic power, who had nothing in common with the people of Vietnam. and that is right there I guess the extent, it is where I stopped thinking.

CONYERS: What do the initials CBU stand for?

FLOYD: Cluster bomb units. and we used these while I was there only in NV. and these are primarily an anti-personnel weapon. It is a little larger than say a 500lb bomb, and you drop it, and you compute your airspeed and so forth, and the altitude you must drop it from and say about 2,000 feet, the cannister blows open and a couple 100 little bomblets about this big spew out and they have little aerodynamic grooves on them and they start to turn. After so many revolutions they arm. and they are strictly anti-personnel. We used them against truck convoys and everything else, because someone seemed to think they worked.

These things are designed so that when they hit and explode, they come apart in tiny jagged fragments that when they enter the body, it darts around, tearing up the inside of a person, or tearing up whatever it enters. and these CBUs have an automatic assumed 10% dud rate. So we dropped a don't know how many of these things up there, probably innumerable. Then you figure there is 20-30 bomblets out of each cannister that are still alive that someone will step on, pick up, and blow a hand off and so forth. We used mines also and delayed-action bombs. We would seed the rivers of NV with these and they would go off at some time later to catch any traffic that was there when we weren't bombing. We would also seed roads with delayed-action bombs.

CONYERS: I merely want to commend you. I don't know if you are doing more good for this Committee than we are doing for you or all of us together perhaps may ultimately be considered as doing a service for our country in helping to raise the level of understanding about what it is we are doing in the war in Vietnam. I thank you for coming here.

DELLUMS: Floyd, you mentioned that bombing raids ostensibly are directed against military targets and that you flew several computerized bombing raids. and you also mentioned that slight deviations in speed, wind, human frailties, could produce significant deviations from the target, which means that the bombings that were computerized against significant military facilities could have ended up killing many innocent people in and around the area. lf that is true, was there ever any effort on the part of the cmnd, the higher-echelon officers, to discuss the reality of the policy that they had established? 1 level policy was established and you indicated that the reality was something different. Was there ever any discussion of these problems or was it just considered to be standard operating procedure to function the way you described it?

FLOYD: No, I don't think there was any great deal of discussion about the policies. The only discussions that would come down, or that we would have ourselves would be when we were assigned specific targets by the 7th USAF.

and there seemed to be a kind of rivalry between the USMC and the USAF in targeting. When the A6 1st came to Vietnam, it was probably, outside of the B52, the most sophisticated bombing aircraft we have and the most accurate. and it had an inherent error of 600 feet. You can get closer than that with a very good BN, a very good peaked-up system. and many times you get farther than that away.

The USAF had the F-105s. I talked to USAF personnel who worked at 7th USAF Hqs, who said there was a kind of study going on, as far as comparison of the 2. and the F-105 I think had an inherent error above 1500 feet.

Initially they would give us targets which were nonradar significant to hit, which were sheer stupidity, because we were a radar bomber going at night, and if we couldn't pick something up on radar we couldn't hit it, but the bombs were dropped anyway, because once you release the bombs, we were already at maximum power, and many times evading flak, you hit your initial point, turn into your target, and say it is 8 miles, well, 4 miles from the target or 5 miles it may get so heavy, you will go ahead and drop the bombs and go.

Normally the system set up with bombardier-navigator had into the computer, we had a computer system that also aided in navigation and a dopler. and if he made a mistake there, there is another chance of error. But once all of this was done, and we had the computer into an attack stage, all I had to do was pull the commit trigger on the stick and follow the pathway up here that the computer was presenting me on my little TV set, and whenever the computer said it was time, it released the bombs and then we could shut the drops and go. But that was the only discussion I can think of as far as policy. where was discussion of the stupidity of some of the policies, assigning targets, this type of thing.

DELLUMS: On behalf of myself and the members of the Committee, I would like to thank you very much for coming forward and I commend you on your courage.

I think your testimony has been extremely clear. I appreciate the preparation and extremely detailed presentation. My hope is your testimony will be heard at some point in time when we might have official hearings. I thank you very much.

FLOYD: I thank you for listening. after lobbying certain congressmen, 1 begins to get a little frustrated that anyone on the Hill will listen at all.

DELLUMS: Most of us feel the same frustration, but we keep on going.

Dellums (House of Representatives) War Crimes Hearings Wednesday, 4-28-71, Washg'tn, DC Testimony Of Charles David Locke, Mortarman, 11th Bgd, Americal Div Wheaton, Maryland

LOCKE: My name is Charles Locke, I am 20 years old, and I am from Wheaton, Maryland. I joined the Army when I was 17, in 11-67.

I went to Ft Bragg for basic training and to Ft Jackson for AIT. Now at Ft Jackson our motto was, you know, before you sit down

DELLUMS: AIT, is that Advanced Infy Training?

LOCKE: Yes. Now before we could sit down to listen to a sermon on how to kill people, we had to stand up and scream, "Kill, kill and kill without mercy." Well, in 1-69 I went to Vietnam. I was in Echo Company. From E-Company I went to D Comp and to Charlie Company. I left Vietnam in 7-70.

While I was in C-Company, we had a short-range patrol. The company was in a night logger.

We left the next day. Well, the company went up the mountain and they dropped us in the bushes. There was 6 of us. We were supposed to sit and wait for dinks who might come along and pick up the food and trash that we left behind.

Well, so we set around for about 2 hours and finally they called down from the mountaintop and said they found 4 dinks moving into our might longer, at which time we lit out of there and went after them.

When we caught up to them we fired at them. 1 was killed - he wasn't really killed, he was shot through the shoulder and through the jaw. He was wounded.

We stopped and called the Col and told him we has 1 wounded dink, you know, and that we wanted him to send a chopper. The Col says, "Is that what I heard you say? Wounded?" and the Sgt said, "No." and they blew his head off.

Before we Left on this mission the Capt of the company had told us definitely do not take any POWs. He didn't want to hear about any POWs. He wanted a body-count. He said he needed 7 more bodies before he could get his promotion to major.

Well, after we blew this dink's head off we spread-eagled the body so that when rigor mortis set in it couldn't be buried in the traditional way.

Well, when we spread the body out, there was a grenade placed under his stomach as a booby trap so if anybody moved the body it would also get them.

Well, his ear was cut off and that was presented to the LT as sort of a war gift. But after this all occurred, our position was given away and the dinks knew we were down there. It was a small patrol, and they knew that the dinks were in the area, so we called in for a liftoff to get us out of there to marry up with our company.

Well, the Col said that we had to get 2 more bodies for his body-count, and he would get us a chopper in there then.

Well, we told him then that we were out of ammo. The machine gun had none and the M-79 had none. But there was only a few rounds for the M-I6 and the M-14.

Well, he said, "Get 1 more dink and we will try to get more ammo in there." Well, it ended up dark almost before they decided to fly in his chopper. He flew around the area about 3 times. Well, he came down as close as 10 feet to the ground, at which time he started kicking the ammo off the chopper which contained the M-79 rounds, which are the grenades. Also the M-I6 rounds, the Claymores and anything else explosive.

He was kicking it off the chopper at us. Well, the chopper started taking off then and before we got the last case of ammo off, it had stuck to the chopper, and of course he got scared.

Then he told the chopper pilot to leave. Well, this was in a FREE-FIRE ZONES, which was that anything moving, anything east of the railroad tracks or west of the railroad tracks, rather, was the FREE-FIRE ZONES.

Also all along the "Gaza Strip," which is the area, it is the farthest area east along the beach.

But those were both FREE-FIRE ZONESs, and if you see anything at all, man, woman, child or animal, you kill it. Any vills, you burn them. Any food, you destroy it or have it lifted out.

West of the red mall - which is the main road that goes through there there are some railroad tracks and between railroad tracks and the mountains there are some paddy fields which the dinks use to grow the food and everything.

Well, that is a FREE-FIRE ZONES between 6am and 6pm Anybody out there after 6 o'clock at night is to be killed, and you don't ask questions or anything.

By the way, 1 dink we did get, he was wearing a pair of black pajama bottoms. He had no ID, no weapons, nothing. He was carrying around a sackful of burned C ration cans, ripped up bars of soap, and other kinds of stuff like that.

Well, the 3 of them that got away - well, the company was on the hill and was going to mortar them, so they mortared us instead. Anyway, along the mountain edge we were ordered to set out mousetraps, which are booby traps with a rattrap in it as a detonating device.

We set out approx 25-30 Claymores per night. Anybody walking by there would trip it off and set off 4-5 Claymores going in every direction.

1 night we left a day logger removing a couple clicks south to a night logger and we set up 4 Claymore mines by a pile of trash. We left the trash behind of course and we put the Claymores there because we figured the dinks would come in, rather the Capt figured that.

We told him that the only persons that might come in there would be kids.

So we had to stay late to keep the kids away from it until it got dark.

Then we spent 3 hours trying to find the company at night.

We left at 5:30 to pick up the booby traps the next morning and on the way up there we saw an old lady, and she was out hoeing, and it was about 15 minutes before 6 in the morning, so we walked over to her and beat her up and threw her in the paddy.

We got up there to where we had placed the booby traps and there was about 10 kids on the perimeter. For some reason they had not used that path to walk on. They went some other way to come in there. They did not know that the booby trap was there because we discontinued the Claymore mines and left the detonating devices hooked up, and we chased the kids out and 5-6 of them ran through there and set it off and blew the detonating devices, which scared the hell out of them.

But we told the Capt that those kids could set it off because we knew they would be there early in the morning to get what they could. He said he didn't care about that.

As I said, the Capt had to get 7-8 more dinks before he could be put in for major. I did witness the systematic destruction of at least 10 vills which was - you go on a mission and you get choppered into an area. You are in 3 forces, forming a triangle around the vill.

2 of the forces sit and wait, 1 sweeps through and kills and burns everything.

People or anything. Just to get rid of it. It's not supposed to be there.

Well, when you come by a bunker, you either throw in a fragmentation inside it or you crawl 1/2 into it and throw a Claymore mine in it and set back and detonate the mine. Anybody in it, that's their grave. They are never even pulled out of there.

The booby trap, we booby-trapped some dead bodies along the edge of the mountain and all the bodies that I ever saw booby-trapped, they were never let's say de-mined, because they were just left like that. As far as I know, there are a few over there with grenades under their bellies right now.

Dellums (House of Representatives) War Crimes Hearings Thursday, 4-29-71, Washg'tn, DC Testimony of Elliot L Meyrowitz E/4 C/2/502, 1st Bgd, 101st Airborne Div, C Company, 502nd Chapel Hill, NV

MEYROWITZ: My name is Elliot Meyrowitz. I served with the 1st Bgd, 101st Airborne Div, C Comp, 502d Infy, from 12-65 to 12-66.

During that time I was a Specialist 4, Class E-4, and I was point man in C Comp. Since my return to the US I have gone to college, graduated ad under the disabled vets retraining program.

While in Vietnam, operating north of Tuy Hue in the IICTZ area in Aug, Sept, and 11-66, I personally have committed the following crimes:

On an occasion in a FREE-FIRE ZONES we proceeded to attack and kill an indiv man only on the assumption that he was a suspect VC. I personally pulled the trigger and killed the man, We had no proof that he was a VC other than the fact that our Sgt told us to go and get him. We proceeded in the same, approx 1 mile, myself, another indiv, and a Sgt with 1 magazine of ammo, 20 rounds, and killed this man without making any attempt to capture him. When we searched the body we found no weapon, which we saw he hadn't to begin with, no weapon, had no info and the only thing he had on was a pair of black pajamas.

In a mathematical society as the US, Vietnam is very easily the greatest indices of mathematical equations, because in Vietnam all people who wore black pajamas are VC.

In the same area, which is a FREE-FIRE ZONES, we entered a vill, we were told it was all VC, all of the people were VC, the villagers were VC, hence we searched, destroyed the vill, burned it down. This was ceased when the Bn cmdr found out about it because it Left too many marks.

But on other occasions when going into a vill, we either roughed the place up by breaking up the thatched huts or destroyed the people's valuables that they kept where they lived.

On another occasion I personally dug up 4 graves which were all counted in the body-count.

On another occasion we captured supposedly suspects, 4 men and 1 woman, the woman was known as a prostitute, the 4 were known as VC, we had no proof of that. They were roughed around, they tried to run away, 1 man was shot, I personally took him and - threw him not on a med-evac chopper, but on a regular chopper. I threw him. That is mishandling POWs of war.

Another instance, in our unit, we placed the ace of spades many times on the bodies of the Vietnamese to signify that they did not reach the final conclusion of their life according to their religion.

Another occasion occurred that I knew about, but did not see, but it was known in the platoon to have occurred, a Sgt who killed an individual civilian in the presence of a Lt by knifing him 16 times.

Another occasion was while searching for water 1 day on the point, I saw a woman, I asked her to come here, I said, "Lade lade" which means "come here" in Vietnamese she attempted to run away, I had my weapon on the automatic, I fired 1 round, it jammed and didn't kill her. But there is no doubt in my mind that I could have killed her as easily as I killed the other civ.

Now briefly I want to say that was a description of my behavior in the years 65-66. But not and explanation of my behavior.

The explanation of my behavior could probably be looked at in terms of things such as the dichotomies that exist in the US in terms of racism. If you are not for me, you are against me, love it or leave it, black-white, etc.

Vietnam and my indiv involvement and participation in war crimes is a logical extension, and inevitable consequence of attitudes that have been developed in the US since the turn of the Revolution in 1776. We have developed a country wherein violence had been the sole means and justification for doing anything, to such an extent that we have reduce all responsibility for our actions to some structure called the system, the establishment or the institutions involved.

Still we have derived a basis of indiv guilt based on an Anglo-Saxon law system that says the indiv is guilty for his actions.

Inherent in this statement is the fact that somewhere along the line the person had an indiv from of reference, within which I could make X essential choice of good or bad, evil, right or wrong. This is a bunch of crap.

In the Amer corporate structure, there is only 1 logical consequence for an indivs behavior and that is success, and success is determined by how much money you can procure, whether legally or illegally. And the power is vested in those people in Congress and upper echelons of the society.

Now I am an average citizen of the USA that was, I would say, unquestionably fully believing in the institutions of the US, allowed to be manipulated so I would carry out policies of some higher order of the US to such an extent that whatever personality or individual processes of decisionmaking that were mine were no longer mine, but diffused to some higher authority or power structure which afforded me certain benefits in society.

Now to show you a brief example, in the US legal system - and I know many congressmen are lawyers - an individual is guilty for individual bankruptcy. But if a corporation made up of individuals declares bankruptcy, the corporation or the entity is responsible for the debts, not the indivs. The same thing here and I have heard it constantly, the fact about individual guilt, individual guilt.

I can say unqualifiedly that I have no question that my behavior in Vietnam was not a product of my individual decision-making but a product of a technologically advanced mass society which wants to produce, and desires conformity to some kind of material reinforcement, and this conformity is based on that assumption that this society can provide materialistic statistics and indices of progress and advancement for the individual and for the society.

The US, and directly related to this is the question of racism, that is another question that has come up constantly. There is no difference in the world between gook, nigger, spic, Jew, kike, or whatever the case may be, and racism. That is it. That is exactly where it is. It is the same thing.

Amer policy in Vietnam that refers to people as Vietnamese, that means you have some respect for their culture. To refer to them as gooks, slopes, or slant eyes is to say there is a degrading meaning, and the only way we can confront their culture and their society on the field of battle is to massively use technological advances to destroy the people.

We are willing to use all the deceits of statistical worth to show we are winning the war. But when it gets down to it, the war still goes on and the people are still killing Amer soldiers.

So the question has to be asked: How persuasive is the NFL and the NV?

So that in conclusion, within a 5-minute limit, I think that the whole question of individual guilt is a misnomer in Amer society. Calley is not guilty of anything other than carrying out the implicit and explicit policies of US Congress, US mili, US corporate structure, the US bureaucracy. Calley never had the opportunity or the framework within which he could make X essential choices or even moral choices, if you want to use that word, in an immoral world.

Never in my time in the mili, my 3 years, of which at 1 time I was going to go to West Point, and I had, I was in West Point Prep Schl for 8 months, was I ever given training on rules of warfare, Nuremberg trials, handling POWs of war or anything like that which SW Morwin said in a poem, about the person that they want to reenlist again.

and, if it came to another war, which no doubt will occur some time in the future of Amer society, because the Congress is not responding to this war, and I doubt seriously in the future if it will respond to another type of war, which will occur and has occurred in the past. For example, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Lebanon, etc, where there has been a concentration of Amer military solely determined by the Executive, so that the only thing I can say is that I am a disgruntled Amer vet, who sees the inevitable consequence of the frustrations and anxieties built up in the hallowed halls of influence in Congress.

I possibly see the only inevitable consequence that the vets may possibly, if continued to be frustrated, pushed into corners of questions of personal guilt, problems of psychiatric questioning, and questions of whether they can find a job in, and blend into Amer society, may very possibly become - and I say this with no doubt in my mind - a rev'ny vanguard.

I don't want to be a harbinger of doom, nor prosecutor of the future, but no longer will we be existing in this society, and no longer will we be fed the crumby C rations of ideological crap.

Hence, the vets, and those people like myself, who have committed war crimes in the name of democracy, morality, Christianity, Judaism, whatever the case may be, were no longer fed the myths of the 19th Century cowboy Amer.

We want people to know this, but sometimes it seems that dissemination of info in the US resides within the hands of the deciding elite. Hence, it may very possibly become necessary in the US that the vets become a proselytizer of a new religion, and what that religion is, I do not know. The only thing I know is that somewhere in the cosmic order, not the 1 made by the technological advanced society of Amer, the natural cosmic order, that the vet has a deep-seated responsibility to assume some necessary point to determine the direction of the US.

Thank you.

Dellums (House of Representatives) War Crimes Hearings Wednesday, 4-28-71, Washg'tn, DC Statement Of Terry Mullen 1/20 Bn, 11th Bgd, Americal Div Racine, WI

MULLEN: I am Terry Mullen from Racine, WI. I think Gary is right in this whole thing, where the thing of the atrocities is really not what matters here today...

We know all this happens. You could sit here and listen to everything, and we could tell you - we could write a book on the war, but that's not really the book we're after. The thing is, why did it start? I aim sure there are atrocities in every war but - Okay, I remember going into basic and the 1st thing that hits you is that they take away from you any individuality you had and put you in a mass. That mass they tell you, they tell you in this situation that you are the legs and they are the head. You don't think.

You don't do anything but alt. From there on it goes. You are in it.

If you are smart you will go along with it because it's the only way out, so you go along with it. You go through the basic training and AIT and you are then in a dream world. You don't believe this is going on, but there it is.

and there's no way out. Before you know it you get your orders for Vietnam. and then everything bursts open. Right away you hit Vietnam and the rockets start coming in and you find out it's the real thing, you know?

and then you've got to make a decision. You have to go along with it over there, to live, or else you can't make it. Any moral questions in your mind about the whole thing, you just have to put those out of your mind because the fact is they ask you to do it and it's the real thing. So you go along with this for a while and you just can't ask any questions. For instance, as soon as I got in the field I was scared stiff. I didn't know what I was going to do or what was going on. All I could think of was that I had to learn what they were doing, which I couldn't question if it was good or bad. So I went along with it and right away I could see these guys, the only thing was they were all depressed and angry and it's just something you can't put your finger on.

The more dinks you kill, goes the motto, the more safer it is for you, and the sooner you get to going home. So you went along with it. You couldn't question it.

As time went on, you could just see this developing. The 1st time I went to a vill, these guys had been out there now for 10 months, but it was my 1st day there. But the 1st thing that happened was we walked into a vill. Now they told me about the dinks and the gooks and what you had to do, and how you take over the whole vill. Well, they took over the whole vill and took anything they wanted. This was it. This was the pattern of the war. This is what went on.

I could tell you atrocities and incidents, and of course you have heard them all day long. It's not a question of what really it is. It's the shock treatment you get when you go in the Army and they put it to you. You do this or you're going to die. If you follow our rules, good or bad, it's going to assure you a ticket home to your great Amer.

That was it. To me it was definitely bad. But what could you do? You have to go along. That was the thing. I was too much of a coward to do anything else. You feel you have to get up and do something about it, yet you want to come home alive. Sure these things went on every day. That was fact. Everybody here knows that. This is the fact. All these atrocities did happen.

DELLUMS: Thank you very much. Next is Steve Padoris.

Dellums (House of Representatives) War Crimes Hearings Wednesday, 4-28-71, Washg'tn, DC Testimony Of Steve Padoris 1/20, with Bgd, Americal Div Los Angeles, California

PADORIS: My name is Steve Padoris, and I am 23 years old. I am from California and I was drafted into the Army. I served with Delta Company, I/20, 11th Bgd, Americal Div. I served with this unit from 7-69 to 3-70, until which time I was - I ran into a, well, that was it. Throughout my military training it was more or less the idea was pounded into our heads that we were just part of the machine. Such as what the Army more or less taught us that from as long as we were with this institution, that they would do our thinking for us.

It was our job more or less just to follow along and do as they said. Another problem pounded into our head was the fact that only - - the only good dink is a dead dink, and once you do feet over there you can't trust any of the people because you really don't know whether they are good or bad because like a lot of the villagers, they are villagers by day and VC by night.

Getting on here, a couple of specific instances which I would like to bring out. When I 1st got into the unit, there was a lot of excitement, and no 1 knew what to expect, but on this particular day right after I got over there, my company had moved out and went and set up on a hill, but throughout the day my squad had set up on this 1 hooch and all of us was more or less there to rest up for the day. During which time, well, let's see - it seems like my squad Sgt, which was an E-5, had apparently lost his comb that he was carrying around with him. Later on through the day he realized he was missing his comb and he went back there to the little hooch that we had set up. But the other day, well, there had been 2 children probably 6-7 years old, this little boy and this little girl, and as it turned out it was actually the little girl that had taken the comb. But in the meantime when this Sgt had realized his comb was missing, he went back there and he started asking questions and messing with the boy and messing up his hair and slapping him around. He had some shaving cream and he was more or less - well, he covered the boy's head with the shaving cream and during this time the little kid was petrified. I didn't know what was going on at all because the Sgt, he started by pulling the kid's hair and tearing at his clothes. When the kid denied that he took the comb, he went into the hooch and started tearing the hooch apart. He was tearing up work clothes, throwing them on the ground, more or less just terrorizing the kid and destroying the hooch. Well, since I was more or less inexperienced over there, well, it was a shock to me but I thought he was doing an injustice to the kid. I really felt sorry for the kid. But a little while later while questioning the Sgt, a couple weeks before, that is, I had got into the company, my company had run into quite a bit of shit and had during this time, well the tension was built up inside of them. All of that was going along with it' My Sgt told me, when I started questioning him, somehow he knew that they had it, he said. But this little kid just kept it and my Sgt told me that, "Don't worry. We are going to get the info and the way to do that is to terrorize them." It was that kind of an attitude.

So about 20 minutes after he started working on this little boy, the little girl came back from the rice fields and when she got there her brother started talking to her and telling her would she give back the comb. This went on for about 10 minutes. Finally, after she saw the damage that had been done and how scared the little brother was, she finally went to he corner where she had hidden the comb and she broke: it out and gave it back to the Sgt. But he did finally get his comb back. That was just 1 little incident.

To get on with a couple other incidents here - I actually took part in some of the burning, at which time our job is to move the people that had more or less remained behind and send them out to the compound that they had set up on Route 1.

During this time all of us, our job mainly was to destroy like other hooches that were standing and destroy the food that was left behind and more or less destroy everything that was standing. But a lot of these people were reluctant to leave, at which time we had to more or less try to persuade them to leave. Some of these people was pretty stubborn and well, to get them to move anyplace you had to push them around and hit them and on a couple of different instances after we had set the hooches on fire and the people were still reluctant to leave, we kept - well, I think we couldn't believe what was happening. But they would run in and out of the hooch trying to get the rest of their possessions. The other incident that happened took place around, I think it was about Jan when my platoon was just leaving the LZ and we were heading south, but at this time we were working with this squad of ARVN's and these 2 POWs were taken when we were checking out the bunker and we found these 2, they were dressed as Buddhas, dressed up like that. So we brought these people to the military aides. Females about age 20.

At which time the ARVN's started interrogation and more or less that was beating them badly with the sticks they had. They did that for an hour and we finally started to move to some of the other hooches and the buildings, but our platoon leader was with us, this lt. Now this PFC wanted to check something out where the ARVN's found these people and he had been an ARVN, and he deserted and was now - this POW was now a VC, but he had come to a couple of different bunkers and I sent him in 1st in case they were booby-trapped.

On this 1 bunker they had to take this Claymore mine in to blow out the bunker. About the 2d bunker they sent him into it and they blew him up.

Well, this suspected VC, we got him, we had captured him. The ARVN's that was with us did. and we were the 1's there. Our job was to check out the fields and bunkers and that more or less was it. But as it turned out they sent him into 1 bunker to check it out and rather than take him back for more interrogation, say to higher-ups such as the LtCols at the base camps that we had set up, well, they just more or less killed him and rather than give him a chance to get back out of the bunker after he had taken these Claymores and was setting them in there to blow the bunker away, they just blew it before he had a chance to get out. Rather than take him as a POW, they decided to do a job on him. Just kill him.

BURTON: So this is a suspected VC who took the Claymore in the bunker?

PADORIS: Yes.

BURTON: and then the Claymore was detonated by whom? By the ARVN or by the Amer troops?

PADORIS: Well, I was there but I didn't actually see who did it. Well, I just assume it was the ARVN's. I think the attitude was, well, it wasn't I think it was just the genl feeling and attitude that it was done anyway. I don't think it really matters who actually did it. It was just more or less all of us involved.

DELLUMS: Does that conclude your testimony, Mr Padoris? Or do you have anything else?

PADORIS: Well, 1 other point that was mentioned before briefly was that there was 1 incident that my squad did not understand. Well, Mr Notley had testified before on this incident that the squad was out on a sneak, and all of these VC, a squad size of VC had come up the trail and was more or less standing around their positions and later on went into the other area. Well, they fired at them. But later the squad went back to the platoon and we moved out into this hill. I believe he mentioned, too, about the little boy that came running out. With most of these little kids it's really hard to tell.

Well, this little kid, like most of the kids that are there, was saying that I am GI #1 which means that you are really a good guy. But ave started asking him questions and he kept denying everything about the VC being there that night and from what I saw my squad Sgt was the 1 on guard when the VC came walking up and he was going to let us back into the vill. When this kid came out and after he questioned him and more or less he kept denying anything about the VC being there, he took, he just slapped him around pretty good.

A couple different times the kid flipped off the dike. He was hit just so hard. But to me it brings to mind in my personal opinion he was - I believe that this incident is more or less the same type that Lt Calley was involved. I believe this was more or less the same type of situation because he went, well, they hid behind everything. When you are there and the people are lying to you, it just is difficult.

Let's see, before I go on with this incident, my attitude and feelings were, to the people over there, were exactly - I couldn't care less what happened to any of them because I had buddies and friends shot and killed, wounded, too.

But it just all - it is a feeling that I have. I just have that feeling. I could actually care less whether they lived or whether they died. I think that the people themselves over there could even give us, about Amers being there because only - they think or they are interested in only raising their crops. They are more or less being self-sufficient, which is their only interest. They wanted to be left alone. I think the thing to do, well, I can't actually see why we are over there. I think that's it.

Dellums (House of Representatives) War Crimes Hearings Thursday, 4-29-71, Washg'tn, DC Opening Statements Testimony of John Sack The Committee met at 9:45am in the Caucus Room, Cannon House Office Building, the Honorable Ronald V Dellums, Chmn of the Committee, presiding.

Present: Representatives James Abourezk, Bella S Abzug, Jonathan B Bingham, Shirley Chisholm, John Conyers, Jr, Ronald V Dellums, Don Edwards, Robert W Kastenmeier, Abner J Mikva and John F Seiberling.

DELLUMS: The hearing will be in order. I Notice that this morning we have students from Kennedy High Schl observing the hearings. We would like to welcome you. Before we begin, I would like to make a few remarks for the record. When we began these hearings the requested the presence af all the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1965-67, who refused to come.

We invited the Nat'l Security Council from 65-67 they did not come. and we invited the foreign policy advisers back several years, who chose not to come. We also invited all of the generals whose names may not have been mentioned in the past several days, and I will read a brief paragraph from the SecDefense in response to our request for the presence of the generals.

"It is the intention of the DoD to keep the Congress fully informed on matters affecting nat'l security, working in an orderly manner through those standing committees designed by Congress itself as being responsible for defense matters.

The tragedy with that paragraph is no standing committee has seen fit to hold open hearings on the war atrocities in SEA. It just goes to point out, the difficulty that we have in trying to get the military to come forward to discuss the war crimes and atrocities in Indochina.

This morning is the final day of the testimony in this particular set of hearings and it will concern itself with the air war and pacification. We also requested the presence of Lt Calley before these hearings, and he was not free to come.

However, we do have Mr John Sack, author of the Confessions of Lt Calley, who is probably his closest confidant, a person who has spent more time with Lt Calley in recent weeks and months than perhaps even his own defense.

We have Mr Sack here with us this morning, and he would like to make a brief statement in regard to Lt Calley.

Statement Of John Sack

SACK: My name is John Sack. I am a writer. I went to Vietnam 5 years ago I wrote about that and, as you say, I have been very close to Lt Calley since then. Lt Calley wants to be here today he wants to testify here today he can't do that, of course, and I am very grateful to the Committee for letting me say something to you about him.

You met those other people from his Bgd, from his company yesterday, very beautiful people. I promise you Lt Calley is a person very much like them.

Idealistic, and intelligent, and sensitive, and I know it sounds strange, but considerate and compassionate.

I remember once at the trial with all of his other troubles, 1 day a fed'l marshal came over and said, "I am serving these papers on you, the people of My Lai are suing you for $400,000,000." and Lt Calley's 1st reaction was concern for the fed'l marshal: "Gee, I hope you didn't have to come far out of your way I hope it wasn't trouble to you." The prosecution witnesses came on and almost all of them Lt Calley invited over to his apartment afterwards for a beer. His girlfriend said to him, "I can't understand it, these people crucify you and you invite them over." and he said to her, "They were ay buddies in Vietnam I don't want them going around the rest of their lives feeling, gee, I really did that guy dirt. I want them to know there is no hard feelings." Finally, Capt Medina testified, and Lt Calley told his lawyers, "Well, if anybody has to be thrown to the dogs, I am glad it is me, and not Medina, because Medina has a wife and children, and if he goes to Leavenworth, his wife and children will lose their allotment." So you take a guy like this, and you ask how could he have done something like that? What was his motive? and it is very strange, sir, because in 4 months of that trial the prosecutor never once brought up the question of motive. What was his motive? You know, was it raping and pillaging there?

There was a lot of rape and pillaging going on in My Lai.

No 1 ever said that Calley participated in this. Calley, was he some sort of monster? You go through the record of the trial, and I think it would probably come a foot-2 high now, and the very worst thing that anybody said about Calley during that trial was 1 soldier said, "I didn't like him I didn't dislike him." Was Calley insane? He had 67 psychiatrists, mili, civilian, defense, prosecution, and all of them said he was sane and normal. and the judge came up to him afterwards and said, "Congratulations, you are the only person in this courtroom who is legally sane.

So what was his motive? Why did he do it? I will tell you why he did it. He did it because the Amer people wanted him to do it. I know the Amer people will say no, no, I didn't want him to do that. I saw those pictures in LIFE magazine I saw those dead women and children. I didn't want him to do that. I wanted him to go to those Vietnamese vills and some of the people there, they are Communists, yes. I wanted him to kill them.

But some of those people there, they are anti-Communist, and I wanted him to say, good morning, and give them a cookie. and some of those people there, they don't know if they are Communists or not, and I wanted him to win their hearts and minds, Pres Nguyen Van Thieu, and the Amer people say I know it is a very hard job these people all look alike they all wear black clothes they are all chewing betel nuts and saying hello, GI.

I never said it would be easy, but all we wanted him to do was win the war, win the war. So what does it mean to Charlie Company, win the war. That company goes into a Vietnamese vill, and there is nobody there but 10 women and children. and a soldier goes up to 1 of those women and says, "Where are the other people in this vill?" She says "Khongbiet," I don't know. The soldier says if she doesn't know, she doesn't know.

They go out of that vill, and when they are 100 meters out of the vill, somebody starts shooting at them with an AK-47, a Sgt is hit and carried off in a chopper. The soldiers maneuver back into the vill and say to the women again, "Where are the VC?" "I don't know." The soldiers say this is a very strange vill, somebody shooting with an AK47, and nobody seems to know about it. and they go out of that vill again and there is noise and soldiers are lying around on the ground. and 1 soldier is there, his name was Wilson, he stepped on a mine and the mine slit him from the crotch up to his chest he had slit in half and fallen on the ground like an exhibit in an anatomical class. All of his organs were exposed there. and then Medina and the medic came and laid out a rubber poncho and put him on top of the poncho. But under the poncho there was another mine and he blew up in the air again and the medic was covered with blood and shaken and crying and the Capt had to slap him, knock him to the ground and very carefully when the medic wasn't looking, take a piece of liver off his religious medal.

and the soldiers saw this happen and they say, they know everyone in that vill knew about those mines. and, nobody in that vill told them about it. and nobody in that vill helped them. and nobody even came to them afterwards and said, "Gee, we are sorry about that." and the soldiers go to the people of that vill and say, "Where are the VC, please." "Khongbeit," I don't know.

and the Amer people keep saying win the war, win the war. and 1 soldier finally says, "All right, I will win this war. This vill, this country, I am going to burn it, every straw, every house, every haystack, I am going to burn it, napalm, I will win this war." and you heard, you know, the testimony yesterday that is what is going on in Vietnam, that is what is going on. and the govt, Army says, "Yes, it is going on, and we found the guy who has been doing it we got him. Calley. We are going to put him in prison the rest of his natural life. We are going to put all our sins upon him and crucify him, Calley Christ." But those soldiers yesterday told you it wasn't Calley who was doing it.

The soldiers yesterday, the beautiful people, when they came to Vietnam, a few months before they came to Vietnam, Calley himself had said, "I am not going to do it any more," had gone up to his Col and, I am quoting, and told the Col, "I don't want to kill these people any more there must be a better way." When those soldiers yesterday came to their Bgd, Calley was the civic action officer, in charge of hospitals, medical aid, helping the farmers, getting them pigs, pig food. and every time there was an Amer attack, going up to the people afterwards and dusting them off and saying, "We are very sorry it happened, but we are really doing it for your own good." So there was 1 congressmen yesterday who said, who asked for amnesty for the draft resisters. Of course, he is right. and for amnesty for the people who are going to Canada, and, of course, he is right. I hope there would also be amnesty for Calley and for the 2 million other "Calleys" that Amer could go to them and say, "Forgive us. You gave us your faith you gave us your loyalty you gave us your service, and we delivered you into evil come with us now and help us to build a country that is dedicated to something higher than the deaths and the massacres of old men, women and children." Thank you.

DELLUMS: Thank you very much. I would like to introduce my colleague on my right, Congressmen John Conyers, of Michigan. Do you have any comments or questions?

CONYERS: Thank you, Mr Chmn. I was moved by this presentation. But did the Amer people tell Calley to do it?

SACK: Sir, if you know any other way that he could have accomplished, or the Americal Div could have accomplished their mission, I don't know about it.

You get to Vietnam and there is a sign there, the motto is "Win in Vietnam." I don't know, the soldiers don't know any other way of accomplishing that.

Other than the way they had to go about it. and some of them do what these soldiers did yesterday, and they drop out, they opt out.

Some of them just turn on with marijuana and heroin and say, I will try to get through the year. Some of them, I guess we have to say they are very naive, say, alright, I will try to do what the Amer people asked of me.

CONYERS: You may be right. On the other hand, it might be that they are given this impression. Because if you are right, I am wrong. My argument has been, since I have come to Congress, that the Amer people did not want the war in Vietnam, and do not want the war in Vietnam, and that 73% of them by impartial polling have indicated they want out of Vietnam, which tells me that is really a higher figure.

and so I would suggest to you that perhaps it is not the Amer people telling them but it is the Amer war machine telling them that the Amer people want war. That is, the Congress telling them that we want war, that we want them to commit war, that is the Pentagon telling them we want them to commit war. It is the Executive branch of this govt reiterating in its many ways this message that you suggest they heard. But it is not the Amer people.

SACK: I have enough love for the Amer people to agree with you 100%, yes, sir.

DELLUMS: Thank you.

DELLUMS: We have been joined to my far 1eft by Congressmen Seiberling from Ohio and Cngswmn Shirley Chisholm from NY.

Originally Congressmen Don Edwards was with us, but he had to leave in order to chair some hearings he is holding himself. Thank you very much we appreciate your comments and message from Calley.

Dellums (House of Representatives) War Crimes Hearings Wednesday, 4-28-71, Washg'tn, DC Testimony Of William Toffling 1/20 Bn, 11th Bgd, Americal Div Philadelphia, PE

TOFFLING: My name is William Toffling and I was born and raised in Philadelphia. At my basic training at Ft Bragg, NC, I remember when we were graduating from Basic, our 1st Sgt was telling us that people at the 11th Bgd with our MOS, which was infy, we would probably go to Vietnam and that "you would witness the killing of women and children and probably do this yourself." I also had my AIT at Ft Dix, NJ, and 1 time we had a class on how to interrogate POWs and we were told that if you get 2 POWs and they won't talk, you take them up in a chopper and throw 1 out and the other 1 will talk.

Well, I served with the Americal Div, the I/20, D Comp, Americal Div.

Well, 1 day while moving past the - on the 1st day in the field right off the South China Sea, I remember mama-san and a papa-san were there. Well, they were beaten up and thrown on the ground. I just couldn't believe this.

So I asked someone in my squad, I said, "Why do you do this? I don't understand it." He said, "When you have been here for a while and you see some of your friends killed, you will have the same attitude, " and this was the genl attitude of everyone in the company.

After we moved through that fishing vill we moved west. I was told that this was a FREE-FIRE ZONES and everything moving in this area was considered our enemy and that "you shoot to kill." Well, we spotted some people in the wood - line, and someone opened up with a M-16 on them. Well, no 1 was hit and we moved into the wooded area. Later we started searching out vills. You would go in there and look for papers or anything.

Usually the vill was torn up and people were beaten up while they were interrogated. I remember 1 time we went into a vill and we got some bamboo poles and we turned the pigs loose, and with the sharpened bamboo poles we killed them.

Someone was at the other end of the vill and they were chasing the ducks and the chickens out of the cages, and smashing them.

Well, also we were on a search and destroy mission and we moved into a vill before dark and a VC came out of the vill and he had a pistol belt on him and he was killed, and as they were firing at him there was a papa-san out there laying on his bed and he was also killed. Then we rounded up in the vill all the people, and we huddled them together on the ground.

2 GI's went over and he got this papa-san and he was about 70 years old, and beat him to death. Then several of the hooches were burned. Myself, I have taken part in a burning of vills in the 515 valley, an area just west of LZ Liz.

We would set ourselves in the center of the vill. The squad would be sent out and we would run clover - leaves. Each squad would burn so many vills.

Also I have witnessed the area northeast of Duc Pho.

Now the ground was bulldozed over there. Up here we have the area on the map, we have indicated all the bulldozed over lands. People were relocated then to a compound.

Also I have witnessed the killing of civilians. 1 time we were moving out and it was getting near dark and like from 6 o'clock in the morning it was to 6 o'clock at night, and everything moving outside the vill was considered your enemy.

So when it was getting dark there, we saw a mama-san and 2 children. I heard the interpreter say, "VC. VC." and they started firing at the mama-san and the 2 children and they were shot and later they were moved out.

Well, also I remember 1 time working with the engineers, and as we moved up to set up some booby traps there were 2 civilians, and we beat them up and we went into the day logger at that point.

I remember someone sitting up on a mound shooting at the people in the field, and I saw him kill a papa-san out there. Also I remember sometimes we were put on conveys and trucked up to Red Ball which is Route 1.

Mostly a pacified area. Everyone got on the truck, and they collected rocks and anything they could to throw at the people and as we went through the vills they were throwing the rocks at the civilians.

I remember 1 instance when this happened and I remember it was a mama-san who was hit in the head with a rock and she was killed.

Also I remember 1 time when we were set up in North OP. That is on OP with LZ Liz. We would sit there and people would be grazing their water buffalo and the cattle right outside our perimeter.

Well, we would shoot CS rounds into the buffalo and the cattle and we would also fare M-16 rounds at them. Also, I remember another instance where we moved into a vill, and it was a case where you would move out of the vill like the children would come running up as soon as you move out and they would try to get food from you, so we wired trip flares into the hooch.

Then the children would run across the doorway, and set off the flare. Well, we would set up this booby trap. The kids kept running into the hooches, of course, which would set off the hooch flares and burn the hooch down.

This 1 instance is about the last thing I have to say and it is while we were running patrols every day and we would have night ambushes every night, so you weren't able to pull proper ambushes.

Well, we would leave 1 man or so as guard because of course you weren't getting the proper amount of sleep so you had to have fewer guards so the rest could sleep.

So this 1 day we set up in this vill. I sat there and I fed this family and that night we set up an ambush outside the vill. 1 man was on guard and I was sleeping. Suddenly I heard some Vietnamese people talking. So I crawled over to the person on guard and I looked up and I could see - I don't know if they were NVA-VC, but there was a platoon-sized number of the enemy there.

There were 6 of us there and we had nowhere to go. Well, we radioed in that we were surrounded, and there were these people only 10-15 meters from us.

They were so close we could hear them talking. and I believe they knew we were there.

Well, he told us to blow the mines. Well, we told him that if we blew the mines we would never make it out of there alive. Well, he kept telling us to do it.

Well, so they moved into the area and they lit flares and anyway it turned out that the next morning we were moving toward this vill to see or to seek the weapons or rice and interrogate the people.

Well, there was this kid. I sat there and I had fed the kid all day, and he was walking along at dike, and he said hello to us and while the squad leader, well, he grabbed the kid and started beating him up.

He put a .45 up to his head and then he cocked the hammer and he said, "Was there VC in his vill last night?" and the kid said, "No, there wasn't." Then we beat him up and then I realized that he wasn't going to tell us that his father, that his father was in their vill that night.

Were they going to tell us that their husbands were there?

That's all I have to say.

DELLUMS: Thank you very much.

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